n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to version 2.47.13, when n8n-mcp runs in HTTP transport mode, authenticated MCP tools/call requests had their full arguments and JSON-RPC params written to server logs by the request dispatcher and several sibling code paths before any redaction. When a tool call carries credential material — most notably n8n_manage_credentials.data — the raw values can be persisted in logs. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: bearer tokens and OAuth credentials sent through n8n_manage_credentials, per-tenant API keys and webhook auth headers embedded in tool arguments, arbitrary secret-bearing payloads passed to any MCP tool. The issue requires authentication (AUTH_TOKEN accepted by the server), so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger it; the runtime exposure is also reduced by an existing console-silencing layer in HTTP mode, but that layer is fragile and the values are still constructed and passed into the logger. This issue has been patched in version 2.47.13.
n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. From version 2.18.7 to before version 2.50.2, there is an authenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability affecting the webhook trigger tools, the n8n API client (N8N_API_URL), and per-request URLs supplied via the x-n8n-url header in multi-tenant HTTP mode. This issue has been patched in version 2.50.2.
n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to version 2.47.11, when n8n-mcp runs in HTTP transport mode, incoming requests to the POST /mcp endpoint had their request metadata written to server logs regardless of the authentication outcome. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: bearer tokens from the Authorization header, per-tenant API keys from the, x-n8n-key header in multi-tenant setups, JSON-RPC request payloads sent to the MCP endpoint. Access control itself was not bypassed — unauthenticated requests were correctly rejected with 401 Unauthorized — but sensitive values from those rejected requests could still be persisted in logs. This issue has been patched in version 2.47.11.
OpenMcdf is a fully .NET / C# library to manipulate Compound File Binary File Format files, also known as Structured Storage. Prior to version 3.1.3, OpenMcdf does not detect cycles in the directory entry red-black tree of a Compound File Binary (CFB) document. A crafted CFB file with a cycle in the LeftSiblingID / RightSiblingID chain causes Storage.EnumerateEntries() and Storage.OpenStream() to loop indefinitely, consuming the calling thread with no possibility of recovery via try/catch. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.3.
pgx is a PostgreSQL driver and toolkit for Go. Prior to version 5.9.2, SQL injection can occur when the non-default simple protocol is used, a dollar quoted string literal is used in the SQL query, that string literal contains text that would be would be interpreted as a placeholder outside of a string literal, and the value of that placeholder is controllable by the attacker. This issue has been patched in version 5.9.2.
MapServer is a system for developing web-based GIS applications. From version 6.0 to before version 8.6.2, a reflected XSS vulnerability in MapServer's WMS server allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into the browser of any user who opens a crafted WMS URL. The vulnerability is triggered via FORMAT=application/openlayers combined with an unsanitized SRS parameter in WMS 1.3.0 requests. This issue has been patched in version 8.6.2.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via atom table exhaustion when parsing attacker-controlled GraphQL SDL.
Multiple Blueprint.Draft.convert/2 implementations in Absinthe's SDL language modules call String.to_atom/1 on attacker-controlled names from parsed GraphQL SDL documents, including directive names, field names, type names, and argument names. Because atoms are never garbage-collected and the BEAM atom table has a fixed limit (default 1,048,576), each unique name permanently consumes one slot. An attacker can exhaust the atom table by submitting SDL documents containing enough unique names, causing the Erlang VM to abort with system_limit and taking down the entire node.
Any application that passes attacker-controlled GraphQL SDL through Absinthe's parser is exposed — for example, a schema-upload endpoint, a federation gateway that ingests remote SDL, or any developer tool that runs the parser over user-supplied documents.
This issue affects absinthe: from 1.5.0 before 1.10.2.
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe_plug allows reflected cross-site scripting via the GraphiQL interface.
'Elixir.Absinthe.Plug.GraphiQL':js_escape/1 in lib/absinthe/plug/graphiql.ex escapes single quotes and newlines in the query GET parameter before embedding it in an inline JavaScript string, but does not escape backslashes. An attacker can bypass the escaping by prefixing a quote with a backslash (e.g. \'), breaking out of the string context and executing arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser.
This issue affects absinthe_plug: from 1.2.0 before 1.5.10.
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in absinthe-graphql absinthe allows unauthenticated denial of service via quadratic fragment-name uniqueness validation.
'Elixir.Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames':run/2 iterates over all fragments and for each one calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, &(&1.name == name)) — a full linear scan of the fragment list. The result is O(N²) comparisons per document, where N is the number of fragment definitions supplied by the caller.
Because input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query body, N is fully attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60,000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this single validation phase. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required.
This issue affects absinthe: from 1.2.0 before 1.10.2.
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.4.0 and prior to zebra-script version 6.0.0, the fix for CVE-2026-41583 introduced a separate issue due to insufficient error handling of the case where the sighash type is invalid, during sighash computation. Instead of returning an error, the normal flow would resume, and the input sighash buffer would be left untouched. In scenarios where a previous signature validation could leave a valid sighash in the buffer, an invalid hash-type could be incorrectly accepted, which would create a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.4.0 and zebra-script version 6.0.0.