Linux: >> Linux Kernel >> 2.6.15.8 Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fixed integer types and null check locations
[why]:
issues fixed:
- comparison with wider integer type in loop condition which can cause
infinite loops
- pointer dereference before null check
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-fc: avoid deadlock on delete association path
When deleting an association the shutdown path is deadlocking because we
try to flush the nvmet_wq nested. Avoid this by deadlock by deferring
the put work into its own work item.
CVSS Score
4.4
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: nvidia-shield: Add missing null pointer checks to LED initialization
devm_kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
[jkosina@suse.com: tweak changelog a bit]
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: ti: edma: Add some null pointer checks to the edma_probe
devm_kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().
syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0]
When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour
entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data.
The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so
the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes.
In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field,
arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's
not a problem.
However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN),
arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL)
in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get().
To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy().
Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible
array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller.
[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128
Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000
R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010
FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261
inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981
sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204
sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce
RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d
Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000
</TASK>
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Fix oob in ntfs_listxattr
The length of name cannot exceed the space occupied by ea.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Add NULL ptr dereference checking at the end of attr_allocate_frame()
It is preferable to exit through the out: label because
internal debugging functions are located there.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't drop extent_map for free space inode on write error
While running the CI for an unrelated change I hit the following panic
with generic/648 on btrfs_holes_spacecache.
assertion failed: block_start != EXTENT_MAP_HOLE, in fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 2695096 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc2+ #1
RIP: 0010:__extent_writepage_io.constprop.0+0x4c1/0x5c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
extent_write_cache_pages+0x2ac/0x8f0
extent_writepages+0x87/0x110
do_writepages+0xd5/0x1f0
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x63/0x90
__filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x5c/0x80
btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1f/0x50
btrfs_write_out_cache+0x507/0x560
btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x32a/0x420
commit_cowonly_roots+0x21b/0x290
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x813/0x1360
btrfs_sync_file+0x51a/0x640
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x52/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
This happens because we fail to write out the free space cache in one
instance, come back around and attempt to write it again. However on
the second pass through we go to call btrfs_get_extent() on the inode to
get the extent mapping. Because this is a new block group, and with the
free space inode we always search the commit root to avoid deadlocking
with the tree, we find nothing and return a EXTENT_MAP_HOLE for the
requested range.
This happens because the first time we try to write the space cache out
we hit an error, and on an error we drop the extent mapping. This is
normal for normal files, but the free space cache inode is special. We
always expect the extent map to be correct. Thus the second time
through we end up with a bogus extent map.
Since we're deprecating this feature, the most straightforward way to
fix this is to simply skip dropping the extent map range for this failed
range.
I shortened the test by using error injection to stress the area to make
it easier to reproduce. With this patch in place we no longer panic
with my error injection test.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix MST Null Ptr for RV
The change try to fix below error specific to RV platform:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2
Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022
RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? plist_add+0xbe/0x100
? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40
drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0
? _copy_to_user+0x25/0x30
? drm_ioctl+0x296/0x4b0
? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
drm_ioctl_kernel+0xcd/0x170
drm_ioctl+0x26d/0x4b0
? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x94/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f4dad17f76f
Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <89> c>
RSP: 002b:00007ffd9ae859f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e255a55900 RCX: 00007f4dad17f76f
RDX: 00007ffd9ae85a90 RSI: 00000000c03864bc RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007ffd9ae85a90 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c03864bc
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 000055e255a7fc60 R15: 000055e255a01eb0
</TASK>
Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_seq_device ccm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg joydev mousedev bnep >
typec libphy k10temp ipmi_msghandler roles i2c_scmi acpi_cpufreq mac_hid nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_mas>
CR2: 0000000000000008
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000
---truncated---
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2024-04-03
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler
The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing
user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides
to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in
ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another
register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus
trash whatever this register is used for.
Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd().
To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is
possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error
code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show
up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not
convert to an integer.
This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach:
We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word.
In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction
"or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler
choosed for the error return code.
In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and
can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and
the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register.
Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT
config option any longer.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2024-04-03