Security Vulnerabilities
- CVEs Published In 2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: dts: imx8ulp: correct the flexspi compatible string
The flexspi on imx8ulp only has 16 LUTs, and imx8mm flexspi has
32 LUTs, so correct the compatible string here, otherwise will
meet below error:
[ 1.119072] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1.123926] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/spi/spi-nxp-fspi.c:855 nxp_fspi_exec_op+0xb04/0xb64
[ 1.133239] Modules linked in:
[ 1.136448] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-next-20240902-00001-g131bf9439dd9 #69
[ 1.146821] Hardware name: NXP i.MX8ULP EVK (DT)
[ 1.151647] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1.158931] pc : nxp_fspi_exec_op+0xb04/0xb64
[ 1.163496] lr : nxp_fspi_exec_op+0xa34/0xb64
[ 1.168060] sp : ffff80008002b2a0
[ 1.171526] x29: ffff80008002b2d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 1.179002] x26: ffff2eb645542580 x25: ffff800080610014 x24: ffff800080610000
[ 1.186480] x23: ffff2eb645548080 x22: 0000000000000006 x21: ffff2eb6455425e0
[ 1.193956] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff80008002b5e0 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1.201432] x17: ffff2eb644467508 x16: 0000000000000138 x15: 0000000000000002
[ 1.208907] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff2eb6400d8080 x12: 00000000ffffff00
[ 1.216378] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff2eb6400d8080 x9 : ffff2eb697adca80
[ 1.223850] x8 : ffff2eb697ad3cc0 x7 : 0000000100000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
[ 1.231324] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000007a6
[ 1.238795] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 00000000000001ce x0 : 00000000ffffff92
[ 1.246267] Call trace:
[ 1.248824] nxp_fspi_exec_op+0xb04/0xb64
[ 1.253031] spi_mem_exec_op+0x3a0/0x430
[ 1.257139] spi_nor_read_id+0x80/0xcc
[ 1.261065] spi_nor_scan+0x1ec/0xf10
[ 1.264901] spi_nor_probe+0x108/0x2fc
[ 1.268828] spi_mem_probe+0x6c/0xbc
[ 1.272574] spi_probe+0x84/0xe4
[ 1.275958] really_probe+0xbc/0x29c
[ 1.279713] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c
[ 1.284277] driver_probe_device+0xd8/0x15c
[ 1.288660] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x134
[ 1.293316] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 1.297337] __device_attach+0xa0/0x190
[ 1.301353] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 1.305734] bus_probe_device+0xac/0xb0
[ 1.309752] device_add+0x5d0/0x790
[ 1.313408] __spi_add_device+0x134/0x204
[ 1.317606] of_register_spi_device+0x3b4/0x590
[ 1.322348] spi_register_controller+0x47c/0x754
[ 1.327181] devm_spi_register_controller+0x4c/0xa4
[ 1.332289] nxp_fspi_probe+0x1cc/0x2b0
[ 1.336307] platform_probe+0x68/0xc4
[ 1.340145] really_probe+0xbc/0x29c
[ 1.343893] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c
[ 1.348457] driver_probe_device+0xd8/0x15c
[ 1.352838] __driver_attach+0x90/0x19c
[ 1.356857] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xdc
[ 1.360877] driver_attach+0x24/0x30
[ 1.364624] bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208
[ 1.368552] driver_register+0x5c/0x124
[ 1.372573] __platform_driver_register+0x28/0x34
[ 1.377497] nxp_fspi_driver_init+0x1c/0x28
[ 1.381888] do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
[ 1.385908] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c4/0x28c
[ 1.390472] kernel_init+0x20/0x1d8
[ 1.394138] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 1.397885] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 1.407908] ------------[ cut here ]------------
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags
walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing
the information to the callback.
This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have
these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that
memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram.
This leads to undefined behavior after reboot. If the kexec buffer is
never touched, nothing happens. If the kexec buffer is touched, it could
lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior.
Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory,
TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y. Adding printk's showed the flags
were being discarded and as a result the check for
IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes.
find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem))
start(10000000000)
end(1034fffffff)
flags(83000200)
locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0)
[.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000
[.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0
[.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286
[.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000
[.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018
[.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900
[.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000
[.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000
[.] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[.] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
[.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[.] PKRU: 55555554
[.] Call Trace:
[.] <TASK>
[.] ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[.] ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0
[.] ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130
[.] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[.] ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410
[.] ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0
[.] ima_init+0x44/0xa0
[.] __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0
[.] ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.] do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200
[.] ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.] ? number+0x12a/0x430
[.] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80
[.] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[.] ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380
[.] ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380
[.] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0
[.] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
[.] ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[.] </TASK>
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_find()
The per-netns IP tunnel hash table is protected by the RTNL mutex and
ip_tunnel_find() is only called from the control path where the mutex is
taken.
Add a lockdep expression to hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() in
ip_tunnel_find() in order to validate that the mutex is held and to
silence the suspicious RCU usage warning [1].
[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:221 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/362:
#0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60
stack backtrace:
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 362 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gd95d9a31aceb #139
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
ip_tunnel_find+0x435/0x4d0
ip_tunnel_newlink+0x517/0x7a0
ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
__rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
__sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
A vulnerability was found in Weaver E-cology allows attackers use race conditions to bypass security mechanisms to upload malicious files and control server privileges
An issue in Weaver E-cology v. attackers construct special requests to insert remote malicious code and to trigger malicious code execution, and control server privileges
Weaver Ecology v9.* was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component /mobilemode/Action.jsp?invoker=com.weaver.formmodel.mobile.mec.servlet.MECAction&action=getFieldTriggerValue&searchField=*&fromTable=HrmResourceManager&whereClause=1%3d1&triggerCondition=1&expression=%3d&fieldValue=1.
Qualys discovered that needrestart, before version 3.8, allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code as root by tricking needrestart into running the Python interpreter with an attacker-controlled PYTHONPATH environment variable.
Qualys discovered that needrestart, before version 3.8, allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code as root by winning a race condition and tricking needrestart into running their own, fake Python interpreter (instead of the system's real Python interpreter). The initial security fix (6ce6136) introduced a regression which was subsequently resolved (42af5d3).
Qualys discovered that needrestart, before version 3.8, allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code as root by tricking needrestart into running the Ruby interpreter with an attacker-controlled RUBYLIB environment variable.
The Versa Director uses PostgreSQL (Postgres) to store operational and configuration data. It is also needed for High Availability function of the Versa Director. The default configuration has a common password across all instances of Versa Director. By default, Versa Director configures Postgres to listen on all network interfaces. This combination allows an unauthenticated attacker to access and administer the database or read local filesystem contents to escalate privileges on the system.
Exploitation Status:
Versa Networks is not aware of this exploitation in any production systems. A proof of concept exists in the lab environment.
Workarounds or Mitigation:
Starting with the latest 22.1.4 version of Versa Director, the software will automatically restrict access to the Postgres and HA ports to only the local and peer Versa Directors. For older releases, Versa recommends performing manual hardening of HA ports. Please refer to the following link for the steps https://docs.versa-networks.com/Solutions/System_Hardening/Perform_Manual_Hardening_for_Versa_Director#Secure_HA_Ports
This vulnerability is not exploitable on Versa Directors if published Firewall guidelines are implemented. We have validated that no Versa-hosted head ends have been affected by this vulnerability. All Versa-hosted head ends are patched and hardened.
Please contact Versa Technical Support or Versa account team for any further assistance.
Software Download Links:
22.1.4: https://support.versa-networks.com/support/solutions/articles/23000026708-release-22-1-4