In wolfSSL 5.8.4, constant-time masking logic in sp_256_get_entry_256_9 is optimized into conditional branches (bnez) by GCC when targeting RISC-V RV32I with -O3. This transformation breaks the side-channel resistance of ECC scalar multiplication, potentially allowing a local attacker to recover secret keys via timing analysis.
Protection mechanism failure in wolfCrypt post-quantum implementations (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) in wolfSSL on ARM Cortex-M microcontrollers allows a physical attacker to compromise key material and/or cryptographic outcomes via induced transient faults that corrupt or redirect seed/pointer values during Keccak-based expansion.
This issue affects wolfSSL (wolfCrypt): commit hash d86575c766e6e67ef93545fa69c04d6eb49400c6.
In wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier, a logic flaw existed in the TLS 1.2 server state machine implementation. The server could incorrectly accept the CertificateVerify message before the ClientKeyExchange message had been received. This issue affects wolfSSL before 5.8.4 (wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier is vulnerable, 5.8.4 is not vulnerable). In 5.8.4 wolfSSL would detect the issue later in the handshake. 5.9.0 was further hardened to catch the issue earlier in the handshake.
A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION() function. When deserializing session data with SESSION_CERTS enabled, certificate and session id lengths are read from an untrusted input without bounds validation, allowing an attacker to overflow fixed-size buffers and corrupt heap memory. A maliciously crafted session would need to be loaded from an external source to trigger this vulnerability. Internal sessions were not vulnerable.
Two buffer overflow vulnerabilities existed in the wolfSSL CRL parser when parsing CRL numbers: a heap-based buffer overflow could occur when improperly storing the CRL number as a hexadecimal string, and a stack-based overflow for sufficiently sized CRL numbers. With appropriately crafted CRLs, either of these out of bound writes could be triggered. Note this only affects builds that specifically enable CRL support, and the user would need to load a CRL from an untrusted source.
A stack buffer overflow vulnerability exists in wolfSSL's PKCS7 SignedData encoding functionality. In wc_PKCS7_BuildSignedAttributes(), when adding custom signed attributes, the code passes an incorrect capacity value (esd->signedAttribsCount) to EncodeAttributes() instead of the remaining available space in the fixed-size signedAttribs[7] array. When an application sets pkcs7->signedAttribsSz to a value greater than MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ (default 7) minus the number of default attributes already added, EncodeAttributes() writes beyond the array bounds, causing stack memory corruption. In WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK builds, this becomes heap corruption. Exploitation requires an application that allows untrusted input to control the signedAttribs array size when calling wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData() or related signing functions.
Integer underflow in wolfSSL packet sniffer <= 5.8.4 allows an attacker to cause a buffer overflow in the AEAD decryption path by injecting a TLS record shorter than the explicit IV plus authentication tag into traffic inspected by ssl_DecodePacket. The underflow wraps a 16-bit length to a large value that is passed to AEAD decryption routines, causing heap buffer overflow and a crash. An unauthenticated attacker can trigger this remotely via malformed TLS Application Data records.
Improper Input Validation in the TLS 1.3 CKS extension parsing in wolfSSL 5.8.2 and earlier on multiple platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to potentially cause a denial-of-service via a crafted ClientHello message with duplicate CKS extensions.