In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP during subvol create
We have recently observed a number of subvolumes with broken dentries.
ls-ing the parent dir looks like:
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 16 Jan 23 16:49 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 24 Jan 23 16:48 ..
d????????? ? ? ? ? ? broken_subvol
and similarly stat-ing the file fails.
In this state, deleting the subvol fails with ENOENT, but attempting to
create a new file or subvol over it errors out with EEXIST and even
aborts the fs. Which leaves us a bit stuck.
dmesg contains a single notable error message reading:
"could not do orphan cleanup -2"
2 is ENOENT and the error comes from the failure handling path of
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), with the stack leading back up to
btrfs_lookup().
btrfs_lookup
btrfs_lookup_dentry
btrfs_orphan_cleanup // prints that message and returns -ENOENT
After some detailed inspection of the internal state, it became clear
that:
- there are no orphan items for the subvol
- the subvol is otherwise healthy looking, it is not half-deleted or
anything, there is no drop progress, etc.
- the subvol was created a while ago and does the meaningful first
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() call that sets BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP much
later.
- after btrfs_orphan_cleanup() fails, btrfs_lookup_dentry() returns -ENOENT,
which results in a negative dentry for the subvolume via
d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry), leading to the observed behavior. The
bug can be mitigated by dropping the dentry cache, at which point we
can successfully delete the subvolume if we want.
i.e.,
btrfs_lookup()
btrfs_lookup_dentry()
if (!sb_rdonly(inode->vfs_inode)->vfs_inode)
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(sub_root)
test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
btrfs_search_slot() // finds orphan item for inode N
...
prints "could not do orphan cleanup -2"
if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ENOENT))
inode = NULL;
return d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry) // NEGATIVE DENTRY for valid subvolume
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() does test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
on the root when it runs, so it cannot run more than once on a given
root, so something else must run concurrently. However, the obvious
routes to deleting an orphan when nlinks goes to 0 should not be able to
run without first doing a lookup into the subvolume, which should run
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() and set the bit.
The final important observation is that create_subvol() calls
d_instantiate_new() but does not set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP, so if
the dentry cache gets dropped, the next lookup into the subvolume will
make a real call into btrfs_orphan_cleanup() for the first time. This
opens up the possibility of concurrently deleting the inode/orphan items
but most typical evict() paths will be holding a reference on the parent
dentry (child dentry holds parent->d_lockref.count via dget in
d_alloc(), released in __dentry_kill()) and prevent the parent from
being removed from the dentry cache.
The one exception is delayed iputs. Ordered extent creation calls
igrab() on the inode. If the file is unlinked and closed while those
refs are held, iput() in __dentry_kill() decrements i_count but does
not trigger eviction (i_count > 0). The child dentry is freed and the
subvol dentry's d_lockref.count drops to 0, making it evictable while
the inode is still alive.
Since there are two races (the race between writeback and unlink and
the race between lookup and delayed iputs), and there are too many moving
parts, the following three diagrams show the complete picture.
(Only the second and third are races)
Phase 1:
Create Subvol in dentry cache without BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP set
btrfs_mksubvol()
lookup_one_len()
__lookup_slow()
d_alloc_parallel()
__d_alloc() // d_lockref.count = 1
create_subvol(dentry)
// doesn't touch the bit..
d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode) // dentry in cache with d_lockref.c
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: Fix kernel panic when a symbol st_shndx is out of bounds
The module loader doesn't check for bounds of the ELF section index in
simplify_symbols():
for (i = 1; i < symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); i++) {
const char *name = info->strtab + sym[i].st_name;
switch (sym[i].st_shndx) {
case SHN_COMMON:
[...]
default:
/* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */
if (sym[i].st_shndx == info->index.pcpu)
secbase = (unsigned long)mod_percpu(mod);
else
/** HERE --> **/ secbase = info->sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr;
sym[i].st_value += secbase;
break;
}
}
A symbol with an out-of-bounds st_shndx value, for example 0xffff
(known as SHN_XINDEX or SHN_HIRESERVE), may cause a kernel panic:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ...
RIP: 0010:simplify_symbols+0x2b2/0x480
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
This can happen when module ELF is legitimately using SHN_XINDEX or
when it is corrupted.
Add a bounds check in simplify_symbols() to validate that st_shndx is
within the valid range before using it.
This issue was discovered due to a bug in llvm-objcopy, see relevant
discussion for details [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/20251224005752.201911-1-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_key: validate families in pfkey_send_migrate()
syzbot was able to trigger a crash in skb_put() [1]
Issue is that pfkey_send_migrate() does not check old/new families,
and that set_ipsecrequest() @family argument was truncated,
thus possibly overfilling the skb.
Validate families early, do not wait set_ipsecrequest().
[1]
skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff8a752120 len:392 put:16 head:ffff88802a4ad040 data:ffff88802a4ad040 tail:0x188 end:0x180 dev:<NULL>
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214 !
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:219 [inline]
skb_put+0x159/0x210 net/core/skbuff.c:2655
skb_put_zero include/linux/skbuff.h:2788 [inline]
set_ipsecrequest net/key/af_key.c:3532 [inline]
pfkey_send_migrate+0x1270/0x2e50 net/key/af_key.c:3636
km_migrate+0x155/0x260 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2848
xfrm_migrate+0x2140/0x2450 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:4705
xfrm_do_migrate+0x8ff/0xaa0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3150
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix fanout UAF in packet_release() via NETDEV_UP race
`packet_release()` has a race window where `NETDEV_UP` can re-register a
socket into a fanout group's `arr[]` array. The re-registration is not
cleaned up by `fanout_release()`, leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout
array.
