In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state
Add validation to ensure the cached parent directory inode matches the
directory info in MDS replies. This prevents client-side race conditions
where concurrent operations (e.g. rename) cause r_parent to become stale
between request initiation and reply processing, which could lead to
applying state changes to incorrect directory inodes.
[ idryomov: folded a kerneldoc fixup and a follow-up fix from Alex to
move CEPH_CAP_PIN reference when r_parent is updated:
When the parent directory lock is not held, req->r_parent can become
stale and is updated to point to the correct inode. However, the
associated CEPH_CAP_PIN reference was not being adjusted. The
CEPH_CAP_PIN is a reference on an inode that is tracked for
accounting purposes. Moving this pin is important to keep the
accounting balanced. When the pin was not moved from the old parent
to the new one, it created two problems: The reference on the old,
stale parent was never released, causing a reference leak.
A reference for the new parent was never acquired, creating the risk
of a reference underflow later in ceph_mdsc_release_request(). This
patch corrects the logic by releasing the pin from the old parent and
acquiring it for the new parent when r_parent is switched. This
ensures reference accounting stays balanced. ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vcan0 to become free. Usage count = 2
problem, for j1939 protocol did not have NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification
handler for undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind().
Commit 25fe97cb7620 ("can: j1939: move j1939_priv_put() into sk_destruct
callback") expects that a call to j1939_priv_put() can be unconditionally
delayed until j1939_sk_sock_destruct() is called. But we need to call
j1939_priv_put() against an extra ref held by j1939_sk_bind() call
(as a part of undoing changes made by j1939_sk_bind()) as soon as
NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification fires (i.e. before j1939_sk_sock_destruct()
is called via j1939_sk_release()). Otherwise, the extra ref on "struct
j1939_priv" held by j1939_sk_bind() call prevents "struct net_device" from
dropping the usage count to 1; making it impossible for
unregister_netdevice() to continue.
[mkl: remove space in front of label]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phylink: add lock for serializing concurrent pl->phydev writes with resolver
Currently phylink_resolve() protects itself against concurrent
phylink_bringup_phy() or phylink_disconnect_phy() calls which modify
pl->phydev by relying on pl->state_mutex.
The problem is that in phylink_resolve(), pl->state_mutex is in a lock
inversion state with pl->phydev->lock. So pl->phydev->lock needs to be
acquired prior to pl->state_mutex. But that requires dereferencing
pl->phydev in the first place, and without pl->state_mutex, that is
racy.
Hence the reason for the extra lock. Currently it is redundant, but it
will serve a functional purpose once mutex_lock(&phy->lock) will be
moved outside of the mutex_lock(&pl->state_mutex) section.
Another alternative considered would have been to let phylink_resolve()
acquire the rtnl_mutex, which is also held when phylink_bringup_phy()
and phylink_disconnect_phy() are called. But since phylink_disconnect_phy()
runs under rtnl_lock(), it would deadlock with phylink_resolve() when
calling flush_work(&pl->resolve). Additionally, it would have been
undesirable because it would have unnecessarily blocked many other call
paths as well in the entire kernel, so the smaller-scoped lock was
preferred.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: remove read access to debugfs files
The 'command' and 'netdev_ops' debugfs files are a legacy debugging
interface supported by the i40e driver since its early days by commit
02e9c290814c ("i40e: debugfs interface").
Both of these debugfs files provide a read handler which is mostly useless,
and which is implemented with questionable logic. They both use a static
256 byte buffer which is initialized to the empty string. In the case of
the 'command' file this buffer is literally never used and simply wastes
space. In the case of the 'netdev_ops' file, the last command written is
saved here.
On read, the files contents are presented as the name of the device
followed by a colon and then the contents of their respective static
buffer. For 'command' this will always be "<device>: ". For 'netdev_ops',
this will be "<device>: <last command written>". But note the buffer is
shared between all devices operated by this module. At best, it is mostly
meaningless information, and at worse it could be accessed simultaneously
as there doesn't appear to be any locking mechanism.
We have also recently received multiple reports for both read functions
about their use of snprintf and potential overflow that could result in
reading arbitrary kernel memory. For the 'command' file, this is definitely
impossible, since the static buffer is always zero and never written to.
