RADIUS Protocol under RFC 2865 is susceptible to forgery attacks by a local attacker who can modify any valid Response (Access-Accept, Access-Reject, or Access-Challenge) to any other response using a chosen-prefix collision attack against MD5 Response Authenticator signature.
In freeradius, the EAP-PWD function compute_password_element() leaks information about the password which allows an attacker to substantially reduce the size of an offline dictionary attack.
In freeradius, when an EAP-SIM supplicant sends an unknown SIM option, the server will try to look that option up in the internal dictionaries. This lookup will fail, but the SIM code will not check for that failure. Instead, it will dereference a NULL pointer, and cause the server to crash.
It was discovered freeradius up to and including version 3.0.19 does not correctly configure logrotate, allowing a local attacker who already has control of the radiusd user to escalate his privileges to root, by tricking logrotate into writing a radiusd-writable file to a directory normally inaccessible by the radiusd user. NOTE: the upstream software maintainer has stated "there is simply no way for anyone to gain privileges through this alleged issue."
FreeRADIUS before 3.0.19 mishandles the "each participant verifies that the received scalar is within a range, and that the received group element is a valid point on the curve being used" protection mechanism, aka a "Dragonblood" issue, a similar issue to CVE-2019-9498 and CVE-2019-9499.
An FR-GV-202 issue in FreeRADIUS 2.x before 2.2.10 allows "Write overflow in rad_coalesce()" - this allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code.