Linux: >> Linux Kernel >> 6.1.2 Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath9k: hif_usb: fix memory leak of remain_skbs
hif_dev->remain_skb is allocated and used exclusively in
ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(). It is implied that an allocated remain_skb is
processed and subsequently freed (in error paths) only during the next
call of ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream().
So, if the urbs are deallocated between those two calls due to the device
deinitialization or suspend, it is possible that ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream()
is not called next time and the allocated remain_skb is leaked. Our local
Syzkaller instance was able to trigger that.
remain_skb makes sense when receiving two consecutive urbs which are
logically linked together, i.e. a specific data field from the first skb
indicates a cached skb to be allocated, memcpy'd with some data and
subsequently processed in the next call to ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(). Urbs
deallocation supposedly makes that link irrelevant so we need to free the
cached skb in those cases.
Fix the leak by introducing a function to explicitly free remain_skb (if
it is not NULL) when the rx urbs have been deallocated. remain_skb is NULL
when it has not been allocated at all (hif_dev struct is kzalloced) or
when it has been processed in next call to ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: fix clear_user_rep_good() exception handling annotation
This code no longer exists in mainline, because it was removed in
commit d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory
clearing") upstream.
However, rather than backport the full range of x86 memory clearing and
copying cleanups, fix the exception table annotation placement for the
final 'rep movsb' in clear_user_rep_good(): rather than pointing at the
actual instruction that did the user space access, it pointed to the
register move just before it.
That made sense from a code flow standpoint, but not from an actual
usage standpoint: it means that if user access takes an exception, the
exception handler won't actually find the instruction in the exception
tables.
As a result, rather than fixing it up and returning -EFAULT, it would
then turn it into a kernel oops report instead, something like:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000020081000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
...
RIP: 0010:clear_user_rep_good+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S:147
...
Call Trace:
__clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:103 [inline]
clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:124 [inline]
iov_iter_zero+0x709/0x1290 lib/iov_iter.c:800
iomap_dio_hole_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:389 [inline]
iomap_dio_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:440 [inline]
__iomap_dio_rw+0xe3d/0x1cd0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:601
iomap_dio_rw+0x40/0xa0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:689
ext4_dio_read_iter fs/ext4/file.c:94 [inline]
ext4_file_read_iter+0x4be/0x690 fs/ext4/file.c:145
call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e0/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:733
do_iter_read+0x2f2/0x750 fs/read_write.c:796
vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:916
do_preadv+0x1b6/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1008
__do_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1070 [inline]
__se_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1061 [inline]
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1061
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
which then looks like a filesystem bug rather than the incorrect
exception annotation that it is.
[ The alternative to this one-liner fix is to take the upstream series
that cleans this all up:
68674f94ffc9 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory copies")
20f3337d350c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory clearing")
adfcf4231b8c ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory copies")
* d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don't use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory clearing")
3639a535587d ("x86: move stac/clac from user copy routines into callers")
577e6a7fd50d ("x86: inline the 'rep movs' in user copies for the FSRM case")
8c9b6a88b7e2 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'clear_user' function")
427fda2c8a49 ("x86: improve on the non-rep 'copy_user' function")
* e046fe5a36a9 ("x86: set FSRS automatically on AMD CPUs that have FSRM")
e1f2750edc4a ("x86: remove 'zerorest' argument from __copy_user_nocache()")
034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite '__copy_user_nocache' function")
with either the whole series or at a minimum the two marked commits
being needed to fix this issue ]
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during error recovery
While the error recovery work is temporarily failing reconnect attempts,
running the 'nvme list' command causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference
by calling getsockname() with a released socket.
During error recovery work, the nvme tcp socket is released and a new one
created, so it is not safe to access the socket without proper check.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: radio-shark: Add endpoint checks
The syzbot fuzzer was able to provoke a WARNING from the radio-shark2
driver:
------------[ cut here ]------------
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3271 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3271 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x1880 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:504
Code: 7c 24 18 e8 00 36 ea fb 48 8b 7c 24 18 e8 36 1c 02 ff 41 89 d8 44 89 e1 4c 89 ea 48 89 c6 48 c7 c7 a0 b6 90 8a e8 9a 29 b8 03 <0f> 0b e9 58 f8 ff ff e8 d2 35 ea fb 48 81 c5 c0 05 00 00 e9 84 f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003876dd0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff8880750b0040 RSI: ffffffff816152b8 RDI: fffff5200070edac
RBP: ffff8880172d81e0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8880285c5040 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff888017158200
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe03235b90 CR3: 000000000bc8e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
usb_start_wait_urb+0x101/0x4b0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:58
usb_bulk_msg+0x226/0x550 drivers/usb/core/message.c:387
shark_write_reg+0x1ff/0x2e0 drivers/media/radio/radio-shark2.c:88
...
