Vulnerabilities
Vulnerable Software
Linux:  >> Linux Kernel  >> 5.15.181  Security Vulnerabilities
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: core: fix NULL dereference on unbind due to stale coupling data Failing to reset coupling_desc.n_coupled after freeing coupled_rdevs can lead to NULL pointer dereference when regulators are accessed post-unbind. This can happen during runtime PM or other regulator operations that rely on coupling metadata. For example, on ridesx4, unbinding the 'reg-dummy' platform device triggers a panic in regulator_lock_recursive() due to stale coupling state. Ensure n_coupled is set to 0 to prevent access to invalid pointers.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack() `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks. In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0), clobbering it. In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use ! This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or FPAC if enabled. This is possible on a default config, but unlikely. However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority. Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very* frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics. Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning. Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around the branch. Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations. Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: qup: jump out of the loop in case of timeout Original logic only sets the return value but doesn't jump out of the loop if the bus is kept active by a client. This is not expected. A malicious or buggy i2c client can hang the kernel in this case and should be avoided. This is observed during a long time test with a PCA953x GPIO extender. Fix it by changing the logic to not only sets the return value, but also jumps out of the loop and return to the caller with -ETIMEDOUT.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gfs2: No more self recovery When a node withdraws and it turns out that it is the only node that has the filesystem mounted, gfs2 currently tries to replay the local journal to bring the filesystem back into a consistent state. Not only is that a very bad idea, it has also never worked because gfs2_recover_func() will refuse to do anything during a withdraw. However, before even getting to this point, gfs2_recover_func() dereferences sdp->sd_jdesc->jd_inode. This was a use-after-free before commit 04133b607a78 ("gfs2: Prevent double iput for journal on error") and is a NULL pointer dereference since then. Simply get rid of self recovery to fix that.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: reject invalid file types when reading inodes To prevent inodes with invalid file types from tripping through the vfs and causing malfunctions or assertion failures, add a missing sanity check when reading an inode from a block device. If the file type is not valid, treat it as a filesystem error.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix a null pointer dereference in ice_copy_and_init_pkg() Add check for the return value of devm_kmemdup() to prevent potential null pointer dereference.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: netlink: can_changelink(): fix NULL pointer deref of struct can_priv::do_set_mode Andrei Lalaev reported a NULL pointer deref when a CAN device is restarted from Bus Off and the driver does not implement the struct can_priv::do_set_mode callback. There are 2 code path that call struct can_priv::do_set_mode: - directly by a manual restart from the user space, via can_changelink() - delayed automatic restart after bus off (deactivated by default) To prevent the NULL pointer deference, refuse a manual restart or configure the automatic restart delay in can_changelink() and report the error via extack to user space. As an additional safety measure let can_restart() return an error if can_priv::do_set_mode is not set instead of dereferencing it unchecked.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-boundary access in devs.path - touch /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 - truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) \ /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 - touch /mnt/f2fs/file - truncate -s $((1024*1024*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file - mkfs.f2fs /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \ -c /mnt/f2fs/file - mount /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123 \ /mnt/f2fs/loop [16937.192225] F2FS-fs (loop0): Mount Device [ 0]: /mnt/f2fs/012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123\xff\x01, 511, 0 - 3ffff [16937.192268] F2FS-fs (loop0): Failed to find devices If device path length equals to MAX_PATH_LEN, sbi->devs.path[] may not end up w/ null character due to path array is fully filled, So accidently, fields locate after path[] may be treated as part of device path, result in parsing wrong device path. struct f2fs_dev_info { ... char path[MAX_PATH_LEN]; ... }; Let's add one byte space for sbi->devs.path[] to store null character of device path string.
