A prompt bypass exists in the secondscreen.gateway service running on webOS version 4 through 7. An attacker can create a privileged account without asking the user for the security PIN.
Full versions and TV models affected:
webOS 4.9.7 - 5.30.40 running on LG43UM7000PLA
webOS 5.5.0 - 04.50.51 running on OLED55CXPUA
webOS 6.3.3-442 (kisscurl-kinglake) - 03.36.50 running on OLED48C1PUB
webOS 7.3.1-43 (mullet-mebin) - 03.33.85 running on OLED55A23LA
A command injection vulnerability exists in the processAnalyticsReport method from the com.webos.service.cloudupload service on webOS version 5 through 7. A series of specially crafted requests can lead to command execution as the root user. An attacker can make authenticated requests to trigger this vulnerability.
Full versions and TV models affected:
* webOS 5.5.0 - 04.50.51 running on OLED55CXPUA
* webOS 6.3.3-442 (kisscurl-kinglake) - 03.36.50 running on OLED48C1PUB
* webOS 7.3.1-43 (mullet-mebin) - 03.33.85 running on OLED55A23LA
he vulnerability is that the Call management ("com.android.server.telecom") app patched by LG launches implicit intents that disclose sensitive data to all third-party apps installed on the same device. Those intents include data such as contact details and phone numbers.
he vulnerability is to delete arbitrary files in LGInstallService ("com.lge.lginstallservies") app. The app contains the exported "com.lge.lginstallservies.InstallService" service that exposes an AIDL interface. All its "installPackage*" methods are finally calling the "installPackageVerify()" method that performs signature validation after the delete file method. An attacker can control conditions so this security check is never performed and an attacker-controlled file is deleted.
The vulnerability is that the Messaging ("com.android.mms") app patched by LG forwards attacker-controlled intents back to the attacker in the exported "com.android.mms.ui.QClipIntentReceiverActivity" activity. The attacker can abuse this functionality by launching this activity and then sending a broadcast with the "com.lge.message.action.QCLIP" action. The attacker can send, e.g., their own data/clipdata and set Intent.FLAG_GRANT_* flags. After the attacker received that intent in the "onActivityResult()" method, they would have access to arbitrary content providers that have the `android:grantUriPermissions="true"` flag set.
The vulnerability is that the Call management ("com.android.server.telecom") app patched by LG sends a lot of LG-owned implicit broadcasts that disclose sensitive data to all third-party apps installed on the same device. Those intents include data such as call states, durations, called numbers, contacts info, etc.