In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtl818x: Kill URBs before clearing tx status queue
In rtl8187_stop() move the call of usb_kill_anchored_urbs() before clearing
b_tx_status.queue. This change prevents callbacks from using already freed
skb due to anchor was not killed before freeing such skb.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/7 Not tainted 6.15.0 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe+0x21/0xc0 [mac80211]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
rtl8187_tx_cb+0x116/0x150 [rtl8187]
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x9d/0x120
usb_giveback_urb_bh+0xbb/0x140
process_one_work+0x19b/0x3c0
bh_worker+0x1a7/0x210
tasklet_action+0x10/0x30
handle_softirqs+0xf0/0x340
__irq_exit_rcu+0xcd/0xf0
common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0
</IRQ>
Tested on RTL8187BvE device.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all
There is a race condition/UAF in padata_reorder that goes back
to the initial commit. A reference count is taken at the start
of the process in padata_do_parallel, and released at the end in
padata_serial_worker.
This reference count is (and only is) required for padata_replace
to function correctly. If padata_replace is never called then
there is no issue.
In the function padata_reorder which serves as the core of padata,
as soon as padata is added to queue->serial.list, and the associated
spin lock released, that padata may be processed and the reference
count on pd would go away.
Fix this by getting the next padata before the squeue->serial lock
is released.
In order to make this possible, simplify padata_reorder by only
calling it once the next padata arrives.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: reject malicious packets in ipv6_gso_segment()
syzbot was able to craft a packet with very long IPv6 extension headers
leading to an overflow of skb->transport_header.
This 16bit field has a limited range.
Add skb_reset_transport_header_careful() helper and use it
from ipv6_gso_segment()
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5871 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5871 Comm: syz-executor211 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-syzkaller-g7abc678e3084 #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
RIP: 0010:skb_reset_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3032 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ipv6_gso_segment+0x15e2/0x21e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:151
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53
nsh_gso_segment+0x54a/0xe10 net/nsh/nsh.c:110
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x31c/0x640 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x342/0x510 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x857/0x11b0 net/core/dev.c:3950
validate_xmit_skb_list+0x84/0x120 net/core/dev.c:4000
sch_direct_xmit+0xd3/0x4b0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:329
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4102 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x17b6/0x3a70 net/core/dev.c:4679
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data
on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge()
We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might
read uninit data as reported by syzbot.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193
ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline]
ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314
pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379
sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
__release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727
____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566
___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620
__sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug safe
Multiple race conditions existed between the PCIe hotplug driver and the
EEH driver, leading to a variety of kernel oopses of the same general
nature:
<pcie device unplug>
<eeh driver trigger>
<hotplug removal trigger>
<pcie tree reconfiguration>
<eeh recovery next step>
<oops in EEH driver bus iteration loop>
A second class of oops is also seen when the underlying bus disappears
during device recovery.
Refactor the EEH module to be PCI rescan and remove safe. Also clean
up a few minor formatting / readability issues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget : fix use-after-free in composite_dev_cleanup()
1. In func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_os_desc_req_prepare():
if kmalloc fails, the pointer cdev->os_desc_req will be freed but not
set to NULL. Then it will return a failure to the upper-level function.
2. in func configfs_composite_bind() -> composite_dev_cleanup():
it will checks whether cdev->os_desc_req is NULL. If it is not NULL, it
will attempt to use it.This will lead to a use-after-free issue.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0
Read of size 8 at addr 0000004827837a00 by task init/1
CPU: 10 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G O 5.10.97-oh #1
kasan_report+0x188/0x1cc
__asan_load8+0xb4/0xbc
composite_dev_cleanup+0xf4/0x2c0
configfs_composite_bind+0x210/0x7ac
udc_bind_to_driver+0xb4/0x1ec
usb_gadget_probe_driver+0xec/0x21c
gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x264/0x27c
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits
Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a
shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit
quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but
there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size
set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because
of that.
Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable
result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits
set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: Restrict conditions for adding duplicating netems to qdisc tree
netem_enqueue's duplication prevention logic breaks when a netem
resides in a qdisc tree with other netems - this can lead to a
soft lockup and OOM loop in netem_dequeue, as seen in [1].
Ensure that a duplicating netem cannot exist in a tree with other
netems.
Previous approaches suggested in discussions in chronological order:
1) Track duplication status or ttl in the sk_buff struct. Considered
too specific a use case to extend such a struct, though this would
be a resilient fix and address other previous and potential future
DOS bugs like the one described in loopy fun [2].
2) Restrict netem_enqueue recursion depth like in act_mirred with a
per cpu variable. However, netem_dequeue can call enqueue on its
child, and the depth restriction could be bypassed if the child is a
netem.
3) Use the same approach as in 2, but add metadata in netem_skb_cb
to handle the netem_dequeue case and track a packet's involvement
in duplication. This is an overly complex approach, and Jamal
notes that the skb cb can be overwritten to circumvent this
safeguard.
4) Prevent the addition of a netem to a qdisc tree if its ancestral
path contains a netem. However, filters and actions can cause a
packet to change paths when re-enqueued to the root from netem
duplication, leading us to the current solution: prevent a
duplicating netem from inhabiting the same tree as other netems.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/
[2] https://lwn.net/Articles/719297/
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: appletalk: Fix device refcount leak in atrtr_create()
When updating an existing route entry in atrtr_create(), the old device
reference was not being released before assigning the new device,
leading to a device refcount leak. Fix this by calling dev_put() to
release the old device reference before holding the new one.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: clip: Fix memory leak of struct clip_vcc.
ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) allocates struct clip_vcc and set it to
vcc->user_back.
The code assumes that vcc_destroy_socket() passes NULL skb
to vcc->push() when the socket is close()d, and then clip_push()
frees clip_vcc.
However, ioctl(ATMARPD_CTRL) sets NULL to vcc->push() in
atm_init_atmarp(), resulting in memory leak.
Let's serialise two ioctl() by lock_sock() and check vcc->push()
in atm_init_atmarp() to prevent memleak.