In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: fix possible UAF in icmpv6_rcv()
Caching saddr and daddr before pskb_pull() is problematic
since skb->head can change.
Remove these temporary variables:
- We only access &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr and &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr
when net_dbg_ratelimited() is called in the slow path.
- Avoid potential future misuse after pskb_pull() call.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: zero per-item info buffer before handing it to visitors
rds_for_each_conn_info() and rds_walk_conn_path_info() both hand a
caller-allocated on-stack u64 buffer to a per-connection visitor and
then copy the full item_len bytes back to user space via
rds_info_copy() regardless of how much of the buffer the visitor
actually wrote.
rds_ib_conn_info_visitor() and rds6_ib_conn_info_visitor() only
write a subset of their output struct when the underlying
rds_connection is not in state RDS_CONN_UP (src/dst addr, tos, sl
and the two GIDs via explicit memsets). Several u32 fields
(max_send_wr, max_recv_wr, max_send_sge, rdma_mr_max, rdma_mr_size,
cache_allocs) and the 2-byte alignment hole between sl and
cache_allocs remain as whatever stack contents preceded the visitor
call and are then memcpy_to_user()'d out to user space.
struct rds_info_rdma_connection and struct rds6_info_rdma_connection
are the only rds_info_* structs in include/uapi/linux/rds.h that are
not marked __attribute__((packed)), so they have a real alignment
hole. The other info visitors (rds_conn_info_visitor,
rds6_conn_info_visitor, rds_tcp_tc_info, ...) write all fields of
their packed output struct today and are not known to be vulnerable,
but a future visitor that adds a conditional write-path would have
the same bug.
Reproduction on a kernel built without CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y:
a local unprivileged user opens AF_RDS, sets SO_RDS_TRANSPORT=IB,
binds to a local address on an RDMA-capable netdev (rxe soft-RoCE on
any netdev is sufficient), sendto()'s any peer on the same subnet
(fails cleanly but installs an rds_connection in the global hash in
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING), then calls getsockopt(SOL_RDS,
RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS). The returned 68-byte item contains 26
bytes of stack garbage including kernel text/data pointers:
0..7 0a 63 00 01 0a 63 00 02 src=10.99.0.1 dst=10.99.0.2
8..39 00 ... gids (memset-zeroed)
40..47 e0 92 a3 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (max_send_wr)
48..55 7f 37 b5 81 ff ff ff ff kernel pointer (rdma_mr_max)
56..59 01 00 08 00 rdma_mr_size (garbage)
60..61 00 00 tos, sl
62..63 00 00 alignment padding
64..67 18 00 00 00 cache_allocs (garbage)
Fix by zeroing the per-item buffer in both rds_for_each_conn_info()
and rds_walk_conn_path_info() before invoking the visitor. This
covers the IPv4/IPv6 IB visitors and hardens all current and future
visitors against the same class of bug.
No functional change for visitors that fully populate their output.
Changes in v2:
- retarget at the net tree (subject prefix "[PATCH net v2]",
net/rds: prefix in the title)
- pick up Reviewed-by tags from Sharath Srinivasan and
Allison Henderson
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix potential NULL dereference in ttl check
The nf_osf_ttl() function accessed skb->dev to perform a local interface
address lookup without verifying that the device pointer was valid.
Additionally, the implementation utilized an in_dev_for_each_ifa_rcu
loop to match the packet source address against local interface
addresses. It assumed that packets from the same subnet should not see a
decrement on the initial TTL. A packet might appear it is from the same
subnet but it actually isn't especially in modern environments with
containers and virtual switching.
Remove the device dereference and interface loop. Replace the logic with
a switch statement that evaluates the TTL according to the ttl_check.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: don't use simple_strtoul
Replace unsafe port parsing in epaddr_len(), ct_sip_parse_header_uri(),
and ct_sip_parse_request() with a new sip_parse_port() helper that
validates each digit against the buffer limit, eliminating the use of
simple_strtoul() which assumes NUL-terminated strings.
The previous code dereferenced pointers without bounds checks after
sip_parse_addr() and relied on simple_strtoul() on non-NUL-terminated
skb data. A port that reaches the buffer limit without a trailing
character is also rejected as malformed.
