In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()
A malicious USB device claiming to be a CDC Phonet modem can overflow
the skb_shared_info->frags[] array by sending an unbounded sequence of
full-page bulk transfers.
Drop the skb and increment the length error when the frag limit is
reached. This matches the same fix that commit f0813bcd2d9d ("net:
wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") did for the
t7xx driver.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: clamp report_size in s32ton() to avoid undefined shift
s32ton() shifts by n-1 where n is the field's report_size, a value that
comes directly from a HID device. The HID parser bounds report_size
only to <= 256, so a broken HID device can supply a report descriptor
with a wide field that triggers shift exponents up to 256 on a 32-bit
type when an output report is built via hid_output_field() or
hid_set_field().
Commit ec61b41918587 ("HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in
hid_report_raw_event") added the same n > 32 clamp to the function
snto32(), but s32ton() was never given the same fix as I guess syzbot
hadn't figured out how to fuzz a device the same way.
Fix this up by just clamping the max value of n, just like snto32()
does.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: fix NULL pointer dereference in alps_raw_event()
Commit ecfa6f34492c ("HID: Add HID_CLAIMED_INPUT guards in raw_event
callbacks missing them") attempted to fix up the HID drivers that had
missed the previous fix that was done in 2ff5baa9b527 ("HID: appleir:
Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle"), but the alps
driver was missed.
Fix this up by properly checking in the hid-alps driver that it had been
claimed correctly before attempting to process the raw event.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: initialize le_tmp64 in rtw_BIP_verify()
Initialize le_tmp64 to zero in rtw_BIP_verify() to prevent using
uninitialized data.
Smatch warns that only 6 bytes are copied to this 8-byte (u64)
variable, leaving the last two bytes uninitialized:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c:1308 rtw_BIP_verify()
warn: not copying enough bytes for '&le_tmp64' (8 vs 6 bytes)
Initializing the variable at the start of the function fixes this
warning and ensures predictable behavior.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: avoid double-free in smb_direct_free_sendmsg after smb_direct_flush_send_list()
smb_direct_flush_send_list() already calls smb_direct_free_sendmsg(),
so we should not call it again after post_sendmsg()
moved it to the batch list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: avoid double-free in smbd_free_send_io() after smbd_send_batch_flush()
smbd_send_batch_flush() already calls smbd_free_send_io(),
so we should not call it again after smbd_post_send()
moved it to the batch list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: renesas_usb3: validate endpoint index in standard request handlers
The GET_STATUS and SET/CLEAR_FEATURE handlers extract the endpoint
number from the host-supplied wIndex without any sort of validation.
Fix this up by validating the number of endpoints actually match up with
the number the device has before attempting to dereference a pointer
based on this math.
This is just like what was done in commit ee0d382feb44 ("usb: gadget:
aspeed_udc: validate endpoint index for ast udc") for the aspeed driver.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in pn_rx_complete()
A broken/bored/mean USB host can overflow the skb_shared_info->frags[]
array on a Linux gadget exposing a Phonet function by sending an
unbounded sequence of full-page OUT transfers.
pn_rx_complete() finalizes the skb only when req->actual < req->length,
where req->length is set to PAGE_SIZE by the gadget. If the host always
sends exactly PAGE_SIZE bytes per transfer, fp->rx.skb will never be
reset and each completion will add another fragment via
skb_add_rx_frag(). Once nr_frags exceeds MAX_SKB_FRAGS (default 17),
subsequent frag stores overwrite memory adjacent to the shinfo on the
heap.
Drop the skb and account a length error when the frag limit is reached,
matching the fix applied in t7xx by commit f0813bcd2d9d ("net: wwan:
t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path").
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against
ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than
opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of:
ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size)
will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never
exceed, defeating the check entirely.
The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len
- opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can
choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual
transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the
network skb.
Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB
header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and
block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined.
Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed
a related class of issues on the host side of NCM.