The problem was caused by the fact that the driver does not check
whether the endpoints it uses are actually present and have the
appropriate types. This can be fixed by adding a simple check of
these endpoints (and similarly for the radio-shark driver).
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-sysman: Fix reference leak
If a duplicate attribute is found using kset_find_obj(),
a reference to that attribute is returned. This means
that we need to dispose it accordingly. Use kobject_put()
to dispose the duplicate attribute in such a case.
Compile-tested only.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function
When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump
back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function.
For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually
PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when
the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception
is triggered.
Here is a fault log:
Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000
sp : ffff80000c0c3a50
x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a
x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001
Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144
show_stack+0x24/0x7c
dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
panic+0x1cc/0x3ec
__el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130
el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0
el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0
__sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0
__arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54
invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0
do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0
el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
Kernel Offset: disabled
CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab
Memory Limit: none
And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD,
not PACIASP:
<bpf_fentry_test1>:
bti c
nop
nop
add w0, w0, #0x1
paciasp
For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled
kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass
the branch target check.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: fix wrong ct->timeout value
(struct nf_conn)->timeout is an interval before the conntrack
confirmed. After confirmed, it becomes a timestamp.
It is observed that timeout of an unconfirmed conntrack:
- Set by calling ctnetlink_change_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly added to `ct->timeout` twice.
- Get by calling ctnetlink_dump_timeout(). As a result,
`nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly subtracted.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
ctnetlink_dump_timeout
__ctnetlink_glue_build
ctnetlink_glue_build
__nfqnl_enqueue_packet
nf_queue
nf_hook_slow
ip_mc_output
? __pfx_ip_finish_output
ip_send_skb
? __pfx_dst_output
udp_send_skb
udp_sendmsg
? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag
sock_sendmsg
Separate the 2 cases in:
- Setting `ct->timeout` in __nf_ct_set_timeout().
- Getting `ct->timeout` in ctnetlink_dump_timeout().
Pablo appends:
Update ctnetlink to set up the timeout _after_ the IPS_CONFIRMED flag is
set on, otherwise conntrack creation via ctnetlink breaks.
Note that the problem described in this patch occurs since the
introduction of the nfnetlink_queue conntrack support, select a
sufficiently old Fixes: tag for -stable kernel to pick up this fix.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: microchip: fix potential UAF in auxdev release callback
Similar to commit 1c11289b34ab ("peci: cpu: Fix use-after-free in
adev_release()"), the auxiliary device is not torn down in the correct
order. If auxiliary_device_add() fails, the release callback will be
called twice, resulting in a UAF. Due to timing, the auxdev code in this
driver "took inspiration" from the aforementioned commit, and thus its
bugs too!
Moving auxiliary_device_uninit() to the unregister callback instead
avoids the issue.
CVSS Score
7.8
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: ov772x: Fix memleak in ov772x_probe()
A memory leak was reported when testing ov772x with bpf mock device:
AssertionError: unreferenced object 0xffff888109afa7a8 (size 8):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
80 22 88 15 81 88 ff ff ."......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<00000000faf48134>] v4l2_ctrl_handler_init_class+0x11d/0x180 [videodev]
[<00000000da376937>] ov772x_probe+0x1c3/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
[<00000000a9f2159d>] of_i2c_notify+0x100/0x160
unreferenced object 0xffff888119825c00 (size 256):
comm "python3", pid 279, jiffies 4294805921 (age 20.681s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 b4 a5 17 81 88 ff ff 00 5e 82 19 81 88 ff ff .........^......
