In the COVIDSafe application through 1.0.21 for Android, unsafe use of the Bluetooth transport option in the GATT connection allows attackers to trick the application into establishing a connection over Bluetooth BR/EDR transport, which reveals the public Bluetooth address of the victim's phone without authorisation, bypassing the Bluetooth address randomisation protection in the user's phone.
Unnecessary fields in the OpenTrace/BlueTrace protocol in COVIDSafe through v1.0.17 allow a remote attacker to identify a device model by observing cleartext payload data. This allows re-identification of devices, especially less common phone models or those in low-density situations.
COVIDSafe through v1.0.17 allows a remote attacker to access phone name and model information because a BLE device can have four roles and COVIDSafe uses all of them. This allows for re-identification of a device, and potentially identification of the owner's name.
OpenTrace, as used in COVIDSafe through v1.0.17, TraceTogether, ABTraceTogether, and other applications on iOS and Android, allows remote attackers to conduct long-term re-identification attacks and possibly have unspecified other impact, because of how Bluetooth is used.