In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix the behavior of READ near OFFSET_MAX
Dan Aloni reports:
> Due to commit 8cfb9015280d ("NFS: Always provide aligned buffers to
> the RPC read layers") on the client, a read of 0xfff is aligned up
> to server rsize of 0x1000.
>
> As a result, in a test where the server has a file of size
> 0x7fffffffffffffff, and the client tries to read from the offset
> 0x7ffffffffffff000, the read causes loff_t overflow in the server
> and it returns an NFS code of EINVAL to the client. The client as
> a result indefinitely retries the request.
The Linux NFS client does not handle NFS?ERR_INVAL, even though all
NFS specifications permit servers to return that status code for a
READ.
Instead of NFS?ERR_INVAL, have out-of-range READ requests succeed
and return a short result. Set the EOF flag in the result to prevent
the client from retrying the READ request. This behavior appears to
be consistent with Solaris NFS servers.
Note that NFSv3 and NFSv4 use u64 offset values on the wire. These
must be converted to loff_t internally before use -- an implicit
type cast is not adequate for this purpose. Otherwise VFS checks
against sb->s_maxbytes do not work properly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix ia_size underflow
iattr::ia_size is a loff_t, which is a signed 64-bit type. NFSv3 and
NFSv4 both define file size as an unsigned 64-bit type. Thus there
is a range of valid file size values an NFS client can send that is
already larger than Linux can handle.
Currently decode_fattr4() dumps a full u64 value into ia_size. If
that value happens to be larger than S64_MAX, then ia_size
underflows. I'm about to fix up the NFSv3 behavior as well, so let's
catch the underflow in the common code path: nfsd_setattr().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix NFSv3 SETATTR/CREATE's handling of large file sizes
iattr::ia_size is a loff_t, so these NFSv3 procedures must be
careful to deal with incoming client size values that are larger
than s64_max without corrupting the value.
Silently capping the value results in storing a different value
than the client passed in which is unexpected behavior, so remove
the min_t() check in decode_sattr3().
Note that RFC 1813 permits only the WRITE procedure to return
NFS3ERR_FBIG. We believe that NFSv3 reference implementations
also return NFS3ERR_FBIG when ia_size is too large.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ieee802154: at86rf230: Stop leaking skb's
Upon error the ieee802154_xmit_complete() helper is not called. Only
ieee802154_wake_queue() is called manually. In the Tx case we then leak
the skb structure.
Free the skb structure upon error before returning when appropriate.
As the 'is_tx = 0' cannot be moved in the complete handler because of a
possible race between the delay in switching to STATE_RX_AACK_ON and a
new interrupt, we introduce an intermediate 'was_tx' boolean just for
this purpose.
There is no Fixes tag applying here, many changes have been made on this
area and the issue kind of always existed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt_ioctl: fix array_index_nospec in vt_setactivate
array_index_nospec ensures that an out-of-bounds value is set to zero
on the transient path. Decreasing the value by one afterwards causes
a transient integer underflow. vsa.console should be decreased first
and then sanitized with array_index_nospec.
Kasper Acknowledgements: Jakob Koschel, Brian Johannesmeyer, Kaveh
Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida from the VUSec group at VU
Amsterdam.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-rdma: fix possible use-after-free in transport error_recovery work
While nvme_rdma_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue
state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order
to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error
recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy
the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that
there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler
itself changing the ctrl state.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: fix possible use-after-free in transport error_recovery work
While nvme_tcp_submit_async_event_work is checking the ctrl and queue
state before preparing the AER command and scheduling io_work, in order
to fully prevent a race where this check is not reliable the error
recovery work must flush async_event_work before continuing to destroy
the admin queue after setting the ctrl state to RESETTING such that
there is no race .submit_async_event and the error recovery handler
itself changing the ctrl state.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix a possible use-after-free in controller reset during load
Unlike .queue_rq, in .submit_async_event drivers may not check the ctrl
readiness for AER submission. This may lead to a use-after-free
condition that was observed with nvme-tcp.
The race condition may happen in the following scenario:
1. driver executes its reset_ctrl_work
2. -> nvme_stop_ctrl - flushes ctrl async_event_work
3. ctrl sends AEN which is received by the host, which in turn
schedules AEN handling
4. teardown admin queue (which releases the queue socket)
5. AEN processed, submits another AER, calling the driver to submit
6. driver attempts to send the cmd
==> use-after-free
In order to fix that, add ctrl state check to validate the ctrl
is actually able to accept the AER submission.
This addresses the above race in controller resets because the driver
during teardown should:
1. change ctrl state to RESETTING
2. flush async_event_work (as well as other async work elements)
So after 1,2, any other AER command will find the
ctrl state to be RESETTING and bail out without submitting the AER.