10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff 10 5c 82 19 81 88 ff ff .\.......\......
backtrace:
[<000000009990b438>] __kmalloc_node+0x44/0x1b0
[<000000009e32f7d7>] kvmalloc_node+0x34/0x180
[<0000000073d88e0b>] v4l2_ctrl_new.cold+0x19b/0x86f [videodev]
[<00000000b1f576fb>] v4l2_ctrl_new_std+0x16f/0x210 [videodev]
[<00000000caf7ac99>] ov772x_probe+0x1fa/0x68c [ov772x]
[<000000003f0d225e>] i2c_device_probe+0x28d/0x680
[<00000000e0b6db89>] really_probe+0x17c/0x3f0
[<000000001b19fcee>] __driver_probe_device+0xe3/0x170
[<0000000048370519>] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
[<000000005ead07a0>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150
[<0000000043f452b8>] bus_for_each_drv+0x114/0x180
[<00000000358e5596>] __device_attach+0x1e5/0x2d0
[<0000000043f83c5d>] bus_probe_device+0x126/0x140
[<00000000ee0f3046>] device_add+0x810/0x1130
[<00000000e0278184>] i2c_new_client_device+0x359/0x4f0
[<0000000070baf34f>] of_i2c_register_device+0xf1/0x110
The reason is that if priv->hdl.error is set, ov772x_probe() jumps to the
error_mutex_destroy without doing v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(), and all
resources allocated in v4l2_ctrl_handler_init() and v4l2_ctrl_new_std()
are leaked.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/swap: fix swap_info_struct race between swapoff and get_swap_pages()
The si->lock must be held when deleting the si from the available list.
Otherwise, another thread can re-add the si to the available list, which
can lead to memory corruption. The only place we have found where this
happens is in the swapoff path. This case can be described as below:
core 0 core 1
swapoff
del_from_avail_list(si) waiting
try lock si->lock acquire swap_avail_lock
and re-add si into
swap_avail_head
acquire si->lock but missing si already being added again, and continuing
to clear SWP_WRITEOK, etc.
It can be easily found that a massive warning messages can be triggered
inside get_swap_pages() by some special cases, for example, we call
madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) on blocks of touched memory concurrently, meanwhile,
run much swapon-swapoff operations (e.g. stress-ng-swap).
However, in the worst case, panic can be caused by the above scene. In
swapoff(), the memory used by si could be kept in swap_info[] after
turning off a swap. This means memory corruption will not be caused
immediately until allocated and reset for a new swap in the swapon path.
A panic message caused: (with CONFIG_PLIST_DEBUG enabled)
------------[ cut here ]------------
top: 00000000e58a3003, n: 0000000013e75cda, p: 000000008cd4451a
prev: 0000000035b1e58a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000002150ee8d
next: 000000008cd4451a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000008cd4451a
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 1843 at lib/plist.c:60 plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
Modules linked in: rfkill(E) crct10dif_ce(E)...
CPU: 21 PID: 1843 Comm: stress-ng Kdump: ... 5.10.134+
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
lr : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
sp : ffff0018009d3c30
x29: ffff0018009d3c40 x28: ffff800011b32a98
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff001803908000
x25: ffff8000128ea088 x24: ffff800011b32a48
x23: 0000000000000028 x22: ffff001800875c00
x21: ffff800010f9e520 x20: ffff001800875c00
x19: ffff001800fdc6e0 x18: 0000000000000030
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0736076307640766 x14: 0730073007380731
x13: 0736076307640766 x12: 0730073007380731
x11: 000000000004058d x10: 0000000085a85b76
x9 : ffff8000101436e4 x8 : ffff800011c8ce08
x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0017df9ed338 x4 : 0000000000000001
x3 : ffff8017ce62a000 x2 : ffff0017df9ed340
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
plist_check_head+0x80/0xf0
plist_add+0x28/0x140
add_to_avail_list+0x9c/0xf0
_enable_swap_info+0x78/0xb4
__do_sys_swapon+0x918/0xa10
__arm64_sys_swapon+0x20/0x30
el0_svc_common+0x8c/0x220
do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
irq event stamp: 2082270
Now, si->lock locked before calling 'del_from_avail_list()' to make sure
other thread see the si had been deleted and SWP_WRITEOK cleared together,
will not reinsert again.
This problem exists in versions after stable 5.10.y.
CVSS Score
4.7
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-10-07