In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned()
Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back
in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned
accesses.
For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the
destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory,
and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM
handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page
offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining
bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with
appropriate offsets).
If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second
page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the
MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd
at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the
store as a potential ioeventfd signal.
Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page
starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled
ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using
&dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being
32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires.
E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8,
all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON()
fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm]
kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm]
vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm]
emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm]
emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM
x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0.
Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice,
dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C,
e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove
The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained
handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver
removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are
not removed.
The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by
generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the
driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and
kernel crash.
The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and
syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious
interrupts accessing freed memory.
Fix these issues by:
- Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the
core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove()
is called
- Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state
Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp
registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the
hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree()
in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside
attach_hdlc_protocol().
The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so
detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the
kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(),
is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the
->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A
ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the
kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory,
leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on
every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev)
before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync()
now runs on both free paths.
timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the
keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and
shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown.
Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is
attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so
that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and
ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list
structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so
struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first
timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol
without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync()
operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of
ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the
initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list
twice.
This bug was found by static analysis.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure
nfs4_alloc_stid() publishes the new stid into cl->cl_stateids via
idr_alloc_cyclic() under cl_lock before returning to
nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(). When nfsd4_layout_setlease() then
fails, the error path frees the layout stateid directly with
kmem_cache_free() without ever calling idr_remove(), leaving the
IDR slot pointing at freed slab memory. Any subsequent IDR walker
(states_show, client teardown) dereferences the dangling pointer.
The correct teardown for an IDR-published stid is nfs4_put_stid(),
which removes the IDR slot under cl_lock, dispatches sc_free
(nfsd4_free_layout_stateid) to release ls->ls_file via
nfsd4_close_layout(), and drops the nfs4_file reference in its
tail.
A second issue blocks that switch: nfsd4_free_layout_stateid()
unconditionally inspects ls->ls_fence_work via
delayed_work_pending() under ls_lock, but
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ls->ls_fence_work, ...) currently runs only
after the setlease call. On the setlease-failure path the
destructor would touch an uninitialized delayed_work.
nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid()
nfs4_alloc_stid() /* idr_alloc_cyclic under cl_lock */
nfsd4_layout_setlease() /* fails */
nfs4_put_stid()
nfsd4_free_layout_stateid()
delayed_work_pending(&ls->ls_fence_work) /* needs INIT */
nfsd4_close_layout() /* nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file) */
put_nfs4_file()
Fix by hoisting the ls_fenced / ls_fence_delay / INIT_DELAYED_WORK
initialization above the nfsd4_layout_setlease() call, and replace
the manual nfsd_file_put + put_nfs4_file + kmem_cache_free cleanup
with a single nfs4_put_stid(stp).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: core: fix adapter registration race
Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter()
which takes a reference to the embedded struct device.
Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been
initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised
data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free.
Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier,
currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the
IDR before registration.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: omap2: fix use-after-free in omapfb_mmap
omapfb_mmap() has a race condition with OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE ioctl that
can lead to use-after-free:
The fb_mmap() entry point holds mm_lock but not lock (fb_info->lock),
while ioctl handlers like OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE hold lock but not mm_lock.
This allows concurrent execution.
In omapfb_mmap():
1. rg = omapfb_get_mem_region(ofbi->region); // Get old region ref
2. start = omapfb_get_region_paddr(ofbi); // Read from NEW region
3. len = fix->smem_len; // Read from NEW region
4. vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len); // Map NEW region memory
5. atomic_inc(&rg->map_count); // Increment OLD region!
Concurrently, OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE can:
- Reassign ofbi->region = new_rg
- Update fix->smem_len
- OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM then checks NEW region's map_count (0!) and frees it
This leaves userspace with a mapping to freed physical memory.
The fix is to read all required values (start, len) from the same
region reference (rg) that will have its map_count incremented,
preventing the region from being freed while still mapped.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr
nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a
netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately
calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes
use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only
"nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string.
When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline()
returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its
"*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value
of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is
strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from
any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised
metadata server.
Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with
-EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of
panicking the client.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/flexfiles: reject zero filehandle version count
ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count
from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for
kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL.
A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in
dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at
least one filehandle version exists.
Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero
version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser.
A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750
ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970
nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic,
and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: zero-initialize GART table on allocation
GART TLB is flushed after unmapping but not after mapping. Since
amdgpu_bo_create_kernel() does not zero-initialize the buffer, when a
single PTE is written the TLB may speculatively load other uninitialized
entries from the same cacheline. Those garbage entries can appear valid,
and a subsequent write to another PTE in the same cacheline may cause the
GPU to use a stale garbage PTE from the TLB.
Fix this by calling memset_io() to zero-initialize the GART table with
gart_pte_flags immediately after allocation.
Using AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, SDMA-based clear will not work
since SDMA needs GART to be initialized to work.
(cherry picked from commit d9af8263b82b6eaa60c5718e0c6631c5037e4b24)