For the 'netdev_ops' file, it does appear to be possible, if the user
carefully crafts the command input, it will be copied into the buffer,
which could be large enough to cause snprintf to truncate, which then
causes the copy_to_user to read beyond the length of the buffer allocated
by kzalloc.
A minimal fix would be to replace snprintf() with scnprintf() which would
cap the return to the number of bytes written, preventing an overflow. A
more involved fix would be to drop the mostly useless static buffers,
saving 512 bytes and modifying the read functions to stop needing those as
input.
Instead, lets just completely drop the read access to these files. These
are debug interfaces exposed as part of debugfs, and I don't believe that
dropping read access will break any script, as the provided output is
pretty useless. You can find the netdev name through other more standard
interfaces, and the 'netdev_ops' interface can easily result in garbage if
you issue simultaneous writes to multiple devices at once.
In order to properly remove the i40e_dbg_netdev_ops_buf, we need to
refactor its write function to avoid using the static buffer. Instead, use
the same logic as the i40e_dbg_command_write, with an allocated buffer.
Update the code to use this instead of the static buffer, and ensure we
free the buffer on exit. This fixes simultaneous writes to 'netdev_ops' on
multiple devices, and allows us to remove the now unused static buffer
along with removing the read access.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Disable works on hci_unregister_dev
This make use of disable_work_* on hci_unregister_dev since the hci_dev is
about to be freed new submissions are not disarable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Tell memcg to use allow_spinning=false path in bpf_timer_init()
Currently, calling bpf_map_kmalloc_node() from __bpf_async_init() can
cause various locking issues; see the following stack trace (edited for
style) as one example:
...
[10.011566] do_raw_spin_lock.cold
[10.011570] try_to_wake_up (5) double-acquiring the same
[10.011575] kick_pool rq_lock, causing a hardlockup
[10.011579] __queue_work
[10.011582] queue_work_on
[10.011585] kernfs_notify
[10.011589] cgroup_file_notify
[10.011593] try_charge_memcg (4) memcg accounting raises an
[10.011597] obj_cgroup_charge_pages MEMCG_MAX event
[10.011599] obj_cgroup_charge_account
[10.011600] __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook
[10.011603] __kmalloc_node_noprof
...
[10.011611] bpf_map_kmalloc_node
[10.011612] __bpf_async_init
[10.011615] bpf_timer_init (3) BPF calls bpf_timer_init()
[10.011617] bpf_prog_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx_fcg_runnable
[10.011619] bpf__sched_ext_ops_runnable
[10.011620] enqueue_task_scx (2) BPF runs with rq_lock held
[10.011622] enqueue_task
[10.011626] ttwu_do_activate
[10.011629] sched_ttwu_pending (1) grabs rq_lock
...
The above was reproduced on bpf-next (b338cf849ec8) by modifying
./tools/sched_ext/scx_flatcg.bpf.c to call bpf_timer_init() during
ops.runnable(), and hacking the memcg accounting code a bit to make
a bpf_timer_init() call more likely to raise an MEMCG_MAX event.
We have also run into other similar variants (both internally and on
bpf-next), including double-acquiring cgroup_file_kn_lock, the same
worker_pool::lock, etc.
As suggested by Shakeel, fix this by using __GFP_HIGH instead of
GFP_ATOMIC in __bpf_async_init(), so that e.g. if try_charge_memcg()
raises an MEMCG_MAX event, we call __memcg_memory_event() with
@allow_spinning=false and avoid calling cgroup_file_notify() there.
Depends on mm patch
"memcg: skip cgroup_file_notify if spinning is not allowed":
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905201606.66198-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev/
v0 approach s/bpf_map_kmalloc_node/bpf_mem_alloc/
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905061919.439648-1-yepeilin@google.com/
v1 approach:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905234547.862249-1-yepeilin@google.com/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: fix use-after-free when rescheduling brcmf_btcoex_info work
The brcmf_btcoex_detach() only shuts down the btcoex timer, if the
flag timer_on is false. However, the brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc(), which
runs as timer handler, sets timer_on to false. This creates critical
race conditions:
1.If brcmf_btcoex_detach() is called while brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc()
is executing, it may observe timer_on as false and skip the call to
timer_shutdown_sync().
