In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Fix in_atomic() handling in do_secure_storage_access()
Kernel user spaces accesses to not exported pages in atomic context
incorrectly try to resolve the page fault.
With debug options enabled call traces like this can be seen:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1523
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 419074, name: qemu-system-s39
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
Preemption disabled at:
[<00000383ea47cfa2>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0xa2/0x8a0
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 419074 Comm: qemu-system-s39
Tainted: G W 6.16.0-20250531.rc0.git0.69b3a602feac.63.fc42.s390x+debug #1 PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 703 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
[<00000383e990d282>] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xe8
[<00000383e99bf152>] __might_resched+0x292/0x2d0
[<00000383eaa7c374>] down_read+0x34/0x2d0
[<00000383e99432f8>] do_secure_storage_access+0x108/0x360
[<00000383eaa724b0>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220
[<00000383eaa842e4>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160
[<00000383ea47d028>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0x128/0x8a0
([<00000383ea47d016>] copy_page_from_iter_atomic+0x116/0x8a0)
[<00000383e9c45eae>] generic_perform_write+0x16e/0x310
[<00000383e9eb87f4>] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x84/0x160
[<00000383e9da0de4>] vfs_write+0x1c4/0x460
[<00000383e9da123c>] ksys_write+0x7c/0x100
[<00000383eaa7284e>] __do_syscall+0x15e/0x280
[<00000383eaa8417e>] system_call+0x6e/0x90
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
It is not allowed to take the mmap_lock while in atomic context. Therefore
handle such a secure storage access fault as if the accessed page is not
mapped: the uaccess function will return -EFAULT, and the caller has to
deal with this. Usually this means that the access is retried in process
context, which allows to resolve the page fault (or in this case export the
page).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Check dce_hwseq before dereferencing it
[WHAT]
hws was checked for null earlier in dce110_blank_stream, indicating hws
can be null, and should be checked whenever it is used.
(cherry picked from commit 79db43611ff61280b6de58ce1305e0b2ecf675ad)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to bail out in get_new_segment()
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 579 at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2832 new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
pc : new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
Call trace:
new_curseg+0x5e8/0x6dc
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0xa54/0xe28
do_write_page+0x6c/0x194
f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x38/0x78
__write_node_page+0x248/0x6d4
f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x524/0x72c
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x4bc/0x9b0
__checkpoint_and_complete_reqs+0x80/0x244
issue_checkpoint_thread+0x8c/0xec
kthread+0x114/0x1bc
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
get_new_segment() detects inconsistent status in between free_segmap
and free_secmap, let's record such error into super block, and bail
out get_new_segment() instead of continue using the segment.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: Log an error when close_all_cached_dirs fails
Under low-memory conditions, close_all_cached_dirs() can't move the
dentries to a separate list to dput() them once the locks are dropped.
This will result in a "Dentry still in use" error, so add an error
message that makes it clear this is what happened:
[ 495.281119] CIFS: VFS: \\otters.example.com\share Out of memory while dropping dentries
[ 495.281595] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 495.281887] BUG: Dentry ffff888115531138{i=78,n=/} still in use (2) [unmount of cifs cifs]
[ 495.282391] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2329 at fs/dcache.c:1536 umount_check+0xc8/0xf0
Also, bail out of looping through all tcons as soon as a single
allocation fails, since we're already in trouble, and kmalloc() attempts
for subseqeuent tcons are likely to fail just like the first one did.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel: Fix crash in icl_update_topdown_event()
The perf_fuzzer found a hard-lockup crash on a RaptorLake machine:
Oops: general protection fault, maybe for address 0xffff89aeceab400: 0000
CPU: 23 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/23
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 9660/0VJ762
RIP: 0010:native_read_pmc+0x7/0x40
Code: cc e8 8d a9 01 00 48 89 03 5b cd cc cc cc cc 0f 1f ...
RSP: 000:fffb03100273de8 EFLAGS: 00010046
....
Call Trace:
<TASK>
icl_update_topdown_event+0x165/0x190
? ktime_get+0x38/0xd0
intel_pmu_read_event+0xf9/0x210
__perf_event_read+0xf9/0x210
CPUs 16-23 are E-core CPUs that don't support the perf metrics feature.
The icl_update_topdown_event() should not be invoked on these CPUs.
It's a regression of commit:
f9bdf1f95339 ("perf/x86/intel: Avoid disable PMU if !cpuc->enabled in sample read")
The bug introduced by that commit is that the is_topdown_event() function
is mistakenly used to replace the is_topdown_count() call to check if the
topdown functions for the perf metrics feature should be invoked.
Fix it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iavf: get rid of the crit lock
Get rid of the crit lock.
That frees us from the error prone logic of try_locks.
Thanks to netdev_lock() by Jakub it is now easy, and in most cases we were
protected by it already - replace crit lock by netdev lock when it was not
the case.
Lockdep reports that we should cancel the work under crit_lock [splat1],
and that was the scheme we have mostly followed since [1] by Slawomir.
But when that is done we still got into deadlocks [splat2]. So instead
we should look at the bigger problem, namely "weird locking/scheduling"
of the iavf. The first step to fix that is to remove the crit lock.
I will followup with a -next series that simplifies scheduling/tasks.
Cancel the work without netdev lock (weird unlock+lock scheme),
to fix the [splat2] (which would be totally ugly if we would kept
the crit lock).
Extend protected part of iavf_watchdog_task() to include scheduling
more work.
Note that the removed comment in iavf_reset_task() was misplaced,
it belonged to inside of the removed if condition, so it's gone now.
[splat1] - w/o this patch - The deadlock during VF removal:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
sh/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
((work_completion)(&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: start_flush_work+0x1a1/0x470
but task is already holding lock:
(&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: iavf_remove+0xd1/0x690 [iavf]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[splat2] - when cancelling work under crit lock, w/o this series,
see [2] for the band aid attempt
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
sh/3550 is trying to acquire lock:
((wq_completion)iavf){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
(&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: iavf_remove+0xa6/0x6e0 [iavf]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[1] fc2e6b3b132a ("iavf: Rework mutexes for better synchronisation")
[2] https://github.com/pkitszel/linux/commit/52dddbfc2bb60294083f5711a158a
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: eir: Fix possible crashes on eir_create_adv_data
eir_create_adv_data may attempt to add EIR_FLAGS and EIR_TX_POWER
without checking if that would fit.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hisi_acc_vfio_pci: bugfix live migration function without VF device driver
If the VF device driver is not loaded in the Guest OS and we attempt to
perform device data migration, the address of the migrated data will
be NULL.
The live migration recovery operation on the destination side will
access a null address value, which will cause access errors.
Therefore, live migration of VMs without added VF device drivers
does not require device data migration.
In addition, when the queue address data obtained by the destination
is empty, device queue recovery processing will not be performed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: exit after state insertion failure at btrfs_convert_extent_bit()
If insert_state() state failed it returns an error pointer and we call
extent_io_tree_panic() which will trigger a BUG() call. However if
CONFIG_BUG is disabled, which is an uncommon and exotic scenario, then
we fallthrough and call cache_state() which will dereference the error
pointer, resulting in an invalid memory access.
So jump to the 'out' label after calling extent_io_tree_panic(), it also
makes the code more clear besides dealing with the exotic scenario where
CONFIG_BUG is disabled.