In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: qfq: Use cl_is_active to determine whether class is active in qfq_rm_from_ag
This is more of a preventive patch to make the code more consistent and
to prevent possible exploits that employ child qlen manipulations on qfq.
use cl_is_active instead of relying on the child qdisc's qlen to determine
class activation.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: usb_8dev: usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak
Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:
gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").
In usb_8dev_open() -> usb_8dev_start(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are
allocated, added to the priv->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the
complete callback usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and
resubmitted. In usb_8dev_close() -> unlink_all_urbs() the URBs are freed by
calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_submitted).
However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors
the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an
in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not
released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().
Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the
usb_8dev_read_bulk_callback() to the priv->rx_submitted anchor.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gue: Fix skb memleak with inner IP protocol 0.
syzbot reported skb memleak below. [0]
The repro generated a GUE packet with its inner protocol 0.
gue_udp_recv() returns -guehdr->proto_ctype for "resubmit"
in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(), but this only works with
non-zero protocol number.
Let's drop such packets.
Note that 0 is a valid number (IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option).
I think it is not practical to encap HOPOPT in GUE, so once
someone starts to complain, we could pass down a resubmit
flag pointer to distinguish two zeros from the upper layer:
* no error
* resubmit HOPOPT
[0]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888109695a00 (size 240):
comm "syz.0.17", pid 6088, jiffies 4294943096
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 40 c2 10 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............
backtrace (crc a84b336f):
kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:44 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4958 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3b4/0x590 mm/slub.c:5270
__build_skb+0x23/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:474
build_skb+0x20/0x190 net/core/skbuff.c:490
__tun_build_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1541 [inline]
tun_build_skb+0x4a1/0xa40 drivers/net/tun.c:1636
tun_get_user+0xc12/0x2030 drivers/net/tun.c:1770
tun_chr_write_iter+0x71/0x120 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
vfs_write+0x45d/0x710 fs/read_write.c:686
ksys_write+0xa7/0x170 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xa4/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netrom: fix double-free in nr_route_frame()
In nr_route_frame(), old_skb is immediately freed without checking if
nr_neigh->ax25 pointer is NULL. Therefore, if nr_neigh->ax25 is NULL,
the caller function will free old_skb again, causing a double-free bug.
Therefore, to prevent this, we need to modify it to check whether
nr_neigh->ax25 is NULL before freeing old_skb.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: led-class: Only Add LED to leds_list when it is fully ready
Before this change the LED was added to leds_list before led_init_core()
gets called adding it the list before led_classdev.set_brightness_work gets
initialized.
This leaves a window where led_trigger_register() of a LED's default
trigger will call led_trigger_set() which calls led_set_brightness()
which in turn will end up queueing the *uninitialized*
led_classdev.set_brightness_work.
This race gets hit by the lenovo-thinkpad-t14s EC driver which registers
2 LEDs with a default trigger provided by snd_ctl_led.ko in quick
succession. The first led_classdev_register() causes an async modprobe of
snd_ctl_led to run and that async modprobe manages to exactly hit
the window where the second LED is on the leds_list without led_init_core()
being called for it, resulting in:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 5608 at kernel/workqueue.c:4234 __flush_work+0x344/0x390
Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2S01F0B/21N2S01F0B, BIOS N42ET93W (2.23 ) 09/01/2025
...
Call trace:
__flush_work+0x344/0x390 (P)
flush_work+0x2c/0x50
led_trigger_set+0x1c8/0x340
led_trigger_register+0x17c/0x1c0
led_trigger_register_simple+0x84/0xe8
snd_ctl_led_init+0x40/0xf88 [snd_ctl_led]
do_one_initcall+0x5c/0x318
do_init_module+0x9c/0x2b8
load_module+0x7e0/0x998
Close the race window by moving the adding of the LED to leds_list to
after the led_init_core() call.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fou: Don't allow 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.
fou_udp_recv() has the same problem mentioned in the previous
patch.
If FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO is set to 0, skb is not freed by
fou_udp_recv() nor "resubmit"-ted in ip_protocol_deliver_rcu().
