In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xts - Handle EBUSY correctly
As it is xts only handles the special return value of EINPROGRESS,
which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the
request.
However, as the caller of xts may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need
to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged
requests will trigger a use-after-free.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mvpp2_main: fix possible OOB write in mvpp2_ethtool_get_rxnfc()
rules is allocated in ethtool_get_rxnfc and the size is determined by
rule_cnt from user space. So rule_cnt needs to be check before using
rules to avoid OOB writing or NULL pointer dereference.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: processor: Check for null return of devm_kzalloc() in fch_misc_setup()
devm_kzalloc() may fail, clk_data->name might be NULL and will
cause a NULL pointer dereference later.
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib: cpu_rmap: Avoid use after free on rmap->obj array entries
When calling irq_set_affinity_notifier() with NULL at the notify
argument, it will cause freeing of the glue pointer in the
corresponding array entry but will leave the pointer in the array. A
subsequent call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() will try to free this entry again
leading to possible use after free.
Fix that by setting NULL to the array entry and checking that we have
non-zero at the array entry when iterating over the array in
free_irq_cpu_rmap().
The current code does not suffer from this since there are no cases
where irq_set_affinity_notifier(irq, NULL) (note the NULL passed for the
notify arg) is called, followed by a call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() so we
don't hit and issue. Subsequent patches in this series excersize this
flow, hence the required fix.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the
/proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system
firmware update yields a BUG():
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2
Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+)
MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c
CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0
[ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0
LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0
Call Trace:
usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0
__check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380
rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250
proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160
vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0
ksys_write+0x90/0x160
system_call_exception+0x178/0x320
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory
to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must
be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user
access.
[mpe: Trim and indent oops]
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix possible panic during hotplug remove
During hotplug remove it is possible that the update counters work
might be pending, and may run after memory has been freed.
Cancel the update counters work before freeing memory.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp/udp: Fix memleaks of sk and zerocopy skbs with TX timestamp.
syzkaller reported [0] memory leaks of an UDP socket and ZEROCOPY
skbs. We can reproduce the problem with these sequences:
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)
sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING, SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE)
sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROCOPY, 1)
sk.sendto(b'', MSG_ZEROCOPY, ('127.0.0.1', 53))
sk.close()
sendmsg() calls msg_zerocopy_alloc(), which allocates a skb, sets
skb->cb->ubuf.refcnt to 1, and calls sock_hold(). Here, struct
ubuf_info_msgzc indirectly holds a refcnt of the socket. When the
skb is sent, __skb_tstamp_tx() clones it and puts the clone into
the socket's error queue with the TX timestamp.
When the original skb is received locally, skb_copy_ubufs() calls
skb_unclone(), and pskb_expand_head() increments skb->cb->ubuf.refcnt.
This additional count is decremented while freeing the skb, but struct
ubuf_info_msgzc still has a refcnt, so __msg_zerocopy_callback() is
not called.
The last refcnt is not released unless we retrieve the TX timestamped
skb by recvmsg(). Since we clear the error queue in inet_sock_destruct()
after the socket's refcnt reaches 0, there is a circular dependency.
If we close() the socket holding such skbs, we never call sock_put()
and leak the count, sk, and skb.
TCP has the same problem, and commit e0c8bccd40fc ("net: stream:
purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()") tried to fix it
by calling skb_queue_purge() during close(). However, there is a
small chance that skb queued in a qdisc or device could be put
into the error queue after the skb_queue_purge() call.
In __skb_tstamp_tx(), the cloned skb should not have a reference
to the ubuf to remove the circular dependency, but skb_clone() does
not call skb_copy_ubufs() for zerocopy skb. So, we need to call
skb_orphan_frags_rx() for the cloned skb to call skb_copy_ubufs().
[0]:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88800c6d2d00 (size 1152):
comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cd af e8 81 00 00 00 00 ................
02 00 07 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...@............
backtrace:
[<0000000055636812>] sk_prot_alloc+0x64/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2024
[<0000000054d77b7a>] sk_alloc+0x3b/0x800 net/core/sock.c:2083
[<0000000066f3c7e0>] inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:319 [inline]
[<0000000066f3c7e0>] inet_create+0x31e/0xe40 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:245
[<000000009b83af97>] __sock_create+0x2ab/0x550 net/socket.c:1515
[<00000000b9b11231>] sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
[<00000000b9b11231>] __sys_socket+0x138/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
[<000000004fb45142>] __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
[<000000004fb45142>] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
[<000000004fb45142>] __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
[<0000000066999e0e>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<0000000066999e0e>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<0000000017f238c1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888017633a00 (size 240):
comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2d 6d 0c 80 88 ff ff .........-m.....
backtrace:
[<000000002b1c4368>] __alloc_skb+0x229/0x320 net/core/skbuff.c:497
[<00000000143579a6>] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1265 [inline]
[<00000000143579a6>] sock_omalloc+0xaa/0x190 net/core/sock.c:2596
[<00000000be626478>] msg_zerocopy_alloc net/core/skbuff.c:1294 [inline]
[<00000000be626478>]
---truncated---