In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: fix VLAN 0 refcount imbalance of toggling filtering during runtime
Assuming the "rx-vlan-filter" feature is enabled on a net device, the
8021q module will automatically add or remove VLAN 0 when the net device
is put administratively up or down, respectively. There are a couple of
problems with the above scheme.
The first problem is a memory leak that can happen if the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled while the device is running:
# ip link add bond1 up type bond mode 0
# ethtool -K bond1 rx-vlan-filter off
# ip link del dev bond1
When the device is put administratively down the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled, so the 8021q module will not remove VLAN 0 and the
memory will be leaked [1].
Another problem that can happen is that the kernel can automatically
delete VLAN 0 when the device is put administratively down despite not
adding it when the device was put administratively up since during that
time the "rx-vlan-filter" feature was disabled. null-ptr-unref or
bug_on[2] will be triggered by unregister_vlan_dev() for refcount
imbalance if toggling filtering during runtime:
$ ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0
$ ip link add link bond0 name vlan0 type vlan id 0 protocol 802.1q
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter off
$ ifconfig bond0 up
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter on
$ ifconfig bond0 down
$ ip link del vlan0
Root cause is as below:
step1: add vlan0 for real_dev, such as bond, team.
register_vlan_dev
vlan_vid_add(real_dev,htons(ETH_P_8021Q),0) //refcnt=1
step2: disable vlan filter feature and enable real_dev
step3: change filter from 0 to 1
vlan_device_event
vlan_filter_push_vids
ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid //No refcnt added to real_dev vlan0
step4: real_dev down
vlan_device_event
vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0); //refcnt=0
vlan_info_rcu_free //free vlan0
step5: delete vlan0
unregister_vlan_dev
BUG_ON(!vlan_info); //vlan_info is null
Fix both problems by noting in the VLAN info whether VLAN 0 was
automatically added upon NETDEV_UP and based on that decide whether it
should be deleted upon NETDEV_DOWN, regardless of the state of the
"rx-vlan-filter" feature.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff8880068e3100 (size 256):
comm "ip", pid 384, jiffies 4296130254
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 30 0d 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . 0.............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 81ce31fa):
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2b5/0x340
vlan_vid_add+0x434/0x940
vlan_device_event.cold+0x75/0xa8
notifier_call_chain+0xca/0x150
__dev_notify_flags+0xe3/0x250
rtnl_configure_link+0x193/0x260
rtnl_newlink_create+0x383/0x8e0
__rtnl_newlink+0x22c/0xa40
rtnl_newlink+0x627/0xb00
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fb/0xb70
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350
netlink_unicast+0x426/0x710
netlink_sendmsg+0x75a/0xc20
__sock_sendmsg+0xc1/0x150
____sys_sendmsg+0x5aa/0x7b0
___sys_sendmsg+0xfc/0x180
[2]
kernel BUG at net/8021q/vlan.c:99!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 382 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #61 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:unregister_vlan_dev (net/8021q/vlan.c:99 (discriminator 1))
RSP: 0018:ffff88810badf310 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810da84000 RCX: ffffffffb47ceb9a
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88810e8b43c8
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6cefe80
R10: ffffffffb677f407 R11: ffff88810badf3c0 R12: ffff88810e8b4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810642a5c0 R15: 000000000000017e
FS: 00007f1ff68c20c0(0000) GS:ffff888163a24000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1ff5dad240 CR3: 0000000107e56000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK
---truncated---
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_conn_close().
syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref in tipc_conn_close() during netns
dismantle. [0]
tipc_topsrv_stop() iterates tipc_net(net)->topsrv->conn_idr and calls
tipc_conn_close() for each tipc_conn.
The problem is that tipc_conn_close() is called after releasing the
IDR lock.
At the same time, there might be tipc_conn_recv_work() running and it
could call tipc_conn_close() for the same tipc_conn and release its
last ->kref.
Once we release the IDR lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), there is no
guarantee that the tipc_conn is alive.
Let's hold the ref before releasing the lock and put the ref after
tipc_conn_close() in tipc_topsrv_stop().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888099305a08 by task kworker/u4:3/435
CPU: 0 PID: 435 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.19.204-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1fc/0x2ef lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description.cold+0x54/0x219 mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error.cold+0x8a/0x1b9 mm/kasan/report.c:354
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:412 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x88/0x90 mm/kasan/report.c:433
tipc_conn_close+0x122/0x140 net/tipc/topsrv.c:165
tipc_topsrv_stop net/tipc/topsrv.c:701 [inline]
tipc_topsrv_exit_net+0x27b/0x5c0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:722
ops_exit_list+0xa5/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:153
cleanup_net+0x3b4/0x8b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:553
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Allocated by task 23:
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12f/0x380 mm/slab.c:3625
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:515 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:709 [inline]
tipc_conn_alloc+0x43/0x4f0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:192
tipc_topsrv_accept+0x1b5/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:470
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
Freed by task 23:
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline]
kfree+0xcc/0x210 mm/slab.c:3822
tipc_conn_kref_release net/tipc/topsrv.c:150 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
conn_put+0x2cd/0x3a0 net/tipc/topsrv.c:155
process_one_work+0x864/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1130 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x33f/0x460 kernel/kthread.c:259
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:415
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888099305a00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of
512-byte region [ffff888099305a00, ffff888099305c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000264c140 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88813bff0940 index:0x0
flags: 0xfff00000000100(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000100 ffffea00028b6b88 ffffea0002cd2b08 ffff88813bff0940
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888099305000 0000000100000006 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888099305900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888099305a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888099305a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888099305b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: Fix wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.
