Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.
In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows
org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to
create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to
org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest.
Into deeper calling stacks,
org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked
through refection. This could lead to RCE through via
various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11.
1 Call newRecording.
2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it.
3 Call startRecording.
4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file.
The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia.
A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.
The Java OpenWire protocol marshaller is vulnerable to Remote Code
Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker with network
access to either a Java-based OpenWire broker or client to run arbitrary
shell commands by manipulating serialized class types in the OpenWire
protocol to cause either the client or the broker (respectively) to
instantiate any class on the classpath.
Users are recommended to upgrade
both brokers and clients to version 5.15.16, 5.16.7, 5.17.6, or 5.18.3
which fixes this issue.