In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use
I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Sanitise num_phys
Information is stored in mr_sas_port->phy_mask, values larger then size of
this field shouldn't be allowed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: check validation of fault attrs in f2fs_build_fault_attr()
- It missed to check validation of fault attrs in parse_options(),
let's fix to add check condition in f2fs_build_fault_attr().
- Use f2fs_build_fault_attr() in __sbi_store() to clean up code.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Avoid uninitialized value in BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD
[Changes from V1:
- Use a default branch in the switch statement to initialize `val'.]
GCC warns that `val' may be used uninitialized in the
BPF_CRE_READ_BITFIELD macro, defined in bpf_core_read.h as:
[...]
unsigned long long val; \
[...] \
switch (__CORE_RELO(s, field, BYTE_SIZE)) { \
case 1: val = *(const unsigned char *)p; break; \
case 2: val = *(const unsigned short *)p; break; \
case 4: val = *(const unsigned int *)p; break; \
case 8: val = *(const unsigned long long *)p; break; \
} \
[...]
val; \
} \
This patch adds a default entry in the switch statement that sets
`val' to zero in order to avoid the warning, and random values to be
used in case __builtin_preserve_field_info returns unexpected values
for BPF_FIELD_BYTE_SIZE.
Tested in bpf-next master.
No regressions.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: dvb-frontends: tda10048: Fix integer overflow
state->xtal_hz can be up to 16M, so it can overflow a 32 bit integer
when multiplied by pll_mfactor.
Create a new 64 bit variable to hold the calculations.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: replace skb_put with skb_put_zero
Avoid potentially reusing uninitialized data
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix overlapping copy within dml_core_mode_programming
[WHY]
&mode_lib->mp.Watermark and &locals->Watermark are
the same address. memcpy may lead to unexpected behavior.
[HOW]
memmove should be used.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001.
V2: To really improve the handling we would actually
need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal/drivers/mediatek/lvts_thermal: Check NULL ptr on lvts_data
Verify that lvts_data is not NULL before using it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/core: Implement a limit on UMAD receive List
The existing behavior of ib_umad, which maintains received MAD
packets in an unbounded list, poses a risk of uncontrolled growth.
As user-space applications extract packets from this list, the rate
of extraction may not match the rate of incoming packets, leading
to potential list overflow.
To address this, we introduce a limit to the size of the list. After
considering typical scenarios, such as OpenSM processing, which can
handle approximately 100k packets per second, and the 1-second retry
timeout for most packets, we set the list size limit to 200k. Packets
received beyond this limit are dropped, assuming they are likely timed
out by the time they are handled by user-space.
Notably, packets queued on the receive list due to reasons like
timed-out sends are preserved even when the list is full.