Mattermost fails to properly validate the length of the emoji value in the custom user status, allowing an attacker to send multiple times a very long string as an emoji value causing high resource consumption and possibly crashing the server.
Mattermost fails to check if compliance export is enabled when fetching posts of public channels allowing a user that is not a member of the public channel to fetch the posts, which will not be audited in the compliance export.
Mattermost fails to check if a custom emoji reaction exists when sending it to a post and to limit the amount of custom emojis allowed to be added in a post, allowing an attacker sending a huge amount of non-existent custom emojis in a post to crash the mobile app of a user seeing the post and to crash the server due to overloading when clients attempt to retrive the aforementioned post.
Mattermost Jira Plugin fails to protect against logout CSRF allowing an attacker to post a specially crafted message that would disconnect a user's Jira connection in Mattermost only by viewing the message.
Mattermost Jira Plugin handling subscriptions fails to check the security level of an incoming issue or limit it based on the user who created the subscription resulting in registered users on Jira being able to create webhooks that give them access to all Jira issues.
Mattermost fails to check the required permissions in the POST /api/v4/channels/stats/member_count API resulting in channel member counts being leaked to a user without permissions.