Medtronic: Security Vulnerabilities
Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer
uses a virtual private network connection to securely download updates. It does not verify it is still connected to this virtual private network before downloading updates. The affected products initially establish an encapsulated IP-based VPN connection to a Medtronic-hosted update network. Once the VPN is established, it makes a request to a HTTP (non-TLS) server across the VPN for updates, which responds and provides any available updates. The programmer-side (client) service responsible for this HTTP request does not check to ensure it is still connected to the VPN before making the HTTP request. Thus, an attacker could cause the VPN connection to terminate (through various methods and attack points) and intercept the HTTP request, responding with malicious updates via a man-in-the-middle attack. The affected products do not verify the origin or integrity of these updates, as it insufficiently relied on the security of the VPN. An attacker with remote network access to the programmer could influence these communications.
CVSS Score
8.0
EPSS Score
0.002
Published
2018-07-03
Medtronic N'Vision Clinician Programmer 8840 N'Vision Clinician Programme and 8870 N'Vision removable Application Card do not encrypt PII and PHI while at rest.
CVSS Score
4.6
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2018-05-18
Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer
uses a per-product username and password that is stored in a recoverable format.
CVSS Score
5.3
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2018-05-04
Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer’s software deployment network contains a directory traversal vulnerability that could allow an attacker to read files on the system.
CVSS Score
5.7
EPSS Score
0.001
Published
2018-05-04
Unspecified vulnerability in Medtronic Paradigm wireless insulin pump 512, 522, 712, and 722 allows remote attackers to modify the delivery of an insulin bolus dose and cause a denial of service (adverse human health effects) via unspecified vectors involving wireless communications and knowledge of the device's serial number, as demonstrated by Jerome Radcliffe at the Black Hat USA conference in August 2011. NOTE: the vendor has disputed the severity of this issue, saying "we believe the risk of deliberate, malicious, or unauthorized manipulation of medical devices is extremely low... we strongly believe it would be extremely difficult for a third-party to wirelessly tamper with your insulin pump... you would be able to detect tones on the insulin pump that weren't intentionally programmed and could intervene accordingly."
CVSS Score
4.0
EPSS Score
0.011
Published
2011-09-02
Page 3