In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's
private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the
card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent
chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory.
Call trace:
usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline]
usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182
usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458
...
hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953
Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into
usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local
before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent
new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed
after the card may be freed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (powerz) Fix use-after-free on USB disconnect
After powerz_disconnect() frees the URB and releases the mutex, a
subsequent powerz_read() call can acquire the mutex and call
powerz_read_data(), which dereferences the freed URB pointer.
Fix by:
- Setting priv->urb to NULL in powerz_disconnect() so that
powerz_read_data() can detect the disconnected state.
- Adding a !priv->urb check at the start of powerz_read_data()
to return -ENODEV on a disconnected device.
- Moving usb_set_intfdata() before hwmon registration so the
disconnect handler can always find the priv pointer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP during subvol create
We have recently observed a number of subvolumes with broken dentries.
ls-ing the parent dir looks like:
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 16 Jan 23 16:49 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 24 Jan 23 16:48 ..
d????????? ? ? ? ? ? broken_subvol
and similarly stat-ing the file fails.
In this state, deleting the subvol fails with ENOENT, but attempting to
create a new file or subvol over it errors out with EEXIST and even
aborts the fs. Which leaves us a bit stuck.
dmesg contains a single notable error message reading:
"could not do orphan cleanup -2"
2 is ENOENT and the error comes from the failure handling path of
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), with the stack leading back up to
btrfs_lookup().
btrfs_lookup
btrfs_lookup_dentry
btrfs_orphan_cleanup // prints that message and returns -ENOENT
After some detailed inspection of the internal state, it became clear
that:
- there are no orphan items for the subvol
- the subvol is otherwise healthy looking, it is not half-deleted or
anything, there is no drop progress, etc.
- the subvol was created a while ago and does the meaningful first
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() call that sets BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP much
later.
- after btrfs_orphan_cleanup() fails, btrfs_lookup_dentry() returns -ENOENT,
which results in a negative dentry for the subvolume via
d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry), leading to the observed behavior. The
bug can be mitigated by dropping the dentry cache, at which point we
can successfully delete the subvolume if we want.
i.e.,
btrfs_lookup()
btrfs_lookup_dentry()
if (!sb_rdonly(inode->vfs_inode)->vfs_inode)
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(sub_root)
test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
btrfs_search_slot() // finds orphan item for inode N
...
prints "could not do orphan cleanup -2"
if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ENOENT))
inode = NULL;
return d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry) // NEGATIVE DENTRY for valid subvolume
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() does test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
on the root when it runs, so it cannot run more than once on a given
root, so something else must run concurrently. However, the obvious
routes to deleting an orphan when nlinks goes to 0 should not be able to
run without first doing a lookup into the subvolume, which should run
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() and set the bit.
The final important observation is that create_subvol() calls
d_instantiate_new() but does not set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP, so if
the dentry cache gets dropped, the next lookup into the subvolume will
make a real call into btrfs_orphan_cleanup() for the first time. This
opens up the possibility of concurrently deleting the inode/orphan items
but most typical evict() paths will be holding a reference on the parent
dentry (child dentry holds parent->d_lockref.count via dget in
d_alloc(), released in __dentry_kill()) and prevent the parent from
being removed from the dentry cache.
The one exception is delayed iputs. Ordered extent creation calls
igrab() on the inode. If the file is unlinked and closed while those
refs are held, iput() in __dentry_kill() decrements i_count but does
not trigger eviction (i_count > 0). The child dentry is freed and the
subvol dentry's d_lockref.count drops to 0, making it evictable while
the inode is still alive.
Since there are two races (the race between writeback and unlink and
the race between lookup and delayed iputs), and there are too many moving
parts, the following three diagrams show the complete picture.
