In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer
Since commit 7d5e9737efda ("net: rfkill: gpio: get the name and type from
device property") rfkill_find_type() gets called with the possibly
uninitialized "const char *type_name;" local variable.
On x86 systems when rfkill-gpio binds to a "BCM4752" or "LNV4752"
acpi_device, the rfkill->type is set based on the ACPI acpi_device_id:
rfkill->type = (unsigned)id->driver_data;
and there is no "type" property so device_property_read_string() will fail
and leave type_name uninitialized, leading to a potential crash.
rfkill_find_type() does accept a NULL pointer, fix the potential crash
by initializing type_name to NULL.
Note likely sofar this has not been caught because:
1. Not many x86 machines actually have a "BCM4752"/"LNV4752" acpi_device
2. The stack happened to contain NULL where type_name is stored
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6apm-lpass-dais: Fix NULL pointer dereference if source graph failed
If earlier opening of source graph fails (e.g. ADSP rejects due to
incorrect audioreach topology), the graph is closed and
"dai_data->graph[dai->id]" is assigned NULL. Preparing the DAI for sink
graph continues though and next call to q6apm_lpass_dai_prepare()
receives dai_data->graph[dai->id]=NULL leading to NULL pointer
exception:
qcom-apm gprsvc:service:2:1: Error (1) Processing 0x01001002 cmd
qcom-apm gprsvc:service:2:1: DSP returned error[1001002] 1
q6apm-lpass-dais 30000000.remoteproc:glink-edge:gpr:service@1:bedais: fail to start APM port 78
q6apm-lpass-dais 30000000.remoteproc:glink-edge:gpr:service@1:bedais: ASoC: error at snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare on TX_CODEC_DMA_TX_3: -22
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a8
...
Call trace:
q6apm_graph_media_format_pcm+0x48/0x120 (P)
q6apm_lpass_dai_prepare+0x110/0x1b4
snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare+0x74/0x108
__soc_pcm_prepare+0x44/0x160
dpcm_be_dai_prepare+0x124/0x1c0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-stripe: fix a possible integer overflow
There's a possible integer overflow in stripe_io_hints if we have too
large chunk size. Test if the overflow happened, and if it did, don't set
limits->io_min and limits->io_opt;
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsg
If an error causes af_alg_sendmsg to abort, ctx->merge may contain
a garbage value from the previous loop. This may then trigger a
crash on the next entry into af_alg_sendmsg when it attempts to do
a merge that can't be done.
Fix this by setting ctx->merge to zero near the start of the loop.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: let smbd_destroy() call disable_work_sync(&info->post_send_credits_work)
In smbd_destroy() we may destroy the memory so we better
wait until post_send_credits_work is no longer pending
and will never be started again.
I actually just hit the case using rxe:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 138 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1032 rxe_post_recv+0x1ee/0x480 [rdma_rxe]
...
[ 5305.686979] [ T138] smbd_post_recv+0x445/0xc10 [cifs]
[ 5305.687135] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5305.687149] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ 5305.687185] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 5305.687329] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
[ 5305.687356] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5305.687368] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5305.687378] [ T138] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x60
[ 5305.687389] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5305.687399] [ T138] ? get_receive_buffer+0x168/0x210 [cifs]
[ 5305.687555] [ T138] smbd_post_send_credits+0x382/0x4b0 [cifs]
[ 5305.687701] [ T138] ? __pfx_smbd_post_send_credits+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
[ 5305.687855] [ T138] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10
[ 5305.687865] [ T138] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[ 5305.687875] [ T138] ? queue_delayed_work_on+0x8e/0xa0
[ 5305.687889] [ T138] process_one_work+0x629/0xf80
[ 5305.687908] [ T138] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 5305.687917] [ T138] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[ 5305.687933] [ T138] worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570
...
It means rxe_post_recv was called after rdma_destroy_qp().
This happened because put_receive_buffer() was triggered
by ib_drain_qp() and called:
queue_work(info->workqueue, &info->post_send_credits_work);
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix smbdirect_recv_io leak in smbd_negotiate() error path
During tests of another unrelated patch I was able to trigger this
error: Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: Fix memory leak in rtw88_usb
Kmemleak shows the following leak arising from routine in the usb
probe routine:
unreferenced object 0xffff895cb29bba00 (size 512):
comm "(udev-worker)", pid 534, jiffies 4294903932 (age 102751.088s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
77 30 30 30 00 00 00 00 02 2f 2d 2b 30 00 00 00 w000...../-+0...