2.The brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc() may then reschedule the brcmf_btcoex_info
worker after the cancel_work_sync() has been executed, resulting in
use-after-free bugs.
The use-after-free bugs occur in two distinct scenarios, depending on
the timing of when the brcmf_btcoex_info struct is freed relative to
the execution of its worker thread.
Scenario 1: Freed before the worker is scheduled
The brcmf_btcoex_info is deallocated before the worker is scheduled.
A race condition can occur when schedule_work(&bt_local->work) is
called after the target memory has been freed. The sequence of events
is detailed below:
CPU0 | CPU1
brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc
| bt_local->timer_on = false;
if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) |
... |
cancel_work_sync(); |
... |
kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE |
| schedule_work(&bt_local->work); // USE
Scenario 2: Freed after the worker is scheduled
The brcmf_btcoex_info is freed after the worker has been scheduled
but before or during its execution. In this case, statements within
the brcmf_btcoex_handler() — such as the container_of macro and
subsequent dereferences of the brcmf_btcoex_info object will cause
a use-after-free access. The following timeline illustrates this
scenario:
CPU0 | CPU1
brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc
| bt_local->timer_on = false;
if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) |
... |
cancel_work_sync(); |
... | schedule_work(); // Reschedule
|
kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE | brcmf_btcoex_handler() // Worker
/* | btci = container_of(....); // USE
The kfree() above could | ...
also occur at any point | btci-> // USE
during the worker's execution|
*/ |
To resolve the race conditions, drop the conditional check and call
timer_shutdown_sync() directly. It can deactivate the timer reliably,
regardless of its current state. Once stopped, the timer_on state is
then set to false.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: ocp: fix use-after-free bugs causing by ptp_ocp_watchdog
The ptp_ocp_detach() only shuts down the watchdog timer if it is
pending. However, if the timer handler is already running, the
timer_delete_sync() is not called. This leads to race conditions
where the devlink that contains the ptp_ocp is deallocated while
the timer handler is still accessing it, resulting in use-after-free
bugs. The following details one of the race scenarios.
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
ptp_ocp_remove() |
ptp_ocp_detach() | ptp_ocp_watchdog()
if (timer_pending(&bp->watchdog))| bp = timer_container_of()
timer_delete_sync() |
|
devlink_free(devlink) //free |
| bp-> //use
Resolve this by unconditionally calling timer_delete_sync() to ensure
the timer is reliably deactivated, preventing any access after free.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix NPD in {arp,neigh}_reduce() when using nexthop objects
When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will
suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is
able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and
valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address
is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::).
The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC
address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if
the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a
NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4].
Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing
it.
[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[2]
#!/bin/bash
ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo
ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb
ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb
ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy
ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0
bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10
arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3
[3]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0
ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0
ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0
ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90
rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77
[4]
#!/bin/bash
ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo
ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb
ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb
ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy
ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0
bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10
ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix NPD when refreshing an FDB entry with a nexthop object
VXLAN FDB entries can point to either a remote destination or an FDB
nexthop group. The latter is usually used in EVPN deployments where
learning is disabled.
However, when learning is enabled, an incoming packet might try to
refresh an FDB entry that points to an FDB nexthop group and therefore
does not have a remote. Such packets should be dropped, but they are
only dropped after dereferencing the non-existent remote, resulting in a
NPD [1] which can be reproduced using [2].
Fix by dropping such packets earlier. Remove the misleading comment from
first_remote_rcu().
[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: mausezahn Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-virtme-g9f6b606b6b37 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_snoop+0x98/0x1e0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vxlan_encap_bypass+0x209/0x240
encap_bypass_if_local+0xb1/0x100
vxlan_xmit_one+0x1375/0x17e0
vxlan_xmit+0x6b4/0x15f0
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
__dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850
__sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
__sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[2]
#!/bin/bash
ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo
ip address add 192.0.2.2/32 dev lo
ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.3 fdb
ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb
ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 12345 localbypass
ip link add name vx1 up type vxlan id 10020 local 192.0.2.2 dstport 54321 learning
bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static dst 192.0.2.2 port 54321 vni 10020
bridge fdb add 00:aa:bb:cc:dd:ee dev vx1 self static nhid 10
mausezahn vx0 -a 00:aa:bb:cc:dd:ee -b 00:11:22:33:44:55 -c 1 -q