In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: clip: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in to_atmarpd().
atmarpd is protected by RTNL since commit f3a0592b37b8 ("[ATM]: clip
causes unregister hang").
However, it is not enough because to_atmarpd() is called without RTNL,
especially clip_neigh_solicit() / neigh_ops->solicit() is unsleepable.
Also, there is no RTNL dependency around atmarpd.
Let's use a private mutex and RCU to protect access to atmarpd in
to_atmarpd().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport
from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();
add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600
Call Trace:
vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40
__sys_connect+0xe8/0x100
__x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: u_serial: Fix race condition in TTY wakeup
A race condition occurs when gs_start_io() calls either gs_start_rx() or
gs_start_tx(), as those functions briefly drop the port_lock for
usb_ep_queue(). This allows gs_close() and gserial_disconnect() to clear
port.tty and port_usb, respectively.
Use the null-safe TTY Port helper function to wake up TTY.
Example
CPU1: CPU2:
gserial_connect() // lock
gs_close() // await lock
gs_start_rx() // unlock
usb_ep_queue()
gs_close() // lock, reset port.tty and unlock
gs_start_rx() // lock
tty_wakeup() // NPE
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Acquire references on GEM handles for framebuffers
A GEM handle can be released while the GEM buffer object is attached
to a DRM framebuffer. This leads to the release of the dma-buf backing
the buffer object, if any. [1] Trying to use the framebuffer in further
mode-setting operations leads to a segmentation fault. Most easily
happens with driver that use shadow planes for vmap-ing the dma-buf
during a page flip. An example is shown below.
[ 156.791968] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 156.796830] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2255 at drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:1527 dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[...]
[ 156.942028] RIP: 0010:dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.043420] Call Trace:
[ 157.045898] <TASK>
[ 157.048030] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.052436] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.056836] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.061253] ? drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.065567] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.069446] ? __warn.cold+0x58/0xe4
[ 157.073061] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.077111] ? report_bug+0x1dd/0x390
[ 157.080842] ? handle_bug+0x5e/0xa0
[ 157.084389] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
[ 157.088291] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 157.092548] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.096663] ? dma_resv_get_singleton+0x6d/0x230
[ 157.101341] ? __pfx_dma_buf_vmap+0x10/0x10
[ 157.105588] ? __pfx_dma_resv_get_singleton+0x10/0x10
[ 157.110697] drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.114866] drm_gem_vmap+0xa9/0x1b0
[ 157.118763] drm_gem_vmap_unlocked+0x46/0xa0
[ 157.123086] drm_gem_fb_vmap+0xab/0x300
[ 157.126979] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes.part.0+0x487/0xb10
[ 157.133032] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x19d/0x880
[ 157.137701] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x13d/0x2e0
[ 157.142671] ? drm_atomic_nonblocking_commit+0xa0/0x180
[ 157.147988] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x766/0xe40
[...]
[ 157.346424] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Acquiring GEM handles for the framebuffer's GEM buffer objects prevents
this from happening. The framebuffer's cleanup later puts the handle
references.
Commit 1a148af06000 ("drm/gem-shmem: Use dma_buf from GEM object
instance") triggers the segmentation fault easily by using the dma-buf
field more widely. The underlying issue with reference counting has
been present before.
v2:
- acquire the handle instead of the BO (Christian)
- fix comment style (Christian)
- drop the Fixes tag (Christian)
- rename err_ gotos
- add missing Link tag
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: Use devm_kstrdup() to avoid memleak.
sof_pdata->tplg_filename can have address allocated by kstrdup()
and can be overwritten. Memory leak was detected with kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88812391ff60 (size 16):
comm "kworker/4:1", pid 161, jiffies 4294802931
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
73 6f 66 2d 68 64 61 2d 67 65 6e 65 72 69 63 00 sof-hda-generic.
backtrace (crc 4bf1675c):
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x49c/0x6b0
kstrdup+0x46/0xc0
hda_machine_select.cold+0x1de/0x12cf [snd_sof_intel_hda_generic]
sof_init_environment+0x16f/0xb50 [snd_sof]
sof_probe_continue+0x45/0x7c0 [snd_sof]
sof_probe_work+0x1e/0x40 [snd_sof]
process_one_work+0x894/0x14b0
worker_thread+0x5e5/0xfb0
kthread+0x39d/0x760
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid1: Fix stack memory use after return in raid1_reshape
In the raid1_reshape function, newpool is
allocated on the stack and assigned to conf->r1bio_pool.
This results in conf->r1bio_pool.wait.head pointing
to a stack address.
Accessing this address later can lead to a kernel panic.
Example access path:
raid1_reshape()
{
// newpool is on the stack
mempool_t newpool, oldpool;
// initialize newpool.wait.head to stack address
mempool_init(&newpool, ...);
conf->r1bio_pool = newpool;
}
raid1_read_request() or raid1_write_request()
{
alloc_r1bio()
{
mempool_alloc()
{
// if pool->alloc fails
remove_element()
{
--pool->curr_nr;
}
}
}
}
mempool_free()
{
if (pool->curr_nr < pool->min_nr) {
// pool->wait.head is a stack address
// wake_up() will try to access this invalid address
// which leads to a kernel panic
return;
wake_up(&pool->wait);
}
}
Fix:
reinit conf->r1bio_pool.wait after assigning newpool.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/scheduler: signal scheduled fence when kill job
When an entity from application B is killed, drm_sched_entity_kill()
removes all jobs belonging to that entity through
drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(). If application A's job depends on a
scheduled fence from application B's job, and that fence is not properly
signaled during the killing process, application A's dependency cannot be
cleared.
This leads to application A hanging indefinitely while waiting for a
dependency that will never be resolved. Fix this issue by ensuring that
scheduled fences are properly signaled when an entity is killed, allowing
dependent applications to continue execution.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: Modify the EEPROM and OTP size for PCI1xxxx devices
Maximum OTP and EEPROM size for hearthstone PCI1xxxx devices are 8 Kb
and 64 Kb respectively. Adjust max size definitions and return correct
EEPROM length based on device. Also prevent out-of-bound read/write.