The system fails to evaluate instructional permissions over multiple internal operation codes (opcodes), permitting unauthorized application installations or command executions.
The ai_cmd utility executes with full root permissions. It pipes socket inputs directly to popen(), paving the way for unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary root commands.
The local MQTT broker does not enforce topic-level Access Control Lists (ACLs). This allows any client to subscribe using wildcard characters (# or +) to enumerate hidden network devices or publish rogue control commands.
The upload.cgi binary, responsible for processing device backups, contains a hardcoded AES encryption key. This allows an attacker to decrypt, modify, and re-encrypt system backups, facilitating persistent backdoor injection.
The acer_cgi.log file in the device firmware is accessible without authentication via the web interface. This file contains cleartext login credentials (for web and Telnet), leading to unauthorized system access.