Let's forbid 0 for FOU_ATTR_IPPROTO.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
be2net: Fix NULL pointer dereference in be_cmd_get_mac_from_list
When the parameter pmac_id_valid argument of be_cmd_get_mac_from_list() is
set to false, the driver may request the PMAC_ID from the firmware of the
network card, and this function will store that PMAC_ID at the provided
address pmac_id. This is the contract of this function.
However, there is a location within the driver where both
pmac_id_valid == false and pmac_id == NULL are being passed. This could
result in dereferencing a NULL pointer.
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to pass the address of a stub
variable to the function.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Avoid truncating memory addresses
On 32-bit machines with CONFIG_ARM_LPAE, it is possible for lowmem
allocations to be backed by addresses physical memory above the 32-bit
address limit, as found while experimenting with larger VMSPLIT
configurations.
This caused the qemu virt model to crash in the GICv3 driver, which
allocates the 'itt' object using GFP_KERNEL. Since all memory below
the 4GB physical address limit is in ZONE_DMA in this configuration,
kmalloc() defaults to higher addresses for ZONE_NORMAL, and the
ITS driver stores the physical address in a 32-bit 'unsigned long'
variable.
Change the itt_addr variable to the correct phys_addr_t type instead,
along with all other variables in this driver that hold a physical
address.
The gicv5 driver correctly uses u64 variables, while all other irqchip
drivers don't call virt_to_phys or similar interfaces. It's expected that
other device drivers have similar issues, but fixing this one is
sufficient for booting a virtio based guest.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: cap TX credit to local buffer size
The virtio transports derives its TX credit directly from peer_buf_alloc,
which is set from the remote endpoint's SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_SIZE value.
On the host side this means that the amount of data we are willing to
queue for a connection is scaled by a guest-chosen buffer size, rather
than the host's own vsock configuration. A malicious guest can advertise
a large buffer and read slowly, causing the host to allocate a
correspondingly large amount of sk_buff memory.
The same thing would happen in the guest with a malicious host, since
virtio transports share the same code base.
Introduce a small helper, virtio_transport_tx_buf_size(), that
returns min(peer_buf_alloc, buf_alloc), and use it wherever we consume
peer_buf_alloc.
This ensures the effective TX window is bounded by both the peer's
advertised buffer and our own buf_alloc (already clamped to
buffer_max_size via SO_VM_SOCKETS_BUFFER_MAX_SIZE), so a remote peer
cannot force the other to queue more data than allowed by its own
vsock settings.
On an unpatched Ubuntu 22.04 host (~64 GiB RAM), running a PoC with
32 guest vsock connections advertising 2 GiB each and reading slowly
drove Slab/SUnreclaim from ~0.5 GiB to ~57 GiB; the system only
recovered after killing the QEMU process. That said, if QEMU memory is
limited with cgroups, the maximum memory used will be limited.
With this patch applied:
Before:
MemFree: ~61.6 GiB
Slab: ~142 MiB
SUnreclaim: ~117 MiB
After 32 high-credit connections:
MemFree: ~61.5 GiB
Slab: ~178 MiB
SUnreclaim: ~152 MiB
Only ~35 MiB increase in Slab/SUnreclaim, no host OOM, and the guest
remains responsive.
Compatibility with non-virtio transports:
- VMCI uses the AF_VSOCK buffer knobs to size its queue pairs per
socket based on the local vsk->buffer_* values; the remote side
cannot enlarge those queues beyond what the local endpoint
configured.
- Hyper-V's vsock transport uses fixed-size VMBus ring buffers and
an MTU bound; there is no peer-controlled credit field comparable
to peer_buf_alloc, and the remote endpoint cannot drive in-flight
kernel memory above those ring sizes.
- The loopback path reuses virtio_transport_common.c, so it
naturally follows the same semantics as the virtio transport.
This change is limited to virtio_transport_common.c and thus affects
virtio-vsock, vhost-vsock, and loopback, bringing them in line with the
"remote window intersected with local policy" behaviour that VMCI and
Hyper-V already effectively have.
[Stefano: small adjustments after changing the previous patch]
[Stefano: tweak the commit message]