02 00 2a 28 00 00 00 00 ff 55 ff ff ff 00 00 00 ..*(.....U......
backtrace:
[<ffffffff9265fa36>] kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x90
[<ffffffffc17eec41>] rtw_usb_probe+0x2f1/0x680 [rtw_usb]
[<ffffffffc03e19fd>] usb_probe_interface+0xdd/0x2e0 [usbcore]
[<ffffffff92b4f2fe>] really_probe+0x18e/0x3d0
[<ffffffff92b4f5b8>] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x160
[<ffffffff92b4f6bf>] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[<ffffffff92b4f8df>] __driver_attach+0xbf/0x1b0
[<ffffffff92b4d350>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0
[<ffffffff92b4e51e>] bus_add_driver+0x10e/0x210
[<ffffffff92b50935>] driver_register+0x55/0xf0
[<ffffffffc03e0708>] usb_register_driver+0x88/0x140 [usbcore]
[<ffffffff92401153>] do_one_initcall+0x43/0x210
[<ffffffff9254f42a>] do_init_module+0x4a/0x200
[<ffffffff92551d1c>] __do_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x120
[<ffffffff92ee6626>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0x80
[<ffffffff9300006a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
The leak was verified to be real by unloading the driver, which resulted
in a dangling pointer to the allocation.
The allocated memory is freed in rtw_usb_intf_deinit().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gs_usb: fix time stamp counter initialization
If the gs_usb device driver is unloaded (or unbound) before the
interface is shut down, the USB stack first calls the struct
usb_driver::disconnect and then the struct net_device_ops::ndo_stop
callback.
In gs_usb_disconnect() all pending bulk URBs are killed, i.e. no more
RX'ed CAN frames are send from the USB device to the host. Later in
gs_can_close() a reset control message is send to each CAN channel to
remove the controller from the CAN bus. In this race window the USB
device can still receive CAN frames from the bus and internally queue
them to be send to the host.
At least in the current version of the candlelight firmware, the queue
of received CAN frames is not emptied during the reset command. After
loading (or binding) the gs_usb driver, new URBs are submitted during
the struct net_device_ops::ndo_open callback and the candlelight
firmware starts sending its already queued CAN frames to the host.
However, this scenario was not considered when implementing the
hardware timestamp function. The cycle counter/time counter
infrastructure is set up (gs_usb_timestamp_init()) after the USBs are
submitted, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference if
timecounter_cyc2time() (via the call chain:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() -> gs_usb_set_timestamp() ->
gs_usb_skb_set_timestamp()) is called too early.
Move the gs_usb_timestamp_init() function before the URBs are
submitted to fix this problem.
For a comprehensive solution, we need to consider gs_usb devices with
more than 1 channel. The cycle counter/time counter infrastructure is
setup per channel, but the RX URBs are per device. Once gs_can_open()
of _a_ channel has been called, and URBs have been submitted, the
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() can be called for _all_ available
channels, even for channels that are not running, yet. As cycle
counter/time counter has not set up, this will again lead to a NULL
pointer dereference.
Convert the cycle counter/time counter from a "per channel" to a "per
device" functionality. Also set it up, before submitting any URBs to
the device.
Further in gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), don't process any URBs for
not started CAN channels, only resubmit the URB.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix handling of lrbp->cmd
ufshcd_queuecommand() may be called two times in a row for a SCSI command
before it is completed. Hence make the following changes:
- In the functions that submit a command, do not check the old value of
lrbp->cmd nor clear lrbp->cmd in error paths.
- In ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd(), do not clear lrbp->cmd.
See also scsi_send_eh_cmnd().
This commit prevents that the following appears if a command times out:
WARNING: at drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c:2965 ufshcd_queuecommand+0x6f8/0x9a8
Call trace:
ufshcd_queuecommand+0x6f8/0x9a8
scsi_send_eh_cmnd+0x2c0/0x960
scsi_eh_test_devices+0x100/0x314
scsi_eh_ready_devs+0xd90/0x114c
scsi_error_handler+0x2b4/0xb70
kthread+0x16c/0x1e0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of
commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try")
we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission
of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had
support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in
gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using
it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute
unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary
stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to
boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail()
then panic.