A security vulnerability has been detected in cskefu up to 8.0.1. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file com/cskefu/cc/controller/resource/MediaController.java of the component Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
Mattermost versions 11.1.x <= 11.1.2, 10.11.x <= 10.11.9, 11.2.x <= 11.2.1 fail to properly validate team membership when processing channel mentions which allows authenticated users to determine the existence of teams and their URL names via posting channel shortlinks and observing the channel_mentions property in the API response. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2025-00563
A vulnerability was identified in ZenTao up to 21.7.8. Affected by this issue is the function delete of the file editor/control.php of the component Committer. Such manipulation of the argument filePath leads to path traversal. Upgrading to version 21.7.9 can resolve this issue. The affected component should be upgraded.
A weakness has been identified in JeecgBoot 3.9.1. This vulnerability affects the function importDocumentFromZip of the file org/jeecg/modules/airag/llm/controller/AiragKnowledgeController.java of the component Retrieval-Augmented Generation. Executing a manipulation can lead to deserialization. The attack can be launched remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}
is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's
name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant
bugs:
*
It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.
This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates
(usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive
information from the system configuration, including even database
passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such
malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were
not fully effective for the email subject.
*
Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were
wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a
placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was
rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the
ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a
ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available
in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the
issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not
impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition
to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could
theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the
attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario
very unlikely under typical conditions.
Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.
Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}
is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's
name for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:
It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.
This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates
(usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive
information from the system configuration, including even database
passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such
malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were
not fully effective for this plugin.
Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg file.
Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}
is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's
name for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:
It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.
This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates
(usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive
information from the system configuration, including even database
passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such
malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were
not fully effective for this plugin.
Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.
A vulnerability was determined in ZenTao up to 21.7.8. Affected by this vulnerability is the function delete of the file editor/control.php of the component Backup Handler. This manipulation of the argument fileName causes path traversal. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.