In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: fix device leak on probe failure
Driver core holds a reference to the USB interface and its parent USB
device while the interface is bound to a driver and there is no need to
take additional references unless the structures are needed after
disconnect.
This driver takes a reference to the USB device during probe but does
not to release it on all probe errors (e.g. when descriptor parsing
fails).
Drop the redundant device reference to fix the leak, reduce cargo
culting, make it easier to spot drivers where an extra reference is
needed, and reduce the risk of further memory leaks.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: udlfb: avoid divide-by-zero on FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO
Much like commit 19f953e74356 ("fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide
by zero error"), we also need to prevent that same crash from happening
in the udlfb driver as it uses pixclock directly when dividing, which
will crash.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_hid: don't call cdev_init while cdev in use
When calling unbind, then bind again, cdev_init reinitialized the cdev,
even though there may still be references to it. That's the case when
the /dev/hidg* device is still opened. This obviously unsafe behavior
like oopes.
This fixes this by using cdev_alloc to put the cdev on the heap. That
way, we can simply allocate a new one in hidg_bind.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,
usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites
urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is
subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible
array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the
*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.
A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response
to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap
out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to
urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.
KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)
The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already
validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits
c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle
malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden
CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates
against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.
On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter
bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.
This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against
transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the
response value against the original allocation size.
Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in
usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;
this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its
source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and
using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global
USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.
Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against
urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the
overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections
syzbot reported a general protection fault in vidtv_psi_desc_assign [1].
vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init() can return NULL on memory allocation
failure, but vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections() does not check for
this. When tail is NULL, the subsequent call to
vidtv_psi_desc_assign(&tail->descriptor, desc) dereferences a NULL
pointer offset, causing a general protection fault.
Add a NULL check after vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init(). On failure, clean
up the already-allocated stream chain and return.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_desc_assign+0x24/0x90 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:629
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:349 [inline]
vidtv_channel_si_init+0x1445/0x1a50 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:479
vidtv_mux_init+0x526/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:519
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline]
vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown
epf_ntb_epc_destroy() duplicates the teardown that the caller is
supposed to perform later. This leads to an oops when .allow_link fails
or when .drop_link is performed. The following is an example oops of the
former case:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000108
[...]
[dead000000000108] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000044 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call trace:
pci_epc_remove_epf+0x78/0xe0 (P)
pci_primary_epc_epf_link+0x88/0xa8
configfs_symlink+0x1f4/0x5a0
vfs_symlink+0x134/0x1d8
do_symlinkat+0x88/0x138
__arm64_sys_symlinkat+0x74/0xe0
[...]
Remove the helper, and drop pci_epc_put(). EPC device refcounting is
tied to the configfs EPC group lifetime, and pci_epc_put() in the
.drop_link path is sufficient.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-vntb: Stop cmd_handler work in epf_ntb_epc_cleanup
Disable the delayed work before clearing BAR mappings and doorbells to
avoid running the handler after resources have been torn down.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800083f46004
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
[...]
Call trace:
epf_ntb_cmd_handler+0x54/0x200 [pci_epf_vntb] (P)
process_one_work+0x154/0x3b0
worker_thread+0x2c8/0x400
kthread+0x148/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend
[BUG]
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308
Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block
returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and
BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too
strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path
can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the
resize ioctl.
[FIX]
Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global
bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem
corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of
crashing the kernel.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix use-after-free in ocfs2_fault() when VM_FAULT_RETRY
filemap_fault() may drop the mmap_lock before returning VM_FAULT_RETRY,
as documented in mm/filemap.c:
"If our return value has VM_FAULT_RETRY set, it's because the mmap_lock
may be dropped before doing I/O or by lock_folio_maybe_drop_mmap()."
When this happens, a concurrent munmap() can call remove_vma() and free
the vm_area_struct via RCU. The saved 'vma' pointer in ocfs2_fault() then
becomes a dangling pointer, and the subsequent trace_ocfs2_fault() call
dereferences it -- a use-after-free.
Fix this by saving ip_blkno as a plain integer before calling
filemap_fault(), and removing vma from the trace event. Since
ip_blkno is copied by value before the lock can be dropped, it
remains valid regardless of what happens to the vma or inode
afterward.