In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: fix wild-memory-access in proto_unregister
There's issue as follows:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...108-0xdead...10f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2805 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W
RIP: 0010:proto_unregister+0xee/0x400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__do_sys_delete_module+0x318/0x580
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
As bnep_init() ignore bnep_sock_init()'s return value, and bnep_sock_init()
will cleanup all resource. Then when remove bnep module will call
bnep_sock_cleanup() to cleanup sock's resource.
To solve above issue just return bnep_sock_init()'s return value in
bnep_exit().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vboxvideo: Replace fake VLA at end of vbva_mouse_pointer_shape with real VLA
Replace the fake VLA at end of the vbva_mouse_pointer_shape shape with
a real VLA to fix a "memcpy: detected field-spanning write error" warning:
[ 13.319813] memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16896) of single field "p->data" at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 (size 4)
[ 13.319841] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1105 at drivers/gpu/drm/vboxvideo/hgsmi_base.c:154 hgsmi_update_pointer_shape+0x192/0x1c0 [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320038] Call Trace:
[ 13.320173] hgsmi_update_pointer_shape [vboxvideo]
[ 13.320184] vbox_cursor_atomic_update [vboxvideo]
Note as mentioned in the added comment it seems the original length
calculation for the allocated and send hgsmi buffer is 4 bytes too large.
Changing this is not the goal of this patch, so this behavior is kept.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Disable PSR-SU on Parade 08-01 TCON too
Stuart Hayhurst has found that both at bootup and fullscreen VA-API video
is leading to black screens for around 1 second and kernel WARNING [1] traces
when calling dmub_psr_enable() with Parade 08-01 TCON.
These symptoms all go away with PSR-SU disabled for this TCON, so disable
it for now while DMUB traces [2] from the failure can be analyzed and the failure
state properly root caused.
(cherry picked from commit afb634a6823d8d9db23c5fb04f79c5549349628b)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Enable IRQ if do_ale() triggered in irq-enabled context
Unaligned access exception can be triggered in irq-enabled context such
as user mode, in this case do_ale() may call get_user() which may cause
sleep. Then we will get:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/loongarch/kernel/access-helper.h:7
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 129, name: modprobe
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 129 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc1+ #1723
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Stack : 9000000105e0bd48 0000000000000000 9000000003803944 9000000105e08000
9000000105e0bc70 9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000001 9000000185e0ba07 9000000105e0b890
ffffffffffffffff 9000000105e0bc78 73924b81763be05b 9000000100194500
000000000000020c 000000000000000a 0000000000000000 0000000000000003
00000000000023f0 00000000000e1401 00000000072f8000 0000007ffbb0e260
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005437650 90000000055d5000
0000000000000000 0000000000000003 0000007ffbb0e1f0 0000000000000000
0000005567b00490 0000000000000000 9000000003803964 0000007ffbb0dfec
00000000000000b0 0000000000000007 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d
...
Call Trace:
[<9000000003803964>] show_stack+0x64/0x1a0
[<9000000004c57464>] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xb0
[<9000000003861ab4>] __might_resched+0x154/0x1a0
[<900000000380c96c>] emulate_load_store_insn+0x6c/0xf60
[<9000000004c58118>] do_ale+0x78/0x180
[<9000000003801bc8>] handle_ale+0x128/0x1e0
So enable IRQ if unaligned access exception is triggered in irq-enabled
context to fix it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases
Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient
execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address
Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable.
Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST,
or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time,
otherwise keep LAM disabled.
There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently
nobody is affected by this issue.
[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
[2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
[ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Fix overflow in oa batch buffer
By default xe_bb_create_job() appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END to batch
buffer, this is not a problem if batch buffer is only used once but
oa reuses the batch buffer for the same metric and at each call
it appends a MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END, printing the warning below and then
overflowing.
[ 381.072016] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 381.072019] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] Assertion `bb->len * 4 + bb_prefetch(q->gt) <= size` failed!
platform: LUNARLAKE subplatform: 1
graphics: Xe2_LPG / Xe2_HPG 20.04 step B0
media: Xe2_LPM / Xe2_HPM 20.00 step B0
tile: 0 VRAM 0 B
GT: 0 type 1
So here checking if batch buffer already have MI_BATCH_BUFFER_END if
not append it.
v2:
- simply fix, suggestion from Ashutosh
(cherry picked from commit 9ba0e0f30ca42a98af3689460063edfb6315718a)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm vdo: don't refer to dedupe_context after releasing it
Clear the dedupe_context pointer in a data_vio whenever ownership of
the context is lost, so that vdo can't examine it accidentally.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: support non-r10 register spill/fill to/from stack in precision tracking
Use instruction (jump) history to record instructions that performed
register spill/fill to/from stack, regardless if this was done through
read-only r10 register, or any other register after copying r10 into it
*and* potentially adjusting offset.
To make this work reliably, we push extra per-instruction flags into
instruction history, encoding stack slot index (spi) and stack frame
number in extra 10 bit flags we take away from prev_idx in instruction
history. We don't touch idx field for maximum performance, as it's
checked most frequently during backtracking.
This change removes basically the last remaining practical limitation of
precision backtracking logic in BPF verifier. It fixes known
deficiencies, but also opens up new opportunities to reduce number of
verified states, explored in the subsequent patches.
There are only three differences in selftests' BPF object files
according to veristat, all in the positive direction (less states).
File Program Insns (A) Insns (B) Insns (DIFF) States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
-------------------------------------- ------------- --------- --------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked3.o cls_redirect 2987 2864 -123 (-4.12%) 240 231 -9 (-3.75%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_tc 82848 82661 -187 (-0.23%) 5107 5073 -34 (-0.67%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked3.o syncookie_xdp 85116 84964 -152 (-0.18%) 5162 5130 -32 (-0.62%)
Note, I avoided renaming jmp_history to more generic insn_hist to
minimize number of lines changed and potential merge conflicts between
bpf and bpf-next trees.
Notice also cur_hist_entry pointer reset to NULL at the beginning of
instruction verification loop. This pointer avoids the problem of
relying on last jump history entry's insn_idx to determine whether we
already have entry for current instruction or not. It can happen that we
added jump history entry because current instruction is_jmp_point(), but
also we need to add instruction flags for stack access. In this case, we
don't want to entries, so we need to reuse last added entry, if it is
present.
Relying on insn_idx comparison has the same ambiguity problem as the one
that was fixed recently in [0], so we avoid that.
[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231110002638.4168352-3-andrii@kernel.org/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix user-after-free from session log off
There is racy issue between smb2 session log off and smb2 session setup.
It will cause user-after-free from session log off.
This add session_lock when setting SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED and referece
count to session struct not to free session while it is being used.