In FreeBSD before 11.2-STABLE(r338983), 11.2-RELEASE-p4, 11.1-RELEASE-p15, 10.4-STABLE(r338984), and 10.4-RELEASE-p13, due to insufficient initialization of memory copied to userland in the getcontext and swapcontext system calls, small amounts of kernel memory may be disclosed to userland processes. Unprivileged authenticated local users may be able to access small amounts privileged kernel data.
In FreeBSD before 11.2-RELEASE, a stack guard-page is available but is disabled by default. This results in the possibility a poorly written process could be cause a stack overflow.
In FreeBSD before 11.2-RELEASE, multiple issues with the implementation of the stack guard-page reduce the protections afforded by the guard-page. This results in the possibility a poorly written process could be cause a stack overflow.
In FreeBSD before 11.2-RELEASE, an application which calls setrlimit() to increase RLIMIT_STACK may turn a read-only memory region below the stack into a read-write region. A specially crafted executable could be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the user context.
In FreeBSD before 11.0-STABLE, 11.0-RELEASE-p10, 10.3-STABLE, and 10.3-RELEASE-p19, ipfilter using "keep state" or "keep frags" options can cause a kernel panic when fed specially crafted packet fragments due to incorrect memory handling.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the four-way handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) allows reinstallation of the Group Temporal Key (GTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11w allows reinstallation of the Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK) during the group key handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to spoof frames from access points to clients.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) that supports IEEE 802.11r allows reinstallation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Temporal Key (TK) during the fast BSS transmission (FT) handshake, allowing an attacker within radio range to replay, decrypt, or spoof frames.