A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app that enables a man in the middle attacker to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This vulnerability is triggered during the processing of requests and responses exchanged between Portal and Gateway.
The GlobalProtect app on iOS is not affected.
Multiple local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app allow a local user to escalate their privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows and root on macOS and Linux. This enables a non-administrative user to execute arbitrary commands with administrative privileges.
The GlobalProtect app on iOS, Android, Chrome OS and GlobalProtect UWP app are not affected.
An improper access control vulnerability in the Endpoint Traffic Policy Enforcement https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/globalprotect/6-0/globalprotect-app-new-features/new-features-released-in-gp-app/endpoint-traffic-policy-enforcement feature of the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app allows certain packets to remain unencrypted instead of being properly secured within the tunnel.
An attacker with physical access to the network can inject rogue devices to intercept these packets. Under normal operating conditions, the GlobalProtect app automatically recovers from this interception within one minute.
A vulnerability with a privilege management mechanism in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app on Windows devices allows a locally authenticated non-administrative Windows user to escalate their privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However, execution requires that the local user can also successfully exploit a race condition, which makes this vulnerability difficult to exploit.
A privilege escalation vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app on Windows allows a locally authenticated non-administrative Windows user to escalate their privileges to NT AUTHORITY/SYSTEM through the use of the repair functionality offered by the .msi file used to install GlobalProtect.
DHCP can add routes to a client’s routing table via the classless static route option (121). VPN-based security solutions that rely on routes to redirect traffic can be forced to leak traffic over the physical interface. An attacker on the same local network can read, disrupt, or possibly modify network traffic that was expected to be protected by the VPN.