CVSS Score
7.1
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfsplus: remove mutex_lock check in hfsplus_free_extents Syzbot reported an issue in hfsplus filesystem: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4400 at fs/hfsplus/extents.c:346 hfsplus_free_extents+0x700/0xad0 Call Trace: <TASK> hfsplus_file_truncate+0x768/0xbb0 fs/hfsplus/extents.c:606 hfsplus_write_begin+0xc2/0xd0 fs/hfsplus/inode.c:56 cont_expand_zero fs/buffer.c:2383 [inline] cont_write_begin+0x2cf/0x860 fs/buffer.c:2446 hfsplus_write_begin+0x86/0xd0 fs/hfsplus/inode.c:52 generic_cont_expand_simple+0x151/0x250 fs/buffer.c:2347 hfsplus_setattr+0x168/0x280 fs/hfsplus/inode.c:263 notify_change+0xe38/0x10f0 fs/attr.c:420 do_truncate+0x1fb/0x2e0 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x2eb/0x380 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd To avoid deadlock, Commit 31651c607151 ("hfsplus: avoid deadlock on file truncation") unlock extree before hfsplus_free_extents(), and add check wheather extree is locked in hfsplus_free_extents(). However, when operations such as hfsplus_file_release, hfsplus_setattr, hfsplus_unlink, and hfsplus_get_block are executed concurrently in different files, it is very likely to trigger the WARN_ON, which will lead syzbot and xfstest to consider it as an abnormality. The comment above this warning also describes one of the easy triggering situations, which can easily trigger and cause xfstest&syzbot to report errors. [task A] [task B] ->hfsplus_file_release ->hfsplus_file_truncate ->hfs_find_init ->mutex_lock ->mutex_unlock ->hfsplus_write_begin ->hfsplus_get_block ->hfsplus_file_extend ->hfsplus_ext_read_extent ->hfs_find_init ->mutex_lock ->hfsplus_free_extents WARN_ON(mutex_is_locked) !!! Several threads could try to lock the shared extents tree. And warning can be triggered in one thread when another thread has locked the tree. This is the wrong behavior of the code and we need to remove the warning.
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: Add missing lock in cfg80211_check_and_end_cac() Callers of wdev_chandef() must hold the wiphy mutex. But the worker cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk() never takes the lock. Which triggers the warning below with the mesh_peer_connected_dfs test from hostapd and not (yet) released mac80211 code changes: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 495 at net/wireless/chan.c:1552 wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 495 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-wt-g03960e6f9d47 #33 13c287eeabfe1efea01c0bcc863723ab082e17cf Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk Stack: 00000000 00000001 ffffff00 6093267c 00000000 6002ec30 6d577c50 60037608 00000000 67e8d108 6063717b 00000000 Call Trace: [<6002ec30>] ? _printk+0x0/0x98 [<6003c2b3>] show_stack+0x10e/0x11a [<6002ec30>] ? _printk+0x0/0x98 [<60037608>] dump_stack_lvl+0x71/0xb8 [<6063717b>] ? wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165 [<6003766d>] dump_stack+0x1e/0x20 [<6005d1b7>] __warn+0x101/0x20f [<6005d3a8>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xe3/0x15d [<600b0c5c>] ? mark_lock.part.0+0x0/0x4ec [<60751191>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x0/0x16 [<600b11a2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x5a/0x6e [<6005d2c5>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0x15d [<60052e53>] ? unblock_signals+0x3a/0xe7 [<60052f2d>] ? um_set_signals+0x2d/0x43 [<60751191>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x0/0x16 [<607508b2>] ? lock_is_held_type+0x207/0x21f [<6063717b>] wdev_chandef+0x60/0x165 [<605f89b4>] regulatory_propagate_dfs_state+0x247/0x43f [<60052f00>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43 [<605e6bfd>] cfg80211_propagate_cac_done_wk+0x3a/0x4a [<6007e460>] process_scheduled_works+0x3bc/0x60e [<6007d0ec>] ? move_linked_works+0x4d/0x81 [<6007d120>] ? assign_work+0x0/0xaa [<6007f81f>] worker_thread+0x220/0x2dc [<600786ef>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x57 [<60087c96>] ? to_kthread+0x0/0x43 [<6008ab3c>] kthread+0x2d3/0x2e2 [<6007f5ff>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x2dc [<6006c05b>] ? calculate_sigpending+0x0/0x56 [<6003b37d>] new_thread_handler+0x4a/0x64 irq event stamp: 614611 hardirqs last enabled at (614621): [<00000000600bc96b>] __up_console_sem+0x82/0xaf hardirqs last disabled at (614630): [<00000000600bc92c>] __up_console_sem+0x43/0xaf softirqs last enabled at (614268): [<00000000606c55c6>] __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x933/0x985 softirqs last disabled at (614266): [<00000000606c52d6>] __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x643/0x985
CVSS Score
5.5
EPSS Score
0.0
Published
2025-08-22


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