`bhyveload -h <host-path>` may be used to grant loader access to the <host-path> directory tree on the host. Affected versions of bhyveload(8) do not make any attempt to restrict loader's access to <host-path>, allowing the loader to read any file the host user has access to. In the bhyveload(8) model, the host supplies a userboot.so to boot with, but the loader scripts generally come from the guest image. A maliciously crafted script could be used to exfiltrate sensitive data from the host accessible to the user running bhyhveload(8), which is often the system root.
grub2-bhyve, as used in FreeBSD bhyve before revision 525916 2020-02-12, does not validate the address provided as part of a memrw command (read_* or write_*) by a guest through a grub2.cfg file. This allows an untrusted guest to perform arbitrary read or write operations in the context of the grub-bhyve process, resulting in code execution as root on the host OS.
grub2-bhyve, as used in FreeBSD bhyve before revision 525916 2020-02-12, mishandles font loading by a guest through a grub2.cfg file, leading to a buffer overflow.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Station-To-Station-Link (STSL) Transient Key (STK) during the PeerKey handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) Peer Key (TPK) during the TDLS handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.