Netlink has this pattern in some places
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf)
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_rmem_alloc);
, which has the same problem fixed by commit 5a465a0da13e ("udp:
Fix multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.").
For example, if we set INT_MAX to SO_RCVBUFFORCE, the condition
is always false as the two operands are of int.
Then, a single socket can eat as many skb as possible until OOM
happens, and we can see multiple wraparounds of sk->sk_rmem_alloc.
Let's fix it by using atomic_add_return() and comparing the two
variables as unsigned int.
Before:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
-1668710080 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/293 *
After:
[root@fedora ~]# ss -f netlink
Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port
2147483072 0 rtnl:nl_wraparound/290 *
^
`--- INT_MAX - 576
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Abort __tc_modify_qdisc if parent class does not exist
Lion's patch [1] revealed an ancient bug in the qdisc API.
Whenever a user creates/modifies a qdisc specifying as a parent another
qdisc, the qdisc API will, during grafting, detect that the user is
not trying to attach to a class and reject. However grafting is
performed after qdisc_create (and thus the qdiscs' init callback) is
executed. In qdiscs that eventually call qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog
during init or change (such as fq, hhf, choke, etc), an issue
arises. For example, executing the following commands:
sudo tc qdisc add dev lo root handle a: htb default 2
sudo tc qdisc add dev lo parent a: handle beef fq
Qdiscs such as fq, hhf, choke, etc unconditionally invoke
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() in their control path init() or change() which
then causes a failure to find the child class; however, that does not stop
the unconditional invocation of the assumed child qdisc's qlen_notify with
a null class. All these qdiscs make the assumption that class is non-null.
The solution is ensure that qdisc_leaf() which looks up the parent
class, and is invoked prior to qdisc_create(), should return failure on
not finding the class.
In this patch, we leverage qdisc_leaf to return ERR_PTRs whenever the
parentid doesn't correspond to a class, so that we can detect it
earlier on and abort before qdisc_create is called.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d912cbd7-193b-4269-9857-525bee8bbb6a@gmail.com/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: clip: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in to_atmarpd().
atmarpd is protected by RTNL since commit f3a0592b37b8 ("[ATM]: clip
causes unregister hang").
However, it is not enough because to_atmarpd() is called without RTNL,
especially clip_neigh_solicit() / neigh_ops->solicit() is unsleepable.
Also, there is no RTNL dependency around atmarpd.
Let's use a private mutex and RCU to protect access to atmarpd in
to_atmarpd().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: u_serial: Fix race condition in TTY wakeup
A race condition occurs when gs_start_io() calls either gs_start_rx() or
gs_start_tx(), as those functions briefly drop the port_lock for
usb_ep_queue(). This allows gs_close() and gserial_disconnect() to clear
port.tty and port_usb, respectively.
Use the null-safe TTY Port helper function to wake up TTY.
Example
CPU1: CPU2:
gserial_connect() // lock
gs_close() // await lock
gs_start_rx() // unlock
usb_ep_queue()
gs_close() // lock, reset port.tty and unlock
gs_start_rx() // lock
tty_wakeup() // NPE
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Acquire references on GEM handles for framebuffers
A GEM handle can be released while the GEM buffer object is attached
to a DRM framebuffer. This leads to the release of the dma-buf backing
the buffer object, if any. [1] Trying to use the framebuffer in further
mode-setting operations leads to a segmentation fault. Most easily
happens with driver that use shadow planes for vmap-ing the dma-buf
during a page flip. An example is shown below.
[ 156.791968] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 156.796830] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2255 at drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c:1527 dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[...]
[ 156.942028] RIP: 0010:dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.043420] Call Trace:
[ 157.045898] <TASK>
[ 157.048030] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.052436] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.056836] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1af/0x2c0
[ 157.061253] ? drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.065567] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.069446] ? __warn.cold+0x58/0xe4
[ 157.073061] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.077111] ? report_bug+0x1dd/0x390
[ 157.080842] ? handle_bug+0x5e/0xa0
[ 157.084389] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50
[ 157.088291] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 157.092548] ? dma_buf_vmap+0x224/0x430
[ 157.096663] ? dma_resv_get_singleton+0x6d/0x230
[ 157.101341] ? __pfx_dma_buf_vmap+0x10/0x10
[ 157.105588] ? __pfx_dma_resv_get_singleton+0x10/0x10
[ 157.110697] drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x74/0x710
[ 157.114866] drm_gem_vmap+0xa9/0x1b0
[ 157.118763] drm_gem_vmap_unlocked+0x46/0xa0
[ 157.123086] drm_gem_fb_vmap+0xab/0x300
[ 157.126979] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes.part.0+0x487/0xb10
[ 157.133032] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x19d/0x880
[ 157.137701] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x13d/0x2e0
[ 157.142671] ? drm_atomic_nonblocking_commit+0xa0/0x180
[ 157.147988] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x766/0xe40
[...]
[ 157.346424] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Acquiring GEM handles for the framebuffer's GEM buffer objects prevents
this from happening. The framebuffer's cleanup later puts the handle
references.
Commit 1a148af06000 ("drm/gem-shmem: Use dma_buf from GEM object
instance") triggers the segmentation fault easily by using the dma-buf
field more widely. The underlying issue with reference counting has
been present before.
v2:
- acquire the handle instead of the BO (Christian)
- fix comment style (Christian)
- drop the Fixes tag (Christian)
- rename err_ gotos
- add missing Link tag
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()
Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.
The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.
It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.
Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().
Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.