An improper access control vulnerability in the Endpoint Traffic Policy Enforcement https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/globalprotect/6-0/globalprotect-app-new-features/new-features-released-in-gp-app/endpoint-traffic-policy-enforcement feature of the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app allows certain packets to remain unencrypted instead of being properly secured within the tunnel.
An attacker with physical access to the network can inject rogue devices to intercept these packets. Under normal operating conditions, the GlobalProtect app automatically recovers from this interception within one minute.
An improper neutralization of wildcards vulnerability in the log collection feature of Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app on macOS allows a non administrative user to escalate their privileges to root.
An incorrect privilege assignment vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ App on macOS devices enables a locally authenticated non administrative user to disable the app.
The GlobalProtect app on Windows, Linux, iOS, Android, Chrome OS and GlobalProtect UWP app are not affected.
A vulnerability with a privilege management mechanism in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect™ app on Windows devices allows a locally authenticated non-administrative Windows user to escalate their privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However, execution requires that the local user can also successfully exploit a race condition, which makes this vulnerability difficult to exploit.
A vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect app on Windows allows a remote attacker to run ActiveX controls within the context of an authenticated Windows user. This enables the attacker to run commands as if they are a legitimate authenticated user. However, to exploit this vulnerability, the authenticated user must navigate to a malicious page during the GlobalProtect SAML login process on a Windows device.
This issue does not apply to the GlobalProtect app on other (non-Windows) platforms.
DHCP can add routes to a client’s routing table via the classless static route option (121). VPN-based security solutions that rely on routes to redirect traffic can be forced to leak traffic over the physical interface. An attacker on the same local network can read, disrupt, or possibly modify network traffic that was expected to be protected by the VPN.