In /ldclient/ldprov.cgi in Ivanti Endpoint Manager through 2020.1.1, an attacker is able to disclose information about the server operating system, local pathnames, and environment variables with no authentication required.
Several services are accessing named pipes in Ivanti Endpoint Manager through 2020.1.1 with default or overly permissive security attributes; as these services run as user ‘NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM’, the issue can be used to escalate privileges from a local standard or service account having SeImpersonatePrivilege (eg. user ‘NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE’).
Various components in Ivanti Endpoint Manager through 2020.1.1 rely on Windows search order when loading a (nonexistent) library file, allowing (under certain conditions) one to gain code execution (and elevation of privileges to the level of privilege held by the vulnerable component such as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) via DLL hijacking. This affects ldiscn32.exe, IpmiRedirectionService.exe, LDAPWhoAmI.exe, and ldprofile.exe.
In Ivanti Service Desk (formerly LANDESK Management Suite) versions between 2016.3 and 2017.3, an Unrestricted Direct Object Reference leads to referencing/updating objects belonging to other users. In other words, a normal user can send requests to a specific URI with the target user's username in an HTTP payload in order to retrieve a key/token and use it to access/update objects belonging to other users. Such objects could be user profiles, tickets, incidents, etc.