In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix NULL pointer dereference in ice_reset_all_vfs()
ice_reset_all_vfs() ignores the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi().
When the VSI rebuild fails (e.g. during NVM firmware update via
nvmupdate64e), ice_vsi_rebuild() tears down the VSI on its error path,
leaving txq_map and rxq_map as NULL. The subsequent unconditional call
to ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() leads to a NULL pointer dereference in
ice_ena_vf_q_mappings() when it accesses vsi->txq_map[0].
The single-VF reset path in ice_reset_vf() already handles this
correctly by checking the return value of ice_vf_reconfig_vsi() and
skipping ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() on failure.
Apply the same pattern to ice_reset_all_vfs(): check the return value
of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi() and skip ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() and
ice_eswitch_attach_vf() on failure. The VF is left safely disabled
(ICE_VF_STATE_INIT not set, VFGEN_RSTAT not set to VFACTIVE) and can
be recovered via a VFLR triggered by a PCI reset of the VF
(sysfs reset or driver rebind).
Note that this patch does not prevent the VF VSI rebuild from failing
during NVM update — the underlying cause is firmware being in a
transitional state while the EMP reset is processed, which can cause
Admin Queue commands (ice_add_vsi, ice_cfg_vsi_lan) to fail. This
patch only prevents the subsequent NULL pointer dereference that
crashes the kernel when the rebuild does fail.
crash> bt
PID: 50795 TASK: ff34c9ee708dc680 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u512:5"
#0 [ff72159bcfe5bb50] machine_kexec at ffffffffaa8850ee
#1 [ff72159bcfe5bba8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa15fba
#2 [ff72159bcfe5bc68] crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa16540
#3 [ff72159bcfe5bc70] oops_end at ffffffffaa837eda
#4 [ff72159bcfe5bc90] page_fault_oops at ffffffffaa893997
#5 [ff72159bcfe5bce8] exc_page_fault at ffffffffab528595
#6 [ff72159bcfe5bd10] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffab600bb2
[exception RIP: ice_ena_vf_q_mappings+0x79]
RIP: ffffffffc0a85b29 RSP: ff72159bcfe5bdc8 RFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00000000000f0000 RBX: ff34c9efc9c00000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: ff34c9efc9c00000
RBP: ff34c9efc27d4828 R8: 0000000000000093 R9: 0000000000000040
R10: ff34c9efc27d4828 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: 0000000000100000
R13: 0000000000000010 R14: R15:
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ff72159bcfe5bdf8] ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild at ffffffffc0a85e2e [ice]
#8 [ff72159bcfe5be08] ice_reset_all_vfs at ffffffffc0a920b4 [ice]
#9 [ff72159bcfe5be48] ice_service_task at ffffffffc0a31519 [ice]
#10 [ff72159bcfe5be88] process_one_work at ffffffffaa93dca4
#11 [ff72159bcfe5bec8] worker_thread at ffffffffaa93e9de
#12 [ff72159bcfe5bf18] kthread at ffffffffaa946663
#13 [ff72159bcfe5bf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffaa8086b9
The panic occurs attempting to dereference the NULL pointer in RDX at
ice_sriov.c:294, which loads vsi->txq_map (offset 0x4b8 in ice_vsi).
The faulting VSI is an allocated slab object but not fully initialized
after a failed ice_vsi_rebuild():
crash> struct ice_vsi 0xff34c9efc27d4828
netdev = 0x0,
rx_rings = 0x0,
tx_rings = 0x0,
q_vectors = 0x0,
txq_map = 0x0,
rxq_map = 0x0,
alloc_txq = 0x10,
num_txq = 0x10,
alloc_rxq = 0x10,
num_rxq = 0x10,
The nvmupdate64e process was performing NVM firmware update:
crash> bt 0xff34c9edd1a30000
PID: 49858 TASK: ff34c9edd1a30000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "nvmupdate64e"
#0 [ff72159bcd617618] __schedule at ffffffffab5333f8
#4 [ff72159bcd617750] ice_sq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a35347 [ice]
#5 [ff72159bcd6177a8] ice_sq_send_cmd_retry at ffffffffc0a35b47 [ice]
#6 [ff72159bcd617810] ice_aq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a38018 [ice]
#7 [ff72159bcd617848] ice_aq_read_nvm at ffffffffc0a40254 [ice]
#8
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/eustall: Fix drm_dev_put called before stream disable in close
In xe_eu_stall_stream_close(), drm_dev_put() is called before the
stream is disabled and its resources are freed. If this drops the
last reference, the device structures could be freed while the
subsequent cleanup code still accesses them, leading to a
use-after-free.
