The Microchip SERCOM-G1 UART driver (drivers/serial/uart_mchp_sercom_g1.c), used by the PIC32CM-JH SoC family, contains an out-of-bounds write in its asynchronous (DMA) receive path. When uart_rx_enable() is invoked with a one-byte receive buffer (len == 1) and CONFIG_UART_MCHP_ASYNC is enabled, the RX-complete ISR starts a single-beat DMA transfer while a received byte is already pending in the SERCOM DATA register. On this SoC the peripheral-triggered DMA start sequencing then writes one byte past the end of the caller-supplied buffer (CWE-787). The overflowed byte's value is the UART RX data supplied by the connected serial peer (adjacent attacker), while its size and location are fixed at one byte immediately after the buffer. Exploitation requires the async UART config (not enabled by default on the in-tree PIC32CM-JH boards) and a consumer that enables RX with a one-byte buffer; impact is limited single-byte memory corruption adjacent to the RX buffer (possible crash / denial of service). The defect shipped in v4.4.0. The fix reads the first byte with the CPU and, for one-byte buffers, performs no DMA at all; for larger buffers it sizes the DMA for the remaining len-1 bytes.
Nmap through 7.99 does not keep the IPv6 extension-header walk within the captured packet in ipv6_get_data_primitive (libnetutil/netutil.cc), so the pointer advances past the buffer and the remaining-length computation underflows to a large value. A scanned target or on-path attacker returning a crafted IPv6 response with a truncated extension header can trigger out-of-bounds reads and a crash during raw IPv6 scans.
libssh2 through 1.11.1 reads an attacker-controlled 32-bit attribute count from a publickey-subsystem response and uses it in the allocation num_attrs * sizeof(libssh2_publickey_attribute) without bounds checking, so on 32-bit platforms the multiplication overflows to an undersized buffer. A malicious SSH server can then drive the attribute-parsing loop to write past the allocation, causing a heap buffer overflow in a connecting libssh2 client.
libssh2 through 1.11.1 grows its publickey list with SSH2_REALLOC but does not zero-initialize new entries before parsing populates them, so a parse failure reaching the cleanup path leaves libssh2_publickey_list_free operating on an uninitialized entry. A malicious SSH server offering the publickey subsystem can use a malformed response to make cleanup free an uninitialized, attacker-influenceable attrs pointer in a connecting libssh2 client.
7-Zip for Windows through 26.02 fails to preserve the Mark-of-the-Web when extracting a crafted RAR5 archive, because its guard that suppresses an archive-supplied Zone.Identifier stream matches the exact name 'Zone.Identifier' while a RAR5 STM record named ':Zone.Identifier:$DATA' is not matched and NTFS canonicalizes it to the same stream, overwriting the propagated Internet-zone marker with ZoneId=0. A second STM record named '::$DATA' overwrites the extracted file's default data stream, letting an attacker defeat SmartScreen/MotW warnings and spoof file content.
nghttp2's nghttpx proxy through 1.69.0 forwards an HTTP/1.1 Upgrade request that also carries a Content-Length header and body onto reusable keep-alive backend connections, re-adding the Upgrade and Connection headers while passing Content-Length verbatim. A backend that resolves the resulting ambiguous message in the attacker's favor enables HTTP request/response smuggling and cross-client response-queue poisoning.
Flowise before 3.1.3 validates Custom MCP stdio environment variables against a denylist using a case-sensitive comparison, so on Windows, where environment names are case-insensitive, supplying 'node_options' bypasses the NODE_OPTIONS denylist entry. An authenticated user who can configure a Custom MCP node can thereby inject NODE_OPTIONS --require and execute arbitrary code in the Flowise server context.
Zephyr's IP socket recvmsg() implementation (subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_inet.c, insert_pktinfo()) validated the user-supplied ancillary (msg_control) buffer using only the payload length (msg-msg_controllen < pktinfo_len) before writing a full control message consisting of an aligned cmsg header plus the payload. Because the check omitted the cmsg header size, a control buffer whose length falls in the under-checked window (e.g. 16-27 bytes for IPv4 IP_PKTINFO on a 64-bit target, where a single element actually occupies 28 bytes) passes the guard yet causes a fixed-size out-of-bounds write of up to one cmsg header (~12 bytes) past the end of the buffer. Under CONFIG_USERSPACE the recvmsg verifier allocates a kernel-heap copy of the control buffer sized to msg_controllen and runs the implementation against it, so the overflow corrupts kernel heap memory and is triggerable from an unprivileged userspace thread; in supervisor mode it corrupts the caller's buffer. The path is reachable on a UDP/IP socket with IP_PKTINFO/IPV6_RECVPKTINFO (or hoplimit/timestamping) enabled when the application calls recvmsg() with an undersized control buffer and a datagram is received; part of the overwritten bytes (the destination IP in ipi_addr) is influenced by the received packet. The fix makes the capacity check use NET_CMSG_SPACE(pktinfo_len) (aligned header + aligned data) and returns -ENOMEM when the buffer is too small. Affected: v3.6.0 through v4.4.0.
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation.
An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen.
An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.