The setcred(2) system call is only available to privileged users. However, before the privilege level of the caller is checked, the user-supplied list of supplementary groups is copied into a fixed-size kernel stack buffer without first validating its length. If the supplied list exceeds the capacity of that buffer, a stack buffer overflow occurs.
Because the bounds check on the supplementary groups list occurs after the kernel stack buffer has already been written, an unprivileged local user may trigger the overflow without holding any special privilege. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the kernel, allowing an unprivileged local user to gain elevated privileges on the affected system.
When processing the header of an incoming message, libnv failed to properly validate the message size.
The lack of validation allows a malicious program to write outside the bounds of a heap allocation. This can trigger a crash or system panic, and it may be possible for an unprivileged user to exploit the bug to elevate their privileges.
When exchanging data over a socket, libnv uses select(2) to wait for data to arrive. However, it does not verify whether the provided socket descriptor fits in select(2)'s file descriptor set size limit of FD_SETSIZE (1024).
An attacker who is able to force a libnv application to allocate large file descriptors, e.g., by opening many descriptors and executing a program which is not careful to close them upon startup, can trigger stack corruption. If the target application is setuid-root, then this could be used to elevate local privileges.
As dhclient is building an environment to pass to dhclient-script, it may need to resize the array of string pointers. The code which expands the array incorrectly calculates its new size when requesting memory, resulting in a heap buffer overrun.
A specially crafted packet can cause dhclient to overrun its buffer of environment entries. This can result in a crash, but it may be possible to leverage this bug to achieve remote code execution.
Incorrect packet validation allowed unbounded recursion parsing SCTP chunk parameters. This can eventually result in a stack overflow and panic.
Remote attackers can craft packets which cause affected systems to panic. This affects any system where pf is configured to process traffic, independent of the configured ruleset.
An operator precedence bug in the kernel results in a scenario where a buffer overflow causes attacker-controlled data to overwrite adjacent execve(2) argument buffers.
The bug may be exploitable by an unprivileged user to obtain superuser privileges.
The BOOTP file field is written to the lease file without escaping embedded double-quotes, allowing injection of arbitrary dhclient.conf directives. When the lease file is subsequently re-parsed by dhclient, e.g., after a system restart, an attacker-controlled field from the lease is passed to dhclient-script(8), which evaluates it.
A rogue DHCP server may be able to execute arbirary code as root on a system running dhclient.
The implementation of TIOCNOTTY failed to clear a back-pointer from the structure representing the controlling terminal to the calling process' session. If the invoking process then exits, the terminal structure may end up containing a pointer to freed memory.
A malicious process can abuse the dangling pointer to grant itself root privileges.
In order to apply a particular protection key to an address range, the kernel must update the corresponding page table entries. The subroutine which handled this failed to take into account the presence of 1GB largepage mappings created using the shm_create_largepage(3) interface. In particular, it would always treat a page directory page entry as pointing to another page table page.
The bug can be abused by an unprivileged user to cause pmap_pkru_update_range() to treat userspace memory as a page table page, and thus overwrite memory to which the application would otherwise not have access.
A regression in the way hashes were calculated caused rules containing the address range syntax (x.x.x.x - y.y.y.y) that only differ in the address range(s) involved to be silently dropped as duplicates. Only the first of such rules is actually loaded into pf. Ranges expressed using the address[/mask-bits] syntax were not affected.
Some keywords representing actions taken on a packet-matching rule, such as 'log', 'return tll', or 'dnpipe', may suffer from the same issue. It is unlikely that users have such configurations, as these rules would always be redundant.
Affected rules are silently ignored, which can lead to unexpected behaviour including over- and underblocking.