Fix this by moving drm_dev_put() after all device accesses are
complete. This matches the ordering in xe_oa_release().
(cherry picked from commit 35aff528f7297e949e5e19c9cd7fd748cf1cf21c)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda/conexant: Fix missing error check for jack detection
In cx_probe(), the return value of snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback()
is ignored. This function returns a pointer, and if it fails (e.g., due
to memory allocation failure), it returns an error pointer which must
be checked using IS_ERR().
If the registration fails, the driver continues to probe, but the jack
detection callback will not be registered. This can lead to a kernel
crash later when the driver attempts to handle jack events or accesses
the uninitialized structure.
Check the return value using IS_ERR() and propagate the error via
PTR_ERR() to the probe caller.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: Push kjump return address even for non-kjump kexec
The version of purgatory code shipped by kexec-tools attempts to look above
the top of its stack to find a return address for a kjump, even in a non-kjump
kexec.
After the commit in Fixes: the word above the stack might not be there,
leading to a fault (which is at least now caught by my exception-handling code
in kexec).
That commit fixed things for the actual kjump path, but no longer
"gratuitously" pushes the unused return address to the stack in the non-kjump
path. Put that *back* in the non-kjump path, to prevent purgatory from
crashing when trying to access it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()
iommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via
bus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The
inlined check_device() path computes the device's sbdf, calls
rlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards
verifies devid <= pci_seg->last_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes
rlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI
device whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past
the end of the allocation before the caller's bounds check can run.
This was harmless before commit e874c666b15b ("iommu/amd: Change
rlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()"): the table was a
zeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the
caller's NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is
a tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents,
which check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *,
causing a boot-time GPF.
Seen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS
describes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at
00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation,
into the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object:
pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0
pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1
pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2
pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025
RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0
Call Trace:
__iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520
probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50
bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0
iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240
iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60
amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40
pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60
do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0
Guard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied
on 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: only release the dirty pages io tree after successful writes
[WARNING]
With extra warning on dirty extent buffers at umount (aka, the next
patch in the series), test case generic/388 can trigger the following
warning about dirty extent buffers at unmount time:
BTRFS critical (device dm-2 state E): emergency shutdown
BTRFS error (device dm-2 state E): error while writing out transaction: -30
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state E): Skipping commit of aborted transaction.
BTRFS error (device dm-2 state EA): Transaction 9 aborted (error -30)
BTRFS: error (device dm-2 state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2068: errno=-30 Readonly filesystem
BTRFS info (device dm-2 state EA): forced readonly
BTRFS info (device dm-2 state EA): last unmount of filesystem 4fbf2e15-f941-49a0-bc7c-716315d2777c
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: disk-io.c:3311 at invalidate_and_check_btree_folios+0xfd/0x1ca [btrfs], CPU#8: umount/914368
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 914368 Comm: umount Tainted: G OE 7.1.0-rc1-custom+ #372 PREEMPT(full) 2de38db8d1deae71fde295430a0ff3ab98ccf596
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
RIP: 0010:invalidate_and_check_btree_folios+0xfd/0x1ca [btrfs]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
close_ctree+0x52e/0x574 [btrfs d2f0b1cd330d1287e7a9919d112eadfc0e914efd]
generic_shutdown_super+0x89/0x1a0
kill_anon_super+0x16/0x40
btrfs_kill_super+0x16/0x20 [btrfs d2f0b1cd330d1287e7a9919d112eadfc0e914efd]
deactivate_locked_super+0x2d/0xb0
cleanup_mnt+0xdc/0x140
task_work_run+0x5a/0xa0
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x123/0x4b0
do_syscall_64+0x243/0x7c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30539776 owner 9 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30621696 owner 257 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30638080 owner 258 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30654464 owner 7 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30703616 owner 2 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30720000 owner 10 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30736384 owner 4 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
BTRFS warning (device dm-2 state EA): unable to release extent buffer 30752768 owner 11 gen 9 refs 2 flags 0x7
I'm using a stripped down version, which seems to trigger the warning
more reliably:
_fsstress_pid=""
workload()
{
dmesg -C
mkfs.btrfs -f -K $dev > /dev/null
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/clear_warn_once
mount $dev $mnt
$fsstress -w -n 1024 -p 4 -d $mnt &
_fsstress_pid=$!
