Netty, an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework, has a vulnerability in versions up to and including 4.1.118.Final. An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty. When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attempts to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crash. A similar issue was previously reported as CVE-2024-47535. This issue was fixed, but the fix was incomplete in that null-bytes were not counted against the input limit. Commit d1fbda62d3a47835d3fb35db8bd42ecc205a5386 contains an updated fix.
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. An unsafe reading of environment file could potentially cause a denial of service in Netty. When loaded on an Windows application, Netty attempts to load a file that does not exist. If an attacker creates such a large file, the Netty application crashes. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.115.
The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. In affected versions the `BinaryHttpParser` class does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol. The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` object where no further parsing or validation occurs. Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.13.Final. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.108.Final.
The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `SniHandler` can allocate up to 16MB of heap for each channel during the TLS handshake. When the handler or the channel does not have an idle timeout, it can be used to make a TCP server using the `SniHandler` to allocate 16MB of heap. The `SniHandler` class is a handler that waits for the TLS handshake to configure a `SslHandler` according to the indicated server name by the `ClientHello` record. For this matter it allocates a `ByteBuf` using the value defined in the `ClientHello` record. Normally the value of the packet should be smaller than the handshake packet but there are not checks done here and the way the code is written, it is possible to craft a packet that makes the `SslClientHelloHandler`. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 4.1.94.Final.
Netty project is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework. Starting in version 4.1.83.Final and prior to 4.1.86.Final, when calling `DefaultHttpHeadesr.set` with an _iterator_ of values, header value validation was not performed, allowing malicious header values in the iterator to perform HTTP Response Splitting. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.86.Final. Integrators can work around the issue by changing the `DefaultHttpHeaders.set(CharSequence, Iterator<?>)` call, into a `remove()` call, and call `add()` in a loop over the iterator of values.
Netty project is an event-driven asynchronous network application framework. In versions prior to 4.1.86.Final, a StackOverflowError can be raised when parsing a malformed crafted message due to an infinite recursion. This issue is patched in version 4.1.86.Final. There is no workaround, except using a custom HaProxyMessageDecoder.
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework. The package `io.netty:netty-codec-http` prior to version 4.1.77.Final contains an insufficient fix for CVE-2021-21290. When Netty's multipart decoders are used local information disclosure can occur via the local system temporary directory if temporary storing uploads on the disk is enabled. This only impacts applications running on Java version 6 and lower. Additionally, this vulnerability impacts code running on Unix-like systems, and very old versions of Mac OSX and Windows as they all share the system temporary directory between all users. Version 4.1.77.Final contains a patch for this vulnerability. As a workaround, specify one's own `java.io.tmpdir` when starting the JVM or use DefaultHttpDataFactory.setBaseDir(...) to set the directory to something that is only readable by the current user.