In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-dw-dma: fix print error log when wait finish transaction
If an error occurs, the device may not have a current message. In this
case, the system will crash.
In this case, it's better to use dev from the struct ctlr (struct spi_controller*).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: cp2615: fix serial string NULL-deref at probe
The cp2615 driver uses the USB device serial string as the i2c adapter
name but does not make sure that the string exists.
Verify that the device has a serial number before accessing it to avoid
triggering a NULL-pointer dereference (e.g. with malicious devices).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Increase ASB control timeout
The bcm2835_asb_control() function uses a tight polling loop to wait
for the ASB bridge to acknowledge a request. During intensive workloads,
this handshake intermittently fails for V3D's master ASB on BCM2711,
resulting in "Failed to disable ASB master for v3d" errors during
runtime PM suspend. As a consequence, the failed power-off leaves V3D in
a broken state, leading to bus faults or system hangs on later accesses.
As the timeout is insufficient in some scenarios, increase the polling
timeout from 1us to 5us, which is still negligible in the context of a
power domain transition. Also, replace the open-coded ktime_get_ns()/
cpu_relax() polling loop with readl_poll_timeout_atomic().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:
WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524
When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.
After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
// acquires the PI futex
exit()
futex_cleanup_begin()
futex_state = EXITING;
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
attach_to_pi_owner()
// observes EXITING
*exiting = owner; // takes ref
return -EBUSY
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
put_task_struct(); // drops ref
// exiting still points to owner
goto retry;
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
lock_pi_update_atomic()
cmpxchg(uaddr)
*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
// value changed
return -EAGAIN;
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)
Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: nxp-nci: allow GPIOs to sleep
Allow the firmware and enable GPIOs to sleep.
This fixes a `WARN_ON' and allows the driver to operate GPIOs which are
connected to I2C GPIO expanders.
-- >8 --
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2636 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3880 gpiod_set_value+0x88/0x98
-- >8 --
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: cancel pmsr_free_wk in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down
When the nl80211 socket that originated a PMSR request is
closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() sets the request's nl_portid
to zero and schedules pmsr_free_wk to process the abort
asynchronously. If the interface is concurrently torn down
before that work runs, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() calls
cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() directly. However, the already-
scheduled pmsr_free_wk work item remains pending and may run
after the interface has been removed from the driver. This
could cause the driver's abort_pmsr callback to operate on a
torn-down interface, leading to undefined behavior and
potential crashes.
Cancel pmsr_free_wk synchronously in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down()
before calling cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort(). This ensures any
pending or in-progress work is drained before interface teardown
proceeds, preventing the work from invoking the driver abort
callback after the interface is gone.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: let send_done handle a completion without IB_SEND_SIGNALED
With smbdirect_send_batch processing we likely have requests without
IB_SEND_SIGNALED, which will be destroyed in the final request
that has IB_SEND_SIGNALED set.
If the connection is broken all requests are signaled
even without explicit IB_SEND_SIGNALED.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: make use of smbdirect_socket.send_io.bcredits
It turns out that our code will corrupt the stream of
reassabled data transfer messages when we trigger an
immendiate (empty) send.
In order to fix this we'll have a single 'batch' credit per
connection. And code getting that credit is free to use
as much messages until remaining_length reaches 0, then
the batch credit it given back and the next logical send can
happen.