(Only the second and third are races)
Phase 1:
Create Subvol in dentry cache without BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP set
btrfs_mksubvol()
lookup_one_len()
__lookup_slow()
d_alloc_parallel()
__d_alloc() // d_lockref.count = 1
create_subvol(dentry)
// doesn't touch the bit..
d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode) // dentry in cache with d_lockref.c
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: Fix kernel panic when a symbol st_shndx is out of bounds
The module loader doesn't check for bounds of the ELF section index in
simplify_symbols():
for (i = 1; i < symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); i++) {
const char *name = info->strtab + sym[i].st_name;
switch (sym[i].st_shndx) {
case SHN_COMMON:
[...]
default:
/* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */
if (sym[i].st_shndx == info->index.pcpu)
secbase = (unsigned long)mod_percpu(mod);
else
/** HERE --> **/ secbase = info->sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr;
sym[i].st_value += secbase;
break;
}
}
A symbol with an out-of-bounds st_shndx value, for example 0xffff
(known as SHN_XINDEX or SHN_HIRESERVE), may cause a kernel panic:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ...
RIP: 0010:simplify_symbols+0x2b2/0x480
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
This can happen when module ELF is legitimately using SHN_XINDEX or
when it is corrupted.
Add a bounds check in simplify_symbols() to validate that st_shndx is
within the valid range before using it.
This issue was discovered due to a bug in llvm-objcopy, see relevant
discussion for details [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/20251224005752.201911-1-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate PDU length before reading SDU length in l2cap_ecred_data_rcv()
l2cap_ecred_data_rcv() reads the SDU length field from skb->data using
get_unaligned_le16() without first verifying that skb contains at least
L2CAP_SDULEN_SIZE (2) bytes. When skb->len is less than 2, this reads
past the valid data in the skb.
The ERTM reassembly path correctly calls pskb_may_pull() before reading
the SDU length (l2cap_reassemble_sdu, L2CAP_SAR_START case). Apply the
same validation to the Enhanced Credit Based Flow Control data path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_key: validate families in pfkey_send_migrate()
syzbot was able to trigger a crash in skb_put() [1]
Issue is that pfkey_send_migrate() does not check old/new families,
and that set_ipsecrequest() @family argument was truncated,
thus possibly overfilling the skb.
Validate families early, do not wait set_ipsecrequest().
[1]
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8a752120 len:392 put:16 head:ffff88802a4ad040 data:ffff88802a4ad040 tail:0x188 end:0x180 dev:<NULL>
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214 !
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:219 [inline]
skb_put+0x159/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:2655
skb_put_zero include/linux/skbuff.h:2788 [inline]
set_ipsecrequest net/key/af_key.c:3532 [inline]
pfkey_send_migrate+0x1270/0x2e50 net/key/af_key.c:3636
km_migrate+0x155/0x260 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2848
xfrm_migrate+0x2140/0x2450 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:4705
xfrm_do_migrate+0x8ff/0xaa0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3150
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix fanout UAF in packet_release() via NETDEV_UP race
`packet_release()` has a race window where `NETDEV_UP` can re-register a
socket into a fanout group's `arr[]` array. The re-registration is not
cleaned up by `fanout_release()`, leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout
array.
`packet_release()` does NOT zero `po->num` in its `bind_lock` section.
After releasing `bind_lock`, `po->num` is still non-zero and `po->ifindex`
still matches the bound device. A concurrent `packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)`
that already found the socket in `sklist` can re-register the hook.
For fanout sockets, this re-registration calls `__fanout_link(sk, po)`
which adds the socket back into `f->arr[]` and increments `f->num_members`,
but does NOT increment `f->sk_ref`.
The fix sets `po->num` to zero in `packet_release` while `bind_lock` is
held to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window.
This bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based
on CVE-2025-38617.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix circular locking dependency in nci_close_device
nci_close_device() flushes rx_wq and tx_wq while holding req_lock.
This causes a circular locking dependency because nci_rx_work()
running on rx_wq can end up taking req_lock too:
nci_rx_work -> nci_rx_data_packet -> nci_data_exchange_complete
-> __sk_destruct -> rawsock_destruct -> nfc_deactivate_target
-> nci_deactivate_target -> nci_request -> mutex_lock(&ndev->req_lock)
Move the flush of rx_wq after req_lock has been released.
This should safe (I think) because NCI_UP has already been cleared
and the transport is closed, so the work will see it and return
-ENETDOWN.
NIPA has been hitting this running the nci selftest with a debug
kernel on roughly 4% of the runs.