When Zabbix Agent was installed on Windows into a custom installation directory, the installer did not verify whether the selected directory had secure access permissions. If the target directory allowed unauthorized users to modify its contents, an attacker could place a malicious DLL that could later be loaded by the application, resulting in DLL sideloading. The installer has been hardened to detect potentially unsafe installation directories and now requires explicit user confirmation before proceeding with installation in such locations. This reduces the risk of accidental installation into directories with inappropriate permissions while preserving compatibility with existing deployment scenarios.
An authenticated administrator is able to crash Zabbix server or proxy by creating specifically crafted preprocessing/script item JavaScript scripts, leading to potential denial of service.
The email media OAuth field 'Client secret' cannot be read after saving, but a Super Admin can leak it by setting a malicious 'Token endpoint'. Changes were made to reset the client secret upon changing the token endpoint.
Prototype pollution vulnerability in searchParamsToObject() is leading to a persistent XSS in Maps. URL parameter processing was not filtering dangerous properties like __proto__, combined with jQuery's unsafe element creation that traversed the prototype chain.
An unauthenticated user is able to cause disproportionate CPU load on the Frontend webserver by sending specifically crafted requests to the Frontend popup.testtriggerexpr action, leading to potential denial of service.
The frontend validatate.api.exists action can be exploited by authenticated users to extract plaintext user macro values leading to potential loss of confidentiality.
In Zabbix 7.4 the cryptographic key used for signing Frontend sessions has been erroneously written to the database seed. Currently the only known exploitation scenario is for deployments that utilize both - SAML authentication and guest users. In such cases the key can be used to forge valid session cookies, potentially leading to unauthorized access. For other Zabbix deployments this does not have a known impact.
An authenticated user is able to cause disproportionate CPU load on the Frontend webserver by sending specifically crafted requests to the Frontend validate.api.exists action, leading to potential denial of service.
A Zabbix administrator is able to read out of bounds memory by utilizing a flaw in script item/preprocessing (JavaScript) HttpRequest logic, leading to potential confidentiality loss.