It's possible for a gRPC client communicating with a HTTP/2 proxy to poison the HPACK table between the proxy and the backend such that other clients see failed requests. It's also possible to use this vulnerability to leak other clients HTTP header keys, but not values.
This occurs because the error status for a misencoded header is not cleared between header reads, resulting in subsequent (incrementally indexed) added headers in the first request being poisoned until cleared from the HPACK table.
Please update to a fixed version of gRPC as soon as possible. This bug has been fixed in 1.58.3, 1.59.5, 1.60.2, 1.61.3, 1.62.3, 1.63.2, 1.64.3, 1.65.4.
The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.
When gRPC HTTP2 stack raised a header size exceeded error, it skipped parsing the rest of the HPACK frame. This caused any HPACK table mutations to also be skipped, resulting in a desynchronization of HPACK tables between sender and receiver. If leveraged, say, between a proxy and a backend, this could lead to requests from the proxy being interpreted as containing headers from different proxy clients - leading to an information leak that can be used for privilege escalation or data exfiltration. We recommend upgrading beyond the commit contained inĀ https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005 https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005