`packet_release()` does NOT zero `po->num` in its `bind_lock` section.
After releasing `bind_lock`, `po->num` is still non-zero and `po->ifindex`
still matches the bound device. A concurrent `packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)`
that already found the socket in `sklist` can re-register the hook.
For fanout sockets, this re-registration calls `__fanout_link(sk, po)`
which adds the socket back into `f->arr[]` and increments `f->num_members`,
but does NOT increment `f->sk_ref`.
The fix sets `po->num` to zero in `packet_release` while `bind_lock` is
held to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window.
This bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based
on CVE-2025-38617.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udp: Fix wildcard bind conflict check when using hash2
When binding a udp_sock to a local address and port, UDP uses
two hashes (udptable->hash and udptable->hash2) for collision
detection. The current code switches to "hash2" when
hslot->count > 10.
"hash2" is keyed by local address and local port.
"hash" is keyed by local port only.
The issue can be shown in the following bind sequence (pseudo code):
bind(fd1, "[fd00::1]:8888")
bind(fd2, "[fd00::2]:8888")
bind(fd3, "[fd00::3]:8888")
bind(fd4, "[fd00::4]:8888")
bind(fd5, "[fd00::5]:8888")
bind(fd6, "[fd00::6]:8888")
bind(fd7, "[fd00::7]:8888")
bind(fd8, "[fd00::8]:8888")
bind(fd9, "[fd00::9]:8888")
bind(fd10, "[fd00::10]:8888")
/* Correctly return -EADDRINUSE because "hash" is used
* instead of "hash2". udp_lib_lport_inuse() detects the
* conflict.
*/
bind(fail_fd, "[::]:8888")
/* After one more socket is bound to "[fd00::11]:8888",
* hslot->count exceeds 10 and "hash2" is used instead.
*/
bind(fd11, "[fd00::11]:8888")
bind(fail_fd, "[::]:8888") /* succeeds unexpectedly */
The same issue applies to the IPv4 wildcard address "0.0.0.0"
and the IPv4-mapped wildcard address "::ffff:0.0.0.0". For
example, if there are existing sockets bound to
"192.168.1.[1-11]:8888", then binding "0.0.0.0:8888" or
"[::ffff:0.0.0.0]:8888" can also miss the conflict when
hslot->count > 10.
TCP inet_csk_get_port() already has the correct check in
inet_use_bhash2_on_bind(). Rename it to
inet_use_hash2_on_bind() and move it to inet_hashtables.h
so udp.c can reuse it in this fix.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: use netlink policy range checks
Replace manual range and mask validations with netlink policy
annotations in ctnetlink code paths, so that the netlink core rejects
invalid values early and can generate extack errors.
- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_STATE: reject values > TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT2 at
policy level, removing the manual >= TCP_CONNTRACK_MAX check.
- CTA_PROTOINFO_TCP_WSCALE_ORIGINAL/REPLY: reject values > TCP_MAX_WSCALE
(14). The normal TCP option parsing path already clamps to this value,
but the ctnetlink path accepted 0-255, causing undefined behavior when
used as a u32 shift count.
- CTA_FILTER_ORIG_FLAGS/REPLY_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with
CTA_FILTER_F_ALL, removing the manual mask checks.
- CTA_EXPECT_FLAGS: use NLA_POLICY_MASK with NF_CT_EXPECT_MASK, adding
a new mask define grouping all valid expect flags.
Extracted from a broader nf-next patch by Florian Westphal, scoped to
ctnetlink for the fixes tree.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: skip expectations in other netns via proc
Skip expectations that do not reside in this netns.
Similar to e77e6ff502ea ("netfilter: conntrack: do not dump other netns's
conntrack entries via proc").
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on
the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly
tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest
them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.
Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles,
which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes.
Reproducer:
$ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do
echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a;
pf="$pf//x";
done
$ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove
Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an
iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly
finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed,
maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfnetlink_osf: validate individual option lengths in fingerprints
nfnl_osf_add_callback() validates opt_num bounds and string
NUL-termination but does not check individual option length fields.
A zero-length option causes nf_osf_match_one() to enter the option
matching loop even when foptsize sums to zero, which matches packets
with no TCP options where ctx->optp is NULL:
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:nf_osf_match_one (net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:98)
Call Trace:
nf_osf_match (net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:227)
xt_osf_match_packet (net/netfilter/xt_osf.c:32)
ipt_do_table (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:293)
nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:623)
ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573)
Additionally, an MSS option (kind=2) with length < 4 causes
out-of-bounds reads when nf_osf_match_one() unconditionally accesses
optp[2] and optp[3] for MSS value extraction. While RFC 9293
section 3.2 specifies that the MSS option is always exactly 4
bytes (Kind=2, Length=4), the check uses "< 4" rather than
"!= 4" because lengths greater than 4 do not cause memory
safety issues -- the buffer is guaranteed to be at least
foptsize bytes by the ctx->optsize == foptsize check.
Reject fingerprints where any option has zero length, or where an MSS
option has length less than 4, at add time rather than trusting these
values in the packet matching hot path.