In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Pass ab pointer directly to ath12k_dp_tx_get_encap_type()
In ath12k_dp_tx_get_encap_type(), the arvif parameter is only used to
retrieve the ab pointer. In vdev delete sequence the arvif->ar could
become NULL and that would trigger kernel panic.
Since the caller ath12k_dp_tx() already has a valid ab pointer, pass it
directly to avoid panic and unnecessary dereferencing.
PC points to "ath12k_dp_tx+0x228/0x988 [ath12k]"
LR points to "ath12k_dp_tx+0xc8/0x988 [ath12k]".
The Backtrace obtained is as follows:
ath12k_dp_tx+0x228/0x988 [ath12k]
ath12k_mac_tx_check_max_limit+0x608/0x920 [ath12k]
ieee80211_process_measurement_req+0x320/0x348 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x9ac/0x1518 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0xb14/0x1518 [mac80211]
ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb+0x224/0x254 [mac80211]
ieee80211_xmit+0xec/0x100 [mac80211]
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc50/0xf40 [mac80211]
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x2e8/0x308 [mac80211]
netdev_start_xmit+0x150/0x18c
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x74/0xc0
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Avoid accessing uninitialized arvif->ar during beacon miss
During beacon miss handling, ath12k driver iterates over active virtual
interfaces (vifs) and attempts to access the radio object (ar) via
arvif->deflink->ar.
However, after commit aa80f12f3bed ("wifi: ath12k: defer vdev creation for
MLO"), arvif is linked to a radio only after vdev creation, typically when
a channel is assigned or a scan is requested.
For P2P capable devices, a default P2P interface is created by
wpa_supplicant along with regular station interfaces, these serve as dummy
interfaces for P2P-capable stations, lack an associated netdev and initiate
frequent scans to discover neighbor p2p devices. When a scan is initiated
on such P2P vifs, driver selects destination radio (ar) based on scan
frequency, creates a scan vdev, and attaches arvif to the radio. Once the
scan completes or is aborted, the scan vdev is deleted, detaching arvif
from the radio and leaving arvif->ar uninitialized.
While handling beacon miss for station interfaces, P2P interface is also
encountered in the vif iteration and ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss_iter()
tries to dereference the uninitialized arvif->deflink->ar.
Fix this by verifying that vdev is created for the arvif before accessing
its ar during beacon miss handling and similar vif iterator callbacks.
==========================================================================
wlp6s0: detected beacon loss from AP (missed 7 beacons) - probing
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-wt-ath+ #2 PREEMPT(full)
RIP: 0010:ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss_iter+0xb5/0x1a0 [ath12k]
Call Trace:
__iterate_interfaces+0x11a/0x410 [mac80211]
ieee80211_iterate_active_interfaces_atomic+0x61/0x140 [mac80211]
ath12k_mac_handle_beacon_miss+0xa1/0xf0 [ath12k]
ath12k_roam_event+0x393/0x560 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_op_rx+0x1486/0x28c0 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_process_trailer.isra.0+0x2fb/0x620 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_rx_completion_handler+0x448/0x830 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_recv_process_cb+0x549/0x9e0 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_per_engine_service+0xbe/0xf0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_ce_workqueue+0x69/0x120 [ath12k]
process_one_work+0xe3a/0x1430
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00284.1-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix UAF on sva unbind with pending IOPFs
Commit 17fce9d2336d ("iommu/vt-d: Put iopf enablement in domain attach
path") disables IOPF on device by removing the device from its IOMMU's
IOPF queue when the last IOPF-capable domain is detached from the device.
Unfortunately, it did this in a wrong place where there are still pending
IOPFs. As a result, a use-after-free error is potentially triggered and
eventually a kernel panic with a kernel trace similar to the following:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 313 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xd8/0xe0
Workqueue: iopf_queue/dmar0-iopfq iommu_sva_handle_iopf
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iopf_free_group+0xe/0x20
process_one_work+0x197/0x3d0
worker_thread+0x23a/0x350
? rescuer_thread+0x4a0/0x4a0
kthread+0xf8/0x230
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x81/0x260
? kthreads_online_cpu+0x110/0x110
? kthreads_online_cpu+0x110/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x13b/0x170
? kthreads_online_cpu+0x110/0x110
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The intel_pasid_tear_down_entry() function is responsible for blocking
hardware from generating new page faults and flushing all in-flight
ones. Therefore, moving iopf_for_domain_remove() after this function
should resolve this.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen: fix UAF in dmabuf_exp_from_pages()
[dma_buf_fd() fixes; no preferences regarding the tree it goes through -
up to xen folks]
As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.
dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
gntdev dmabuf_exp_from_pages() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close - starting with gntdev_dmabuf itself.
Fix that by doing reserving descriptor before anything else and do
fd_install() only when everything had been set up.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Fix UAF in panthor_gem_create_with_handle() debugfs code
The object is potentially already gone after the drm_gem_object_put().
In general the object should be fully constructed before calling
drm_gem_handle_create(), except the debugfs tracking uses a separate
lock and list and separate flag to denotate whether the object is
actually initialized.
Since I'm touching this all anyway simplify this by only adding the
object to the debugfs when it's ready for that, which allows us to
delete that separate flag. panthor_gem_debugfs_bo_rm() already checks
whether we've actually been added to the list or this is some error
path cleanup.
v2: Fix build issues for !CONFIG_DEBUGFS (Adrián)
v3: Add linebreak and remove outdated comment (Liviu)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/rockchip: vop2: fail cleanly if missing a primary plane for a video-port
Each window of a vop2 is usable by a specific set of video ports, so while
binding the vop2, we look through the list of available windows trying to
find one designated as primary-plane and usable by that specific port.
The code later wants to use drm_crtc_init_with_planes with that found
primary plane, but nothing has checked so far if a primary plane was
actually found.
For whatever reason, the rk3576 vp2 does not have a usable primary window
(if vp0 is also in use) which brought the issue to light and ended in a
null-pointer dereference further down.
As we expect a primary-plane to exist for a video-port, add a check at
the end of the window-iteration and fail probing if none was found.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Fix possible OOB access in mt7996_tx()
Fis possible Out-Of-Boundary access in mt7996_tx routine if link_id is
set to IEEE80211_LINK_UNSPECIFIED
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Fix fp initialization for exception boundary
In the ARM64 BPF JIT when prog->aux->exception_boundary is set for a BPF
program, find_used_callee_regs() is not called because for a program
acting as exception boundary, all callee saved registers are saved.
find_used_callee_regs() sets `ctx->fp_used = true;` when it sees FP
being used in any of the instructions.
For programs acting as exception boundary, ctx->fp_used remains false
even if frame pointer is used by the program and therefore, FP is not
set-up for such programs in the prologue. This can cause the kernel to
crash due to a pagefault.
Fix it by setting ctx->fp_used = true for exception boundary programs as
fp is always saved in such programs.