The ugw-logstop method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to terminate arbitrary processes due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input.
The ugw-logread method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to access arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input.
A vulnerability has been found in cilium ebpf up to 0.21.0. This affects the function loadRawSpec of the file btf/btf.go of the component LoadCollectionSpec/LoadCollectionSpecFromReader. Such manipulation of the argument offset leads to integer overflow. The attack can only be performed from a local environment. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The name of the patch is 533dfc82fd228bfadf42ea7180c39de7d9af47fa. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue.
The bac-scanresult method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.
The ugw-delete-file method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.
The ugw-logstop method allows a remote attacker with user privileges to delete arbitrary local files due to insufficient validation of user-controlled input.
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.