Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 4.1.0, the @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend package is affected by sensitive information exposure in scaffolder task logs. An authenticated user who can create and read scaffolder tasks may be able to observe sensitive values in task logs in deployments with restrictive action permissions and affected templates. Exploitation requires a denied action whose input contains such a value. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 1.14.6 and 1.15.4, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node package is affected by bypass of mkdocs configuration sanitizer in techdocs backend. Users with the ability to commit changes to a repository that uses TechDocs can circumvent the MkDocs configuration file sanitizer introduced in response to CVE-2026-25153 and execute arbitrary code on the TechDocs backend host during documentation generation. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.6 and 1.15.4.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 4.1.0, the @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend package is affected by improper input validation in scaffolder task list ordering. An authenticated Backstage user with permission to create and read relevant scaffolder tasks may be able to infer confidential task data under specific conditions. Successful exploitation requires retained task secrets, visibility of a target task, knowledge of the secret structure, and repeated requests. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 3.9.1, the @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend package is affected by inconsistent enforcement of allowed location types during catalog processing. Under certain configurations, the catalog backend could process location types that were not intended to be allowed, potentially leading to unintended file access on the backend host. This issue is fixed in version 3.9.1.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 3.9.1, the @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend package is affected by inconsistent catalog property permission evaluation. In deployments that use affected value-based catalog permission conditions as a confidentiality boundary, an authenticated user could receive catalog entity data that policy authors intended to restrict. This issue is fixed in version 3.9.1.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 3.5.1, 3.6.2, 3.7.2, 3.8.2 and 3.9.1, the @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend package is affected by improper url validation in catalog entity placeholder resolution. An authenticated Backstage user could craft a catalog entity with placeholder directives that reference resources outside the entity's source repository. Under certain configurations, this could allow access to data not intended to be available to the user. This issue is fixed in versions 3.5.1, 3.6.2, 3.7.2, 3.8.2 and 3.9.1.
Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 4.1.0, the @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend package could expose secret-derived values in Scaffolder task logs. Deployments that configure sensitive scaffolder.defaultEnvironment.secrets and allow an attacker to create or modify Scaffolder templates are affected. A template author could cause secret-derived values used during template iteration to be persisted and exposed to users who can access the resulting task logs. This issue is fixed in version 4.1.0.
The Gitea web route for deleting tags (`POST /{owner}/{repo}/tags/delete`) requires only write access to the Code unit, but shares its handler with release deletion and did not check that the target was a plain tag. A collaborator with Code write access and without Releases write access could permanently delete published releases of that repository, including their attachments. Protected tag rules covering the release tag still blocked the deletion.
The Gitea API routes for issue attachments (`/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/assets/{attachment_id}`) also accepted attachments that belong to comments on the issue. Because the author of an issue may edit and delete the issue's attachments, a user who opened an issue could rename or delete attachments that other users had posted in comments on that issue. The contents of the attachments could not be changed.
When migrating a repository from another Gitea instance, Gitea used the page size reported in the source server's API settings to end its paginated downloads. A source that reported `max_response_items` as `0` made these loops run indefinitely and grow server memory until it was exhausted. Any user who can migrate repositories could point a migration at a server they control and cause a denial of service.