Use after free in Dawn in Google Chrome prior to 124.0.6367.118 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled
aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function,
which waits for the work to end if it has already started.
However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will
try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired.
The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state
is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since
disabling aRFS deletes the rules.
Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is
enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled.
Kernel log:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I
------------------------------------------------------
ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90
arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0
worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0
kthread+0xd7/0x100
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270
netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60
__sys_sendto+0x113/0x170
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
lock(&priv->state_lock);
lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by ethtool/386089:
#0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40
#1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240
#2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0
check_noncircular+0x144/0x160
__lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80
lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? save_trace+0x3e/0x360
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
__flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0
? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0
? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80
? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
__cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core]
ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0
ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120
genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0
? ethn
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: incorrect pppoe tuple
pppoe traffic reaching ingress path does not match the flowtable entry
because the pppoe header is expected to be at the network header offset.
This bug causes a mismatch in the flow table lookup, so pppoe packets
enter the classical forwarding path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: validate pppoe header
Ensure there is sufficient room to access the protocol field of the
PPPoe header. Validate it once before the flowtable lookup, then use a
helper function to access protocol field.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: walk over current view on netlink dump
The generation mask can be updated while netlink dump is in progress.
The pipapo set backend walk iterator cannot rely on it to infer what
view of the datastructure is to be used. Add notation to specify if user
wants to read/update the set.
Based on patch from Florian Westphal.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_obj_type_get()
nft_unregister_obj() can concurrent with __nft_obj_type_get(),
and there is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_objects
list in __nft_obj_type_get(). Therefore, there is potential data-race
of nf_tables_objects list entry.
Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_objects
list in __nft_obj_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller
nft_obj_type_get() to protect the entire type query process.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
r8169: fix LED-related deadlock on module removal
Binding devm_led_classdev_register() to the netdev is problematic
because on module removal we get a RTNL-related deadlock. Fix this
by avoiding the device-managed LED functions.
Note: We can safely call led_classdev_unregister() for a LED even
if registering it failed, because led_classdev_unregister() detects
this and is a no-op in this case.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: nv04: Fix out of bounds access
When Output Resource (dcb->or) value is assigned in
fabricate_dcb_output(), there may be out of bounds access to
dac_users array in case dcb->or is zero because ffs(dcb->or) is
used as index there.
The 'or' argument of fabricate_dcb_output() must be interpreted as a
number of bit to set, not value.
Utilize macros from 'enum nouveau_or' in calls instead of hardcoding.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails
From abort path, nft_mapelem_activate() needs to restore refcounters to
the original state. Currently, it uses the set->ops->walk() to iterate
over these set elements. The existing set iterator skips inactive
elements in the next generation, this does not work from the abort path
to restore the original state since it has to skip active elements
instead (not inactive ones).
This patch moves the check for inactive elements to the set iterator
callback, then it reverses the logic for the .activate case which
needs to skip active elements.
Toggle next generation bit for elements when delete set command is
invoked and call nft_clear() from .activate (abort) path to restore the
next generation bit.
The splat below shows an object in mappings memleak:
[43929.457523] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[43929.457532] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1139 at include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1237 nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[...]
[43929.458014] RIP: 0010:nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458076] Code: 83 f8 01 77 ab 49 8d 7c 24 08 e8 37 5e d0 de 49 8b 6c 24 08 48 8d 7d 50 e8 e9 5c d0 de 8b 45 50 8d 50 ff 89 55 50 85 c0 75 86 <0f> 0b eb 82 0f 0b eb b3 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
[43929.458081] RSP: 0018:ffff888140f9f4b0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[43929.458086] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881434f5288 RCX: dffffc0000000000
[43929.458090] RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffffffffa26d28a7 RDI: ffff88810ecc9550
[43929.458093] RBP: ffff88810ecc9500 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10281f3e8f
[43929.458096] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff0000ffff0000 R12: ffff8881434f52a0
[43929.458100] R13: ffff888140f9f5f4 R14: ffff888151c7a800 R15: 0000000000000002
[43929.458103] FS: 00007f0c687c4740(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[43929.458107] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[43929.458111] CR2: 00007f58dbe5b008 CR3: 0000000123602005 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[43929.458114] Call Trace:
[43929.458118] <TASK>
[43929.458121] ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0
[43929.458127] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458188] ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
[43929.458196] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[43929.458200] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
[43929.458211] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xd7/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458271] ? nft_setelem_data_deactivate+0xe4/0xf0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458332] nft_mapelem_deactivate+0x24/0x30 [nf_tables]
[43929.458392] nft_rhash_walk+0xdd/0x180 [nf_tables]
[43929.458453] ? __pfx_nft_rhash_walk+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458512] ? rb_insert_color+0x2e/0x280
[43929.458520] nft_map_deactivate+0xdc/0x1e0 [nf_tables]
[43929.458582] ? __pfx_nft_map_deactivate+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458642] ? __pfx_nft_mapelem_deactivate+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[43929.458701] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x46/0x70
[43929.458709] nft_delset+0xff/0x110 [nf_tables]
[43929.458769] nft_flush_table+0x16f/0x460 [nf_tables]
[43929.458830] nf_tables_deltable+0x501/0x580 [nf_tables]