Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers. This allows unauthorized actors to list catalog items and extract protected binaries from pre-signed cloud links.
The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans.
The system Binder boundary accepts unverified pass-through AT commands, giving local applications the power to read baseband files or disable cellular connectivity.
High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation. Combined with hard-coded DES symmetric encryption keys, a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) actor could decrypt network traffic.
Broadcast events allow malicious software to rewrite the device's default Mobile Device Management (MDM) endpoint address, shifting administrative ownership to an external attacker.
The device encrypts data using AES-CBC with static zero-filled Initialization Vectors (IVs), making it susceptible to replay attacks and known-plaintext decryption.
Weak validation logic within device dissociation API routines allows a remote entity to forcefully unbind unrelated user endpoints, causing severe denial of service.
The account validation endpoint /v1/User/validate returns comprehensive user profile data sheets, which can be crawled by iterating predictable identification strings.