In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_header
The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace
string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are
unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns
is always NULL when the comparison is made.
Remove the incorrect assignment.
The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop,
which is sufficient.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles,
which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes.
Reproducer:
$ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do
echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a;
pf="$pf//x";
done
$ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove
Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an
iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly
finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed,
maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE
When installing an emulated MMIO SPTE, do so *after* dropping/zapping the
existing SPTE (if it's shadow-present). While commit a54aa15c6bda3 was
right about it being impossible to convert a shadow-present SPTE to an
MMIO SPTE due to a _guest_ write, it failed to account for writes to guest
memory that are outside the scope of KVM.
E.g. if host userspace modifies a shadowed gPTE to switch from a memslot
to emulted MMIO and then the guest hits a relevant page fault, KVM will
install the MMIO SPTE without first zapping the shadow-present SPTE.
------------[ cut here ]------------
is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:484 at mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm], CPU#0: vmx_ept_stale_r/4292
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 4292 Comm: vmx_ept_stale_r Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-eafebd2d2ab0-sink-vm #319 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
mmu_set_spte+0x237/0x440 [kvm]
ept_page_fault+0x535/0x7f0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xee/0x1f0 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x8d/0x620 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18c/0x5a0 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc55/0x1c20 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb5/0x730
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x47fa3f
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nf_tables: nft_dynset: fix possible stateful expression memleak in error path
If cloning the second stateful expression in the element via GFP_ATOMIC
fails, then the first stateful expression remains in place without being
released.
unreferenced object (percpu) 0x607b97e9cab8 (size 16):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294931867
hex dump (first 16 bytes on cpu 3):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
backtrace (crc 0):
pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x453/0xd80
nft_counter_clone+0x9c/0x190 [nf_tables]
nft_expr_clone+0x8f/0x1b0 [nf_tables]
nft_dynset_new+0x2cb/0x5f0 [nf_tables]
nft_rhash_update+0x236/0x11c0 [nf_tables]
nft_dynset_eval+0x11f/0x670 [nf_tables]
nft_do_chain+0x253/0x1700 [nf_tables]
nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x18d/0x270 [nf_tables]
nf_hook_slow+0xaa/0x1e0
ip_local_deliver+0x209/0x330
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfnetlink_osf: validate individual option lengths in fingerprints
nfnl_osf_add_callback() validates opt_num bounds and string
NUL-termination but does not check individual option length fields.
A zero-length option causes nf_osf_match_one() to enter the option
matching loop even when foptsize sums to zero, which matches packets
with no TCP options where ctx->optp is NULL:
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:nf_osf_match_one (net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:98)
Call Trace:
nf_osf_match (net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:227)
xt_osf_match_packet (net/netfilter/xt_osf.c:32)
ipt_do_table (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:293)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:623)
ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573)
Additionally, an MSS option (kind=2) with length < 4 causes
out-of-bounds reads when nf_osf_match_one() unconditionally accesses
optp[2] and optp[3] for MSS value extraction. While RFC 9293
section 3.2 specifies that the MSS option is always exactly 4
bytes (Kind=2, Length=4), the check uses "< 4" rather than
"!= 4" because lengths greater than 4 do not cause memory
safety issues -- the buffer is guaranteed to be at least
foptsize bytes by the ctx->optsize == foptsize check.
Reject fingerprints where any option has zero length, or where an MSS
option has length less than 4, at add time rather than trusting these
values in the packet matching hot path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
icmp: fix NULL pointer dereference in icmp_tag_validation()
icmp_tag_validation() unconditionally dereferences the result of
rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]) without checking for NULL.
The inet_protos[] array is sparse -- only about 15 of 256 protocol
numbers have registered handlers. When ip_no_pmtu_disc is set to 3
(hardened PMTU mode) and the kernel receives an ICMP Fragmentation
Needed error with a quoted inner IP header containing an unregistered
protocol number, the NULL dereference causes a kernel panic in
softirq context.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
RIP: 0010:icmp_unreach (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1085 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1143)
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
icmp_rcv (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1527)
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207)
ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242)
ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573)
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6164)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6628)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561)
</IRQ>
Add a NULL check before accessing icmp_strict_tag_validation. If the
protocol has no registered handler, return false since it cannot
perform strict tag validation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix NULL deref in mesh_matches_local()
mesh_matches_local() unconditionally dereferences ie->mesh_config to
compare mesh configuration parameters. When called from
mesh_rx_csa_frame(), the parsed action-frame elements may not contain a
Mesh Configuration IE, leaving ie->mesh_config NULL and triggering a
kernel NULL pointer dereference.