sleep 0
$godown $mnt
pkill --echo -PIPE fsstress > /dev/null
wait $_fsstress_pid
unset _fsstress_pid
umount $mnt
if dmesg | grep -q "WARNING"; then
fail
fi
}
for (( i = 0; i < $runtime; i++ )); do
echo "=== $i/$runtime ==="
workload
done
[CAUSE]
Inside btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction(), we first try to write all
dirty ebs, then wait for them to finish.
After that we call btrfs_extent_io_tree_release() to free all
extent states from dirty_pages io tree.
However if we hit an error from btrfs_write_marked_extent(), then we
still call btrfs_extent_io_tree_release() to clear that dirty_pages io
tree, which may contain dirty records that we haven't yet submitted.
Furthermore, the later transaction cleanup path will utilize that
dirty_pages io tree to properly cleanup those dirty ebs, but since it's
already empty, no dirty ebs are properly cleaned up, thus will later
trigger the warnings inside invalidate_btree_folios().
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gma500/oaktrail_lvds: fix hang on init failure
The LVDS init code looks up an I2C adapter using i2c_get_adapter() and
tries to read the EDID before falling back to allocating and registering
its own adapter.
The error handling does not separate these cases so on a late init
failure it will try to deregister and free also an adapter that had
previously been registered. Since i2c_get_adapter() takes another
reference to the adapter, deregistration hangs indefinitely while
waiting for the reference to be released.
Fix this by only destroying adapters allocated during LVDS init on
errors.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Avoid NULL pointer dereference or refcount corruption
Commit 60f030f7418d ("iommu/vt-d: Avoid use of NULL after WARN_ON_ONCE")
fixed a NULL pointer dereference in an unlikely situation partly.
If dev_pasid is not found in the dev_pasids list, it remains NULL.
However, the teardown operations are executed unconditionally, this lead
to a NULL pointer dereference or refcount corruption.
If the domain was never attached to this IOMMU, info will be NULL, which
would cause an immediate dereference when checking --info->refcnt.
Even if info is not NULL, decrementing the refcount without having removed
a valid PASID might unbalance the count. This could lead to premature
dropping of the refcount to 0, potentially causing a use-after-free for the
remaining active devices sharing the domain.
Fix it by returning early if dev_pasid is NULL, before executing the
teardown operations.
Issue found by AI review and suggested by Kevin Tian.
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260421031347.1408890-1-zhenzhong.duan%40intel.com
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: add mutex to guard hook reference counting
As the synproxy infrastructure register netfilter hooks on-demand when a
user adds the first iptables target or nftables expression, if done
concurrently they can race each other.
Introduce a mutex to serialize the refcount control blocks access from
both frontends. While a per namespace mutex might be more efficient, it
is not needed for target/expression like SYNPROXY.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: clear the svc scheduler ptr early on edit
ip_vs_edit_service() while unbinding the old scheduler clears
the svc->scheduler ptr after the scheduler module initiates
RCU callbacks. This can cause packets to use the old
scheduler at the time when svc->sched_data is already freed
after RCU grace period.
Fix it by clearing the ptr early in ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(),
before the done_service method schedules any RCU callbacks.
Also, if the new scheduler fails to initialize when replacing
the old scheduler, try to restore the old scheduler while still
returning the error code.