In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_uac1_legacy: validate control request size
f_audio_complete() copies req->length bytes into a 4-byte stack
variable:
u32 data = 0;
memcpy(&data, req->buf, req->length);
req->length is derived from the host-controlled USB request path,
which can lead to a stack out-of-bounds write.
Validate req->actual against the expected payload size for the
supported control selectors and decode only the expected amount
of data.
This avoids copying a host-influenced length into a fixed-size
stack object.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_hid: move list and spinlock inits from bind to alloc
There was an issue when you did the following:
- setup and bind an hid gadget
- open /dev/hidg0
- use the resulting fd in EPOLL_CTL_ADD
- unbind the UDC
- bind the UDC
- use the fd in EPOLL_CTL_DEL
When CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST was enabled, a list_del corruption was reported
within remove_wait_queue (via ep_remove_wait_queue). After some
debugging I found out that the queues, which f_hid registers via
poll_wait were the problem. These were initialized using
init_waitqueue_head inside hidg_bind. So effectively, the bind function
re-initialized the queues while there were still items in them.
The solution is to move the initialization from hidg_bind to hidg_alloc
to extend their lifetimes to the lifetime of the function instance.
Additionally, I found many other possibly problematic init calls in the
bind function, which I moved as well.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_rndis: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the borrowed_net flag is used to indicate whether the network device is
shared and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_subset: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_eem: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ecm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix UAF caused by decrementing sbi->nr_pages[] in f2fs_write_end_io()
The xfstests case "generic/107" and syzbot have both reported a NULL
pointer dereference.
The concurrent scenario that triggers the panic is as follows:
F2FS_WB_CP_DATA write callback umount
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
- blk_mq_end_request
- bio_endio
- f2fs_write_end_io
: dec_page_count(sbi, F2FS_WB_CP_DATA)
: wake_up(&sbi->cp_wait)
- kill_f2fs_super
- kill_block_super
- f2fs_put_super
: iput(sbi->node_inode)
: sbi->node_inode = NULL
: f2fs_in_warm_node_list
- is_node_folio // sbi->node_inode is NULL and panic
The root cause is that f2fs_put_super() calls iput(sbi->node_inode) and
sets sbi->node_inode to NULL after sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA] is
decremented to zero. As a result, f2fs_in_warm_node_list() may
dereference a NULL node_inode when checking whether a folio belongs to
the node inode, leading to a panic.
This patch fixes the issue by calling f2fs_in_warm_node_list() before
decrementing sbi->nr_pages[F2FS_WB_CP_DATA], thus preventing the
use-after-free condition.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix use-after-free of sbi in f2fs_compress_write_end_io()
In f2fs_compress_write_end_io(), dec_page_count(sbi, type) can bring
the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter to zero, unblocking
f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() in f2fs_put_super() on a concurrent unmount
CPU. The unmount path then proceeds to call
f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi), which destroys
sbi->page_array_slab via kmem_cache_destroy(), and eventually
kfree(sbi). Meanwhile, the bio completion callback is still executing:
when it reaches page_array_free(sbi, ...), it dereferences
sbi->page_array_slab — a destroyed slab cache — to call
kmem_cache_free(), causing a use-after-free.
This is the same class of bug as CVE-2026-23234 (which fixed the
equivalent race in f2fs_write_end_io() in data.c), but in the
compressed writeback completion path that was not covered by that fix.
Fix this by moving dec_page_count() to after page_array_free(), so
that all sbi accesses complete before the counter decrement that can
unblock unmount. For non-last folios (where atomic_dec_return on
cic->pending_pages is nonzero), dec_page_count is called immediately
before returning — page_array_free is not reached on this path, so
there is no post-decrement sbi access. For the last folio,
page_array_free runs while the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter is still
nonzero (this folio has not yet decremented it), keeping sbi alive,
and dec_page_count runs as the final operation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a
server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the
chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before
reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate
header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on
pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a
header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive
replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated
extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to
validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator
before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same
validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on
what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.