Also get rid of all simple_strtoul() usage in conntrack, prefer a
stricter version instead. There are intentional changes:
- Bail out if number is > UINT_MAX and indicate a failure, same for
too long sequences.
While we do accept 05535 as port 5535, we will not accept e.g.
'sip:10.0.0.1:005060'. While its syntactically valid under RFC 3261,
we should restrict this to not waste cycles when presented with
malformed packets with 64k '0' characters.
- Force base 10 in ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(). This is used to fetch
'expire=' and 'rports='; both are expected to use base-10.
- In nf_nat_sip.c, only accept the parsed value if its within the 1k-64k
range.
- epaddr_len now returns 0 if the port is invalid, as it already does
for invalid ip addresses. This is intentional. nf_conntrack_sip
performs lots of guesswork to find the right parts of the message
to parse. Being stricter could break existing setups.
Connection tracking helpers are designed to allow traffic to
pass, not to block it.
Based on an earlier patch from Jenny Guanni Qu <qguanni@gmail.com>.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
neigh: let neigh_xmit take skb ownership
neigh_xmit always releases the skb, except when no neighbour table is
found. But even the first added user of neigh_xmit (mpls) relied on
neigh_xmit to release the skb (or queue it for tx).
sashiko reported:
If neigh_xmit() is called with an uninitialized neighbor table (for
example, NEIGH_ND_TABLE when IPv6 is disabled), it returns -EAFNOSUPPORT
and bypasses its internal out_kfree_skb error path. Because the return
value of neigh_xmit() is ignored here, does this leak the SKB?
Assume full ownership and remove the last code path that doesn't
xmit or free skb.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: rtl8150: fix use-after-free in rtl8150_start_xmit()
syzbot reported a KASAN slab-use-after-free read in rtl8150_start_xmit()
when accessing skb->len for tx statistics after usb_submit_urb() has
been called:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtl8150_start_xmit+0x71f/0x760
drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c:712
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810eb7a930 by task kworker/0:4/5226
The URB completion handler write_bulk_callback() frees the skb via
dev_kfree_skb_irq(dev->tx_skb). The URB may complete on another CPU
in softirq context before usb_submit_urb() returns in the submitter,
so by the time the submitter reads skb->len the skb has already been
queued to the per-CPU completion_queue and freed by net_tx_action():
CPU A (xmit) CPU B (USB completion softirq)
------------ ------------------------------
dev->tx_skb = skb;
usb_submit_urb() --+
|-------> write_bulk_callback()
| dev_kfree_skb_irq(dev->tx_skb)
| net_tx_action()
| napi_skb_cache_put() <-- free
netdev->stats.tx_bytes |
+= skb->len; <-- UAF read
Fix it by caching skb->len before submitting the URB and using the
cached value when updating the tx_bytes counter.
The pre-existing tx_bytes semantics are preserved: the counter tracks
the original frame length (skb->len), not the ETH_ZLEN/USB-alignment
padded "count" value that is handed to the device. Changing that
would be a user-visible accounting change and is out of scope for
this UAF fix.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: af_alg - Cap AEAD AD length to 0x80000000
In order to prevent arithmetic overflows when checking the TX
buffer size, cap the associated data length to 0x80000000.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix a buffer leak in __ceph_setxattr()
The old_blob in __ceph_setxattr() can store
ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob value during the retry.
However, it is never called the ceph_buffer_put()
for the old_blob object. This patch fixes the issue of
the buffer leak.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in __ceph_x_decrypt()
In __ceph_x_decrypt(), a part of the buffer p is interpreted as a
ceph_x_encrypt_header, and the magic field of this struct is accessed.
This happens without any guarantee that the buffer is large enough to
hold this struct. The function parameter ciphertext_len represents the
length of the ciphertext to decrypt and is guaranteed to be at most the
remaining size of the allocated buffer p. However, this value is not
necessarily greater than sizeof(ceph_x_encrypt_header). E.g., a message
frame of type FRAME_TAG_AUTH_REPLY_MORE, that is just as long to hold
the ciphertext at its end with a ciphertext_len of 8 or less, can
trigger an out-of-bounds memory access when accessing hdr->magic.
This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to ensure that the
decrypted plaintext in the buffer is large enough to represent at least
the ceph_x_encrypt_header.