The other two callers are already safe:
- ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp() checks !elems->mesh_config before
calling mesh_matches_local()
- mesh_plink_get_event() is only reached through
mesh_process_plink_frame(), which checks !elems->mesh_config, too
mesh_rx_csa_frame() is the only caller that passes raw parsed elements
to mesh_matches_local() without guarding mesh_config. An adjacent
attacker can exploit this by sending a crafted CSA action frame that
includes a valid Mesh ID IE but omits the Mesh Configuration IE,
crashing the kernel.
The captured crash log:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __pfx_mesh_matches_local (net/mac80211/mesh.c:65)
ieee80211_mesh_rx_queued_mgmt (net/mac80211/mesh.c:1686)
[...]
ieee80211_iface_work (net/mac80211/iface.c:1754 net/mac80211/iface.c:1802)
[...]
cfg80211_wiphy_work (net/wireless/core.c:426)
process_one_work (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3280)
? assign_work (net/kernel/workqueue.c:1219)
worker_thread (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3352)
? __pfx_worker_thread (net/kernel/workqueue.c:3385)
kthread (net/kernel/kthread.c:436)
[...]
ret_from_fork_asm (net/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255)
</TASK>
This patch adds a NULL check for ie->mesh_config at the top of
mesh_matches_local() to return false early when the Mesh Configuration
IE is absent.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: cfm: Fix race condition in peer_mep deletion
When a peer MEP is being deleted, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called
on ccm_rx_dwork before freeing. However, br_cfm_frame_rx() runs in
softirq context under rcu_read_lock (without RTNL) and can re-schedule
ccm_rx_dwork via ccm_rx_timer_start() between cancel_delayed_work_sync()
returning and kfree_rcu() being called.
The following is a simple race scenario:
cpu0 cpu1
mep_delete_implementation()
cancel_delayed_work_sync(ccm_rx_dwork);
br_cfm_frame_rx()
// peer_mep still in hlist
if (peer_mep->ccm_defect)
ccm_rx_timer_start()
queue_delayed_work(ccm_rx_dwork)
hlist_del_rcu(&peer_mep->head);
kfree_rcu(peer_mep, rcu);
ccm_rx_work_expired()
// on freed peer_mep
To prevent this, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is replaced with
disable_delayed_work_sync() in both peer MEP deletion paths, so
that subsequent queue_delayed_work() calls from br_cfm_frame_rx()
are silently rejected.
The cc_peer_disable() helper retains cancel_delayed_work_sync()
because it is also used for the CC enable/disable toggle path where
the work must remain re-schedulable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting multiple L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ
Currently the code attempts to accept requests regardless of the
command identifier which may cause multiple requests to be marked
as pending (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP) which can cause more than
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID(5) to be allocated in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer
causing an overflow.
The spec is quite clear that the same identifier shall not be used on
subsequent requests:
'Within each signaling channel a different Identifier shall be used
for each successive request or indication.'
https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-62/out/en/host/logical-link-control-and-adaptation-protocol-specification.html#UUID-32a25a06-4aa4-c6c7-77c5-dcfe3682355d
So this attempts to check if there are any channels pending with the
same identifier and rejects if any are found.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU
The Xen privcmd driver allows to issue arbitrary hypercalls from
user space processes. This is normally no problem, as access is
usually limited to root and the hypervisor will deny any hypercalls
affecting other domains.
In case the guest is booted using secure boot, however, the privcmd
driver would be enabling a root user process to modify e.g. kernel
memory contents, thus breaking the secure boot feature.
The only known case where an unprivileged domU is really needing to
use the privcmd driver is the case when it is acting as the device
model for another guest. In this case all hypercalls issued via the
privcmd driver will target that other guest.
Fortunately the privcmd driver can already be locked down to allow
only hypercalls targeting a specific domain, but this mode can be
activated from user land only today.
The target domain can be obtained from Xenstore, so when not running
in dom0 restrict the privcmd driver to that target domain from the
beginning, resolving the potential problem of breaking secure boot.
This is XSA-482
---
V2:
- defer reading from Xenstore if Xenstore isn't ready yet (Jan Beulich)
- wait in open() if target domain isn't known yet
- issue message in case no target